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ABSTRACT
As a result of the technological and financial changes in the 
extraction of manganese nodules from the deep-seabed, the nodules have been 
recognized as an alternative source of minerals to land-based sources. 
The commercial interest in the extraction of the nodules is primarily for 
their nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese. Three sources of uncertainty, 
however, have prevented involved consortia from entry into the actual 
production stage. These uncertainties are of a technological, economic, and 
legal nature. In spite of these difficulties, most experts maintain that 
the nodules are likely to be mined before the end of the century.
The choice of the regime to govern the use of a resource, i.e., the 
property right system, determines the efficiency in the use of resource, the 
rate of extraction, and the distribution of economic rent. Both developing 
and developed countries agree with the notion that manganese nodules are a 
part of the "common heritage of mankind," but the regime advocated by each 
group is different. The efficiency oriented free-access regime of the 
developed countries attempts to maximize the economic rent before dealing 
with the distributional problems through fiscal policies. On the other 
hand, the regime supported by the U.N., the Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST), 
reflects the emerging New International Economic Order and seeks more than a 
fair distribution of the economic rent.
Extraction of manganese nodules from the deep-sea is perceived by 
most observers as an opportunity to increase the degree of competitiveness 
in the metal markets. However, the existing knowledge of the technology and
iv
the costs of deep-seabed mining and the historical trend in other industries 
which have gone through similar changes indicate that the utilization of the 
new source of supply may not improve the concentration significantly. 
Several factors are introduced as barriers to entry such as economies of 
scale in production and in financing. In the evaluation of the two 
alternative regimes, most of the entry barriers are shared by both. 
However, since the consortia views the LOST as a legal barrier, the future 
of the sea-bed mining under this regime does not look promising.
v
INTRODUCTION
Minerals are currently obtained from the land-based reserves, but as 
a result of new technology an alternative source could be the sea-bed. 
Manganese nodules are one of the first deep-sea minerals which will be 
exploited in the foreseeable future. The nodules include as many as sixty 
different elements, but their economic value is based on their nickel, 
cobalt, copper, and manganese components. Experts do not agree about the 
magnitude of the resources. A rather conservative estimate is that there 
are five hundred billion tons of manganese nodules lying on the ocean 
floor. The nodules are perceived as an important source to satisfy the 
growing future demand for the minerals. These minerals are needed for the 
production of Industrial goods and they have limited substitutes. The 
United States, a major consumer of the minerals, is interested in the 
extraction of manganese nodules to alleviate its import dependency. Since 
the mid-1970s, a few consortia have been preparing for the mining of the 
nodules from the deep ocean, but three sources of uncertainty have 
prevented them from the entry into the actual production stage. These 
uncertainties are of technological, economic, and legal nature. In spite 
of these difficulties, most experts maintain that the nodules are likely to 
be mined In the early 1990s.
Manganese nodules are common property resources during transition. 
In the past, the vastness of the ocean waters and their large bounties jus­
tified the common ownership system or the complete freedom of the high 
seas. Advances of technology and increases in demand for the minerals in 
recent years have caused instability in the communal ownership system.
2When a common property system can no longer be sustained, it can be 
replaced by one of two alternative regimes; state ownership or private 
ownership. This substitution has been the task of the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea since 1958. Throughout the negotiations, 
two distinct positions emerged which were associated with the developing 
and developed countries. While both groups agree with the notion that 
manganese nodules are a part of the "common heritage of mankind", the legal 
regime advocated by each group is different.
The developing countries support a tightly controlled state owner­
ship regime under the U.N. which reflects the emerging New International 
Economic Order and seeks to obtain a fair distribution of economic rent. 
On the other hand, developed countries argue that production efficiency is 
best served under a free-access regime of private ownership regime. The 
redistributional problems, they claim, can be remedied by a distribution 
policy after the economic rent is maximized. In this context, economic 
rent is defined as the surplus above the full cost of production which 
exists due to the inelasticity of the supply of the nodules. The 1982 Law 
of the Sea Treaty, ratified by about sixty countries so far, supports a 
parallel system of operation by both the private consortia or government 
owned firms and a U.N. Enterprise resembling a state production agency. 
Under the Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST), however, the U.N., through the 
International Seabed Authority (ISA), will impose a relatively strong con­
trol over the activities of the consortium. Some of the developed 
countries, unsatisfied with the LOST, have tried to carry on with their own 
free-access regime by passing national legislations on the exploitation of 
manganese nodules. There have also been attempts by developed countries to 
formulate mini treaties, outside of the U.N., which would harmonize the
3countries' domestic laws on the issue of the nodule mining. Therefore, at 
this point, there are two competing regimes introduced by the U.N. and some 
of the developed countries. Indeed, the choice of the regime to govern the 
use of a resource, i.e., the property right system, is extremely important 
because it determines how efficiently the resources can be used, at what 
rate they are to be used, and how the economic rent is to be distributed.
Extraction of manganese nodules from the deep-sea, depending upon 
the system of property rights governing these resources, is perceived by 
most observers as an opportunity to increase the degree of competitiveness 
in the metal markets by introducing new sources of supply. Currently, the 
cobalt market is dominated by Zaire, the nickel market is under the price 
leadership of Inco Ltd. of Canada, an attempt to organize the copper market 
is being made by the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting 
Countries (CIPEC), and the Soviet Union and South Africa produce about 60% 
of the world output of manganese. The downward trend of metal prices in 
the early 1980s, due to the depressed world economy, has Increased the 
degree of competitiveness in these markets as the producers have tried to 
maintain their market shares. However, it may well be the case that the 
enhancement of competition in the metal markets as a result of mining of 
manganese nodules will not be as significant as predicted. Economies of 
scale in production and in financing of deep-seabed mining are the main 
reasons for this suspicion. Of course, when economies of scale and 
efficiency are the cause of increases in concentration, consumers of the 
metals will gain from the fact that fewer firms will be operating in the 
industry; i.e., if lower prices prevail in the market. The LOST itself,
4because of its production ceiling and technology transfer provisions, is 
viewed by most mining companies as a barrier to entry.
The objective of this dissertation is to review the two feasible 
atlemative regimes to the present common ownership of manganese nodules, 
and to analyze the market structure impact of nodule mining under either of 
the two regimes. First, the significance of manganese nodules as a source 
of minerals in the future is demonstrated. Then, the inherent instability 
of the common property ownership in general, and manganese nodules in 
particular, will be analyzed. The review of the foundations of the law of 
the sea will help one to understand the position of the opponents and 
proponents of the two alternative regimes. The United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea and the consequent parallel regime of LOST and its 
sea-bed mining provisions will also be discussed followed by the policy 
alternatives of the industrialized countries opposing the LOST, especially 
the United States. A knowledge of the market structure of the present 
land-based mining industries of cobalt, nickel, copper, and manganese is 
necessary for the investigation of the market structure impact of manganese 
nodule mining.
As a part of the analysis of the market structure impact of the 
nodule raining, analogies will be drawn from the historical trends in other 
industries. For example, the development of new technologies in the 
commercial aircraft and automobile industries and the consequent increase 
in the concentration in these markets will be compared with the situation 
in the ocean mining where large scale production and heavy capital costs 
are anticipated. Analogies will be drawn between the extraction of 
offshore oil and gas, where the state has a monopoly over the coastal 
sea-bed resources, and the utilization of manganese nodules as a common
5property resource. There is evidence that the degree of concentration has 
increased in the petroleum industry since 1955. This has coincided with 
the time period when the share of offshore production of oil has increased. 
The rise in concentration might have been due to the higher capital costs 
associated with offshore mining. It will be examined whether deep-sea 
mining shares the characteristics of the type of technological advances 
that occurred in these industries. If so, it is likely that, in spite of 
the increase in the extractable sources of supply of the minerals, no major 
changes in the degree of concentration in the market for the metals will be 
observed. Since the sea-bed producers of the metals will be mainly from 
the industrialized countries, the market power among the producers of the 
minerals from the developing countries and the industrialized countries 
will be more balanced. However, there are potential benefits to be enjoyed 
by the consumers of the metals if metal prices drop as a result of sea-bed 
mining. Finally, considering these market structure studies, the choice of 
the regime to exploit the nodules will be re-examined and some policy 
recommendations will be offered.
CHAPTER II
DISCOVERY OF A NEW RESOURCE BASE: MANGANESE NODULES
The discovery of valuable minerals, later known as manganese nodules 
or polymetallic nodules, on the ocean floor goes back to 1873 when H.M.S. 
Challenger, a British oceanographic vessel was assigned to gather 
comprehensive data about the oceans. In the 1950s, John Mero raised the 
curiosity of the scientific community about the potentials of manganese 
nodules to substitute for land-based sources. In his early and optimistic 
views, Mero believed that there are 1.5 trillion tons of polymetallic 
nodules on the floor of the Pacific Ocean alone. He also maintained that 
the capital expenditures in ocean mining, in comparison with the land-based 
mining, would be much lower. Given the large quantity of the potentially 
available resources and the low production costs, he predicted a total 
replacement of land based mining by ocean mining with the prices dropping 
to about 1/10 of their level before ocean mining (Archer, 1981).
Interest in manganese nodules became widespread in the 1960s, as 
prices of metals continued rising and technology of ocean mining was 
developing. The new climate in the international relations, which gave 
more negotiating power to the developing countries, resulted in the 
extraction of manganese nodules becoming a world issue. Since 1965, 
development of modern sampling methods have made it possible for the 
scientists to explore the oceans in more detail and provide a more accurate 
and objective assessment of the resources. In the last two decades, a 
number of private and government organizations have been engaged in 
exploratory research activities on manganese nodules resources. Recently, 
however, the private sector has refused to share . the results of its
7research activities with the public because of the fear of dissipating 
their technical knowledge on manganese nodules.
Manganese nodules are commonly defined as potato-sized metallic 
nodules composed of fine-grained oxide material which are distributed 
widely over the floor of the ocean. But, Black (1980) explains that 
manganese nodules actually occur in different shapes such as spheres, 
oblate spheriods, disks, stains, or crusts on almost any hard layer on the 
ocean floor. The size of manganese nodules also varies from infinitely 
small to several tons. Some other sources distinguish between manganese 
nodules and manganese crust where manganese crust is just a layer coating 
the surface of the objects on the ocean floor or the ocean floor itself 
(U.N, 1983). So far, about 60 chemical elements have been discovered in 
manganese nodules. The concentration of some of these elements in 
manganese nodules is believed to be much higher than their terrestrial 
sources (McKelvey, et al., 1983), Among the important metals contained in 
manganese nodules are: cadimium, tin, chromium, Iron, vanadiums, titanium,
and molybdenum. Their economic value, however, is based on their nickel, 
copper, cobalt, and manganese components.
There are several theories explaining the origins of the nodules. 
Biogenic materials and nutrients, however, are believed to play a major 
role in the concentration of the metals in the nodules above the ocean's 
background abundance levels (Black, 1980). Variations in grades and 
abundance are the result of differences in the initial processes as well as 
the subsequent physical and chemical occurrence to the nodules (Pearson, 
1975). Geological factors such as terrigenous sediments and high 
sedimentation rates are not conducive to nodule growth. Since these are 
characteristics of water near shores, manganese nodules are not expected to
8be found in these areas (U.N. , 1982). In the deep ocean it appears that 
metal content increases non-linearly with depth. Experts hold that there 
seems to be a threshold depth of nearly 2,900 to 3,000 meters, where 
combined nickel and copper contents are usually lower than 1% above this 
threshold, and cobalt content is usually lower than .6% below it. 
Correlation between manganese content and depth is insignificant (McKelvey, 
et al., 1983).
Since Mero's early writings there have been enormous discrepancies 
in the estimates of the magnitude of the nodule resources. Most scientists 
now maintain that Mero's estimates were gross overestimations (U.N., 1982). 
Archer (1981) holds that the total quantity of nodules in all oceans is 
more likely to be in the neighborhood of five hundred billion tons (wet) —  
about three times less than Mero's early estimates. According to these 
figures, Archer states that only one-fifth of the total world nodules are 
economically recoverable in the first generation of deep-ocean mining 
operations; recoverable reserves of nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese 
contained in manganese nodules are nearly equal to the recoverable reserves 
on land.
In spite of the disagreements about the magnitude of the world 
reserves of manganese nodules, experts unanimously agree that the richest 
deposits are found on the seabed of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans 
(McKelvey, et al. , 1983; Frazer in Kildow, 1980; Hillman, 1983; and Levy, 
et al., 1984). Several other nodule rich areas are also found in the 
Indian Ocean. Currently, however, attention of the companies interested in 
the mining of manganese nodules and research institutes is focused on the 
Clarion-Clipperton zone located in the Pacific Ocean, northeast of the 
equator, where the largest nodules deposits averaging 1.8 percent or more
9of combined nickel and copper were discovered. Scientists have also found 
platinum in the samples taken from the area. Generally speaking, the
average grade of nodules in the most promising deposits surveyed is 1.3%
nickel, 1.1% copper, .24% cobalt, and 27% manganese.
There are two sources of data for the estimates of manganese nodules 
availability: public and proprietory. Most of the estimates made recently
are based on the public data bases, notable the World Ocean Sediment Data 
Bank at Scripps Institution of Oceanography where the relevant data are
updated every six months. A United Nations report on the "Assessment of
Manganese Nodule Sources: The Data and Methodologies" published in 1982,
concentrating on the Scripps' data bank, evaluated the Scripps1 data
reliability and representativeness as well as the sampling methods
employed. The U.N. report questions the reliability of the data on the 
occurrence of manganese nodules. First, there are only 1148 stations 
gathering samples in all oceans. Second, the distribution of the location 
of the samples is biased towards the North Pacific Ocean and
Clarion-Clipperton Zone. Third, the chemical analysis in the public data 
base is not the best for resource evaluation. Furthermore, the methods of 
sampling are uncertain. The report also points out that the samples may 
not represent the whole population of the nodules because manganese nodules 
are not homogeneous in their composition. Different layers of the nodules 
have different chemical compositions. The U.N, document indicates that the 
assumption made by most scientists that abundance and grade are two 
independent variables is erroneous. This argument is based on Menard and 
Frazer's article (1978) which uses public data on the Pacific Ocean to 
determine that the correlation coefficient between abundance and grade is 
-.43, at the 99.9% confidence level. Menard and Frazer have concluded that
10
the assumption of independency between the two variables can lead to an 
overestimation of about 40% in sma'ller areas and up to 500% in larger areas 
under Investigation. However, the significance of such error is downplayed 
by Archer (1981) and McKelvey, et al. (1979) arguing that the inverse 
relationship demonstrated by Menard and Frazer has been weak. Finally, the 
U.N. report reviews the three basic methods of estimating global resources. 
The first method is the Global Estimator which assumes the available data 
are representative of the whole ocean floor. The second method is the 
Prime Area Estimator that after identification of the high-potential areas 
on the basis of available data, and geological theories and evidence 
assumes that the parameters of one high-potential area are usable in a 
similar area. Both of these methods consider grade and abundance as 
independent variables. The last method, Grid Estimator, relies only on the 
available data, making no assumptions about the grade and abundance 
relationship. The report continues that while all three methods are 
applied in the estimates of nodule resources, most of the recent studies 
have focused only on the Clarion-Clipperton Zone which is already known as 
the area of the oceans with the richest manganese nodule deposits. Given 
all the imperfections and biases in gathering the public data, the U.N. 
report views these data as speculations and urges the world to make the 
evaluation of mineral resources of the oceans an international undertaking.
Besides manganese nodules, another potentially rich source of 
minerals in the ocean has been discovered recently. Large areas covered 
with polymetallic sulfides have been found near volcanic hot springs, 
mostly along the continental shelf in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and 
in the Red Sea (Bandow, 1982; Brooks, 1982; and Hanson, 1983). These 
deposits contain copper, zinc, silver, and manganese in addition to sulfur.
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Experts believe that most of these discoveries are too deep to be mined 
with present technology, but they are important resources for the future 
(The New York Times, Sept. 23, 1983), However, Metal Bulletin Monthly
reports that commercial mining of the Red Sea by Preussag Company within 
the framework of a joint Saudi-Sudan commission is likely to begin before 
the end of the decade (Manser, 1981).
Since the mid-1970s, multinational corporations have been preparing 
for the mining of manganese nodules from the deep ocean, but three sources 
of uncertainty have prevented them.from entry into the actual production 
stage. These uncertainties are of technological, economic, and legal 
nature.
1. Technological Uncertainty
Technology of ocean mining has not been tried on a large scale basis 
yet, so its application is uncertain. It is generally agreed, however,
that the state of knowledge in ocean mining is advanced enough to make the
exploitation of manganese nodules technologically feasible. The greatest 
unknown is the economic feasibility of ocean mining. There are four stages 
in the extraction of ores from manganese nodules which are essentially the 
same as in land-based mining. They are: a) prospecting and exploring, b)
mining, c) transporting, and d) processing. In the prospecting stage, mine 
sites are identified and selected. The purpose of prospecting is to 
identify the areas of the sea-bed with the richest manganese nodule
deposits. This information collecting task which covers a large part of 
the oceans utilizes devices such as precision depth recorders, television 
cameras, or side-scan sonars. Samples of the nodules are taken and a
topographic map of the area is prepared. The ore content of the nodules 
and the mineral content of the deposits are investigated and their economic
12
values are estimated in the exploring phase. Frazer (in Kildow, 1980) has 
estimated the economically producible resources for the first generation of 
nodule mining to be 4-15 billion metric tons. These are the resources that 
satisfy the grade and abundance requirements for the first generation of 
mining, but they are not available for commercial extraction only because 
of legal or political constraints. The amount of metals recovered from 
these deposits depends on the mining efficiency, which is defined as the
percentage of the ore in the rocks brought to the surface. With a 24%
mining efficiency and a production requirement of 75 million dry tons for 
each mine site, Frazer believes that the deposits of Clarion and
Cllpperton, which are the producible resources of the first generation of
mining, are sufficient for the establishment of between 9 and 34 mine
sites. This area, at the 24% mining efficiency rate, can produce 8 to 28
million tons of nickel, 6 to 23 million tons of copper, 1.0 to 3.5 million
tons of cobalt, and 144 to 530 million tons of manganese. In addition to
the 4 to 15 million metric tons of manganese available for the first 
generation of mining, Frazer believes that there are 5 to 47 billion tons 
of producible nodules which are not yet explored. Frazer estimates that 
the subraarglnal nodule resources which might be economically mined in the 
next century to total 100 to 200 billion metric tons.
The main problem in the mining stage, is bringing the nodules from 
the depths of thousands of meters to the surface. There are two major 
mining systems that have been tested by the large ocean mining consortia. 
One mining technique is the continuous-line-bucket system which utilizes 
drag buckets attached at regular intervals to scoop-up the nodules from the 
sea-bed. The advocates of the continuous-line-bucket system cite its 
simplicity and its relatively low capital cost requirements. The
13
disadvantages of this system are potential tangling of the bucket line 
assembly and relatively low nodule recovery achieved by it. A Japanese 
consortium, Sumitamo, invented this technique and a French consortium, 
CNEXO, tested it further. This system is almost completely developed. The 
second mining system utilizes hydraulic pressure and a pipe which sucks up 
the nodules. This method has been successfully tested by the INCO and 
DeepSea Ventures Consortia in 1978.
In the transporting stage, a slurry pipeline is used to send the 
nodules from the stationary mining vessel to the transport carrier. After 
the nodules are brought to the surface by the mining vessel, a relatively 
large ore carrier is needed to transport the nodules to the ports. When 
the nodules reach the land the final stage of the operation begins. At 
this stage, nodules are processed to recover nickel, cobalt, copper, and 
manganese.
Several processing methods have been suggested for the recovery of 
the valuable metals from manganese nodules. Generally speaking, nodule 
processing is similar to nickel laterites processing from the land-based 
sources. Four methods of nodule processing considered more promising have 
been tested by the consortia. INCO has used a smelting and sulfuric acid 
leach process by which copper, nickel, cobalt, and ferromanganese alloy can 
be recovered. The advantage of the INCO's method is that nearly all the 
manganese and most of the iron, in addition to the other three metals, can 
be recovered to produce ferromanganese. The disadvantage of this method, 
however, is its high energy requirements. The Kennecott has tested another 
method called the cuprion ammoniacal leach process technique. With this 
technique only copper, nickel, and cobalt can be recovered. But, there are 
a few advantages in this system such as relatively low energy requirements,
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limited use of corrosive and highly toxic reagents, and most reagents being 
either inexpensive or recyclable. Manganese can also be recovered in this 
method; but significant changes in the material handling and process design 
would be needed, and energy requirements would be higher. With some minor 
changes in this method, recovery of molybdenum is also possible.
The third method of processing has been tested by DeepSea Ventures 
as well as by Union Miniere. Their processing technique involves leaching 
the nodules with hydrochloric acid so that all of the four major metals as 
well as molybdenum can be recovered. The main problem in this technique is 
a high consumption of energy. But, the Union Miniere is reported to have 
made some modifications in the processing system to decrease the severity 
of this problem. The fourth technique utilizes a high-temperature sulfuric 
acid leach process which is under investigation in European laboratories. 
The limited information available on this technique indicates that copper, 
nickel, and cobalt are the products of this system. One of the drawbacks 
of this process is that it generates a large amount of waste from the 
disposal of spent sulfate. With some modifications in the system, however, 
ammonium sulfate can be purified and sold as fertilizer. Most studies are 
considering a 3-million ton nodules per year feed rate operation (Haynes, 
et al., 1983; Black, 1980; Hillman, 1983; Clark, et al., 1981; and 
Khalafalla and Pahlman, 1981).
The process of nodule recovery is expected to have some adverse 
environmental impacts on the oceans. But, due to the insufficiency of 
scientific information, very little is known about the extent of probable 
disruptions to the affected areas of the ocean environment. It is known 
that, for example, the scraping or sucking technique applied in mining 
nodules will kill the bottom-dwelling organisms (Barnes in Johnston, 1981).
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Black (1980) has estimated the environmental damages on the land which 
occurs basically as a result of the process of nodules. Depending on the 
processing technique, the rate of extraction, and the form of waste 
disposal used, nodule plants generate wastes accumulating at a rate of 20 
acres per year for a plant recovering four metals. If three metals are 
recovered, the rate of accumulation of wastes Increases to 100 acres per 
year. Black assumes a 40-foot depth for the waste disposal sites. But, 
waste disposal is also a major problem for the land-based mining. Black's 
statistics indicate that the mineral industry of the U.S. alone discards 
about 1.5 billion tons of solid waste material each year. Approximately 
40% of the U.S. waste materials are in tailing form which require enclosure 
to prevent air and water pollution. Black estimates the rate of 
accumulation of the tailing at 26,000 acres per year, assuming again a 
40-foot depth for the disposal site. According to these calculations, 
Black concludes that the impact of a single nodule processing plant waste 
on land would be relatively insignificant, less than .5% in comparison with 
the total tailing wastes in the U.S. Barnes cites some experts suggesting 
that processing of the nodules at sea offers a better solution to the 
pollution problems than processing on land. Arguments such as these have 
led some to note that deep-sea mining is likely to cause far less 
environmental damages than land-based mining (Logue and Johnson in Amacher 
and Sweeny, 1976; and Jones, 1971).
2. Economic Uncertainty
In spite of the existence of massive reserves of manganese nodules 
and the technological feasibility of extracting them, entrepreneurs will 
lack incentive to invest in commercial production if they are uncertain of 
a sufficient capturable profit. Of course, extraction of resources from
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offshore Is not new. Oil has been produced from the offshore sources since 
the 1940s. In 1980 the value of the world offshore oil output was $30 
billion (Bandow, 1982). Offshore oil production has continuously increased 
and moved into deeper waters as the price of oil has risen and cost of 
drilling has fallen. While the potential for deepsea drilling of oil 
exists, no production has taken place yet. Hard-mineral resources of the 
sea, particularly sand and gravel, have also been utilized for many years. 
Bandow estimates the value of the world hard-mineral production at roughly 
$4 billion in 1980.
Some experts have expressed doubts, especially in recent years, 
about the economic feasibility of mining manganese nodules from the deep 
sea. The world wide recession and the consequent decline in metal demand 
and prices have caused some of the 1970's projections to look overly 
optimistic. For example, Pearson's 1975 forecast, a rather outdated one by 
now, projected a 170% increase in the world demand for minerals by the year 
2000 and a 250% increase by 2020, based on a forecasted world population of 
9 billion in 2020. Pearson's forecast is also based on the assumption that 
higher standards of living, in time, will cause greater demand for raw 
materials. The MIT report by Nyhart in 1978 also was optimistic about the 
future of seabed mining. The report indicates that with the unchanged 
present reserves of the world, by the year 2000, projected world demand 
will have used up 48% of the presently known world cobalt reserves, 76% of 
the proven reserves of copper, and 48% of the proven reserves of nickel. 
However, since 1979, the downward trend in the estimates of demand growth 
for minerals indicates that unless the world economy starts to grow at a 
faster rate before 1990, an economic need for deep-sea mining of manganese 
nodules is not likely in this century (Farr, 1982). Farr, who has accepted
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this conclusion, has also emphasized the role of the developing countries 
in the changes of demand for minerals in the future because of the faster 
rate of growth in their population as well as their economy. He believes 
that the sheer weight of number of people in the Third World will, by the 
year 2000, produce a significant shift in the pattern of demand from the 
industrialized world towards the developing world. During 1971-1975 
period, the Third World countries accounted for 14% of the world steel con­
sumption. Farr's estimates show their share of steel consumption would 
increase to 27-29% by the end of the century. Given the slow rate of eco­
nomic growth in the industrialized countries and increasing interdependence 
of the developed and the Third World economies, Farr seems to suggest that
it is the demand from the developing countries that can lead to a high
potential growth in the world consumption of minerals and make deep-sea 
mining attractive before the end of this century.
Along with the worsening of the mineral demand forecasts, the cost
estimates for nodule mining have been increasing. Consequently, there has 
been a continuous drop in the estimated rate of return associated with 
deep-sea mining. In 1978, the MIT Sea Grant Program undertook a detailed 
study of cost estimates, projected cash flows, and economic return to deep 
seabed mining operations. The case study model was a five-phase mining 
operation including prospecting, exploration, mining, transportation, and 
processing. The mining operation was only related to the extraction of 
nickel, copper, and cobalt; therefore, manganese was excluded.* The MIT
Some experts believe that, at present, manganese is not likely to 
be recovered from the deep ocean because the pure manganese from the 
nodules is not thought to be competitive with ferromanganese from 
terrestrial sources (Adams, 1980). Adams reports that only one of the 
mining consortia has proposed recovery of the manganese.
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report concluded that investment in nodule production would yield an in­
ternal rate of return of 18.12 which would be sensitive to metal prices, 
costs, and time lags between investment and the start of the operations 
(Nyhart, 1978).
The MIT Model has been extensively used, criticized, and praised. 
Adams refers to some projected rates of return as high as 50 to 100 
percent; suggesting that a substantial tax or royalties can be applied by 
the ISA without complete elimination of private incentives to develop the 
nodules (Adams, 1980), He, however, gives no citations for this claim. 
The rate of return noted by Adams seems to be extremely optimistic. 
Johnson and Logue (1976), sharing Adam's optimism, also considered deep sea 
mining a profitable business.
Flipse, heading a research group at Texas A&M, on the other hand, 
studied a three metal case similar to the MIT case but he presents a rather 
pessimistic outlook of the ocean mining. Flipse's base case provides a 
discouraging internal rate of return of 7.05 percent. His alternative 
cases consider changes of the scale of operation, variations in the prices 
of metals and delays in the commercial production. As a result, the rate 
of return varies between 4.5 to about 9 percent. He eventually concludes 
that early deep ocean mining will depend upon the effective marketing of at 
least some of the manganese content of the nodules. Since ocean mining is 
a capital intensive operation, Flipse maintains that high interest rates, 
business recession, and political uncertainty are the major obstacles in 
extracting resources (Flipse, 1982). Manser also believes that manganese 
will be crucial to the competitiveness of deep sea mining, despite the fact 
that nickel and cobalt will provide the bulk of revenue (Mauser, 1981).
A study sponsored by.the U.S. Geological Survey estimated a possible 
return on seabed mining of between 28 and 32 percent (Bandow, 1982).
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However, calculations of Tinsley, vice president of the mining division of 
Central Bank of Chicago, result in a return on investment of only 12.8 to 
15 percent. Tinsley noted that a rate of return as high as 30 percent will 
be necessary to attract investment (Bandow, 1982). Finally, financial 
analysis of Hillman in 1983 has predicted a return of 2.7-6.0 percent which 
is one of the lowest in recent years. According to Hillman's calculations, 
inclusion of ferromanganese to the operation will even lower the return 
rate.
Current economic conditions are not too encouraging for the develop­
ment of deep sea mining industry; but, in the long run, there might be 
sufficient economic incentives. First, metal prices are expected to rise 
along with the revival of the world economy. Moreover, as the more econom­
ical land-based mineral deposits are mined out, the quality of the remain­
ing ore is steadily falling and the new deposits are deeper and more 
expensive to extract. For example, comparisons are made for the capital 
costs per annual ton of new production of nickel from land-based sources
versus sea-bed sources. The cost of new land-based mining of nickel is
proven to be more than twice as high as the sea-bed mining (Davis and
Archer in Larsen, 1982). This is because of the decline in the sulphide
sources of nickel on land and the increasing reliance on the laterite 
sources which are more costly to extract (Sibley,1983). Thus, the price of 
metals will increase over time, causing, at the margin, substitution of 
sea-bed mining for land-based mining.
3. Legal Uncertainty
The question of the ownership of the manganese nodules and the legal 
regime governing their extraction and distribution of the benefits has 
created another obstacle in deepsea mining. On one hand, the LOST, signed
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by most members of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea but 
not ratified yet, imposes a rather restrictive and demanding regime on the 
exportation of the minerals. The LOST regime is believed by some to be 
"preventive" because of many restrictions placed on sea-bed mining such as 
production control, transfer technology requirements, taxes and fees, and 
pollution control. On the other hand, a free-access regime is advocated 
mainly by the U.S. and sanctioned through domestic legislation and mini 
treaties. This regime, referred to by some as a "compensatory" regime, 
allows for redistribtuion of economic rent from sea-bed mining, but it 
opposes the institution of any restriction on sea-bed production of 
manganese nodules. The former regime limits the activities of the mining 
companies, but it provides them with a widespread recognition of their 
exclusive rights to exploit a minesite. The latter regime, alternatively, 
grants freedom of activities to the mining firms; but .The right of the 
firms to engage in the production of manganese nodules is not widely 
recognized unless mini treaties are successful. The legal uncertainty 
involved in deep seabed mining would make it difficult for the companies to 
secure bank loans to finance their production activities. In addition to 
the financing problem, most of the firms are not willing to extract nodules 
under the LOST because of its restrictions.
Coal Gassification
Before speculating on the future of manganese nodule mining, perhaps 
some precautionary lessons can be learned from the synthetic or substitute 
natural gas controversy in the 1970s. Conversion of coal into gas was not 
a new idea or technology at this time. In fact, producing gas from coal 
for illumination and cooking purposes had been popular in the U.S. from the
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early 1820s till the early 1940s, when natural gas became easily and 
cheaply available through distribution pipelines. During this period, 
gashouses were operating at a small scale. In Germany during World War II 
and in South Africa in the 1970s, commercial coal gasification took place 
in a relatively large-scale. The renewed interest in coal gasification in 
the U.S. in 1970s, however, was because of the substantial increase in the 
price of natural gas and the realization of the insecurity in dependency on 
foreign suppliers. At this time, there was also a growing awareness about 
depletabllity of natural gas. Where the U.S. had limited reserves of 
natural gas, coal reserves were abundant. In the light of these facts, 
many energy companies considered commercial conversion of coal into gas on 
a very large scale.
After the preliminary studies, the idea of coal gasification lost 
its attractiveness. Ironically, the same factors that have made manganese 
nodule mining a questionable venture created doubts about large-scale coal 
gasification operations in the U.S., and finally led to the indefinite 
abandonment of the Investment project plans. Technological uncertainty 
arose when the performance characteristics of different large-scale 
processing techniques were questioned. There were also some institutional 
and legal issues in regard to the financiers for the producers' invest­
ments, pipeline companies, environmental regulations, changes in the 
natural gas supply industry, and etc. But, the most significant source of 
discouragement was the economic feasibility of the operation. On one hand, 
the rising price of natural gas that had stimulated the renewed interest in 
coal gasification was dampened. On the other hand, coal gasification lost 
its cost competitiveness with natural gas. Like manganese nodule mining, 
conversion of coal to gas requires heavy initial capital investment.
During the 1970s, capital cost estimates for coal gasification were 
continuously revised. Several factors contributed to the increasing trend 
in the estimated costs including: inflation in general, increases in the
construction costs above the general rate of inflation, process changes, 
and improvements in cost estimation methods. Actually, rising cost 
estimates has been common among the new technology plants in the last two 
decades.
Prospects for Manganese Nodules
The uncertainties surrounding the deep-sea mining of manganese 
nodules that have caused the postponement of extraction of these resources 
are not likely to last long. In fact, a few multinational consortia have 
gone through the exploration stage and have tested their technologies in 
pilot studies. Based on Adam’s 1980 computations, production of nodule 
mining could begin with six operations in 1985 and the number of mining 
operations could approach twelve by 1995 and twenty by the year 2000. 
These computations conform with Johnson's (1976). The more recent studies 
indicate that the number and the timing of deep ocean mining depends on the 
rate of growth of the world demand for manganese. This demand in 1995, is 
believed to be high enough to stimulate the start of nodule mining; and by 
the end of the century we can expect between 2-5 seabed mining operations 
to be running (Lenable, 1981; and Manser, 1981).
Some of the 1980s research has put more emphasis on the insecurity 
of the sources of supply of metals rather than the economic incentives of 
miners as a reason to proceed with ocean mining. The Industrialized 
countries are concerned about decreasing their import reliance on countries 
such as Zaire, which are potentially unstable, and they are concerned about 
the possibility of the potential cartels in some of the metal markets
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(Langevad, 1983). For instance» in 1983, the United States imported 99% of 
its manganese consumption, 96% of its cobalt consumption, 77% of its nickel 
consumption, and 17% of its copper consumption. The major exporters of 
these metals to the U.S. were South Africa with 33%, Zaire with 37%, Canada 
with 41%, and Chile with 34% respectively (Mineral Commodity Summaries, 
1984). The importance of nodule mining to countries such as the U.S. is 
apparent when only one nodule mining venture could satisfy the following 
projections of United States' demand in 1990: 12-13% for nickel, 31-41%
for cobalt, and 10% for manganese (Hillman, 1983).
Even if the recent skepticism about mineral potentials of the deep
seabed manganese nodules and the cost of mining them has decreased the
relative importance of these resources, the issue of how to manage a common
property resource in transition remains unanswered. Rationally, common 
property resources are unstable and, at certain stages, the need to 
regulate their use arises. The choice of the regime to govern the 
resource, i.e., the property right system, would determine how efficiently 
the resources are used, at what rate they are used, and how the economic 
rent is distributed. Experts believe that the new source of supply, 
particularly if it is being utilized under a private property right system, 
would lead to a major decrease in concentration in the markets for the 
extracted metals. The enhancement of competition in the metal markets as a 
result of mining of manganese nodules under each of the two basic 
alternatives will be investigated in Chapter Nine.
CHAPTER III 
THE CHANGING COMMON PROPERTY SYSTEM 
Before dealing with the specific issue of the management of man­
ganese nodules resources,- a review of some of the theoretical arguments 
regarding development of property right systems is needed. Three forms of 
property rights, or ownership systems, should be distinguished: communal,
private, and state. Communal ownership refers to a system in which all 
members of the community can exercise their rights; and the state or indi­
vidual citizens are denied the right to Interfere with anybody's exercise 
of communally-owned rights. In the private ownership system the society 
recognizes the exclusive right of the owner to the property. In both 
cases, however, properties, by extension or directly, are individual 
rights. But, in the state ownership system, the state, following some ac­
cepted political procedures, determines who can use the state-owned 
property. In this method, the assets are held by the state and the citi­
zens will not have a direct right to use them (Demsetz, 1967; Macpherson, 
1975). Of course, in all three cases, what is owned is the socially 
recognized rights of action or the rights to use the resources.
In this context, communal ownership provides the right to use the 
resource on the first-come, first-served basis, as long as the Individual 
continues the use of the resource (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). Communal 
ownership is usually associated with, or supervised by, the state —  such 
as public parks, and public roads. The fact that common property 
resource, like private ones, needs governance has been recognized since 
Aristotle (Haefele, 1974).
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Externalities In Communal Ownership
The difficulty, however, with maintaining the communal ownership is 
its tendency to measure inaccurately the costs or benefits associated with 
the use of the resource. This concept is known as "externality" in 
economics and its origin is traced back to Pigou’s analysis of "economic 
efficiency" which requires the equality of social and private net product. 
Pigou argued that any divergence between social and private product 
prevents obtaining economic efficiency (Pigou, 1962; Cheung, 1970; and 
Umbeck, 1981), To illustrate his point, Pigou assumed two roads connecting 
two locations, where one road had better characteristics, in the view of 
the truck drivers, than the other. As a result, the better road would face 
an overcrowding problem while the less preferred road was not being used 
much. Assuming no costs to the marginal truck for being transferred from 
the preferred road to the less preferred road, the reallocation of trucks 
would make the ones using the preferred road better off. Then, to achieve
a better allocation of resources, Pigou suggested a directly forced 
reallocation method between the two roads by the government, or an indirect 
reallocation system through the imposition of taxes on the users of the 
better road.
While there were objections to the simple example of Pigou, it led 
to the development of the concept of externality and its relation with the 
instability of the communal ownership systems (Knight, 1924; Coase, 1960; 
Demsetz, 1967; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; and Cheung, 1970). The basic 
argument is that, if the cost of negotiating and policing contracts is 
zero, externalities will be internalized by changing a communal ownership 
system to either private or state ownership system. To demonstrate this 
point, in one of his examples, Demsetz discusses the problem of land
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ownership. He assumes land is a communally owned resource on which every 
one has the right to hunt, to till, and to mine. But in this form of 
ownership one neglects the costs associated with his exercise of communal 
rights. While one is trying to maximize the value of his communal rights 
he tends to over-hunt and over-use the land because the costs of his action 
is dissipated among the others. This results in the extinction of animal 
species and the reduction of the productivity of the soil. However, if 
land is privately owned by a person, he maximizes his present value by 
considering the costs and benefits of his decisions on the future 
alternatives he has available. Demsetz concludes from this example that 
the private owner of the land acts as a wealth maximizing broker who takes 
into account the competing present and future uses.
Demsetz also believes that the instability of communal ownership 
systems worsens if the value of the communally owned resource increases. 
This can happen either by changes of technology or in demand. His example 
of hunting by Indians illustrates his point where increases in the value of 
furs due to the start of fur trade caused a boost in hunting activities and 
threatened the stock of animals. Later, the substitution of private rights 
in land for the freedom of hunting land remedied the problem. There are 
several other empirical evidences indicating the wide application of 
Demsetz's theory of the instability of communal ownership systems. The 
California Gold Rush (Umbeck, 1981), English agricultural system (Eckert, 
1979), Great Plains in the U.S. (Anderson and Hill, 1975), and development 
of radio in the U.S. (Coase, 1959) are all historical examples of the 
conversion of communal ownership to private property rights.
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Externalities in the Oceans
For centuries, the vastness of the ocean waters and the immensity of 
their bounties justified the complete freedom of the high seas. Common 
ownership did not generate problems as long as demand for ocean uses was 
small relative to supply. As time passed, however, it became clear that 
overcrowding in the use of resources applies even to the oceans. Colberg 
(1971) cites an interesting consequence of the common property nature of 
the ocean. His example is about the U.S. Northern lobster industry where 
continuous high demand for the "Maine lobster" caused a large number of 
fishermen to set traps in the best producing areas. The U.S. Bureau of 
Commercial Fisheries claimed that the multitude of traps had decreased the 
total number of lobsters caught in comparison with the situation where a 
fewer number of traps was used. In this case, given the "common-pool" 
characteristic of the resource, competitive private market activity leads 
to inefficient use of the resource. This is clearly an example of mlsallo- 
cation of resources because if some of the excess labor and capital are 
shifted to another industry, the total production of lobster and the output 
of the other industry will both rise. Of course, the number of lobsters 
caught by each remaining fisherman will increase as well. These commercial 
aspects of resource exploitation create divergence between private and 
social costs and benefits. To eliminate the resulting "market failure" and 
to achieve a fully efficient economic outcome, some form of collective 
agreement among producers or government action is required.
Economists recognize that when the value of better defined property 
rights exceeds the cost of their establishment the ownership structure 
tends to change. In the high seas, changes in technologies accompanied by 
changes in ocean demand and increasing scarcity of resources from the land
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created the incentives for the most recent maritime "enclosure movement" 
(Eckert, 1979). Now, the right of coastal states to the resources of the 
Continental Shelf is recognized. However, the question of ownership of the 
seabed is not settled yet.
Externalities in Sea-Bed Mining
There are three sources of externalities in sea-bed mining: "free­
rider" problem, "common pool" problem, and "pollution" problem. The first 
one claims that nodule exploitation would tend to be too low because of the 
"free-rider" problem, the second one claims that investment will be too 
great due to the "common-pool" problem, and the third one also claims that 
investment will be too great because of "pollution" problem. The first two 
arguments favor the need for a change in the present common ownership
structure of the high seas in regard to sea-bed mining. The third argument
is relevant to any property right system in the absence of some regulations 
to internalize the externalities of pollution.
The "free-rider" argument refers to the reluctance of a miner to 
engage in the optimal degree of searching and dredging since the benefits 
of these investments will not return to him exclusively in the absence of 
property rights. Expensive search activities of the exploratory miner in 
finding valuable and technically appropriate deposits will become public 
knowledge once the initial dredging begins. The validity of this argument 
depends upon the cost to the searcher for keeping his information on nodule
deposits in secret. However, Eckert (1979, and 1974), Sweeney, Tollison
and Willett (1974) discuss the existence of several economic forces 
inhibiting incentive for free-riding. For example, the number of deposits 
of prime quality seems to be large relative to the potential number of 
miners over the next twenty years. Also, differences of dredging and
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processing technologies of the searcher and free-rider make the usage of 
the searcher's knowledge less attractive to the free-rider.
The "common-pool" problem causes inefficiencies because of over 
investment and overproduction of the communally owned resource. This kind 
of inefficiencies usually occur to communal fish and oil in the oceans. 
The inefficiencies of the common pool situation of fish and oil should not 
be found in manganese nodules. First nodules lack the fugitive character­
istics of fish and oil; therefore, it is easy to identify and keep track of 
the nodules. For instance, while the competitive drilling of oil from a 
common reservoir affects the cost of drilling oil, dredging nodules at one 
location should not increase relevant costs elsewhere. Second, nodules do 
not reproduce biologically as fish do. Growth of nodules is independent of 
the stock of nodules. Thus, exploitation of nodules by one miner today 
does not impose a cost on the future mining of nodules.
Economic inefficiencies of free-rider and common pool do not seem to 
be strong enough to suggest the change of common ownership system of 
manganese nodules for the first generation of miners. However, it is known 
that as a result of the process of nodule recovery, there will be some 
adverse environmental impact in or near the sea floor, in the water column, 
and at the ocean surface (Johnston, 1981). But, very little is known about 
the extent of probable disruption to the affected areas of the ocean 
envirnoment. An international regulatory authority is needed to supervise 
manganese nodule exploitation for environmental purposes.
In spite of the lack of a strong economic rational to develop a 
system of property rights, most countries agree with the need to change the 
existing communal ownership of the noduels for the purpose of extracting 
economic rent and providing security for the large investments of the
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miners. While developed and developing countries both agree with the idea 
of changing the communal ownership of the oceans* they disagree with the 
method of rationing. The developed countries favor a market system 
solution administered through a licensing agency or a registry where prices 
will be the rationing criteria. The system advocated by the developed 
countries, while it has some of the characteristics of the market system, 
is essentially a state owned or a centralized rationing system which relies 
more on administrative criteria. Developing countries are less concerned 
about economic efficiency. To them the distribution of economic rent and 
maintaining control over the use of the oceans are the major questions. An 
annual value of approximately one billion dollars is estimated to be the 
competitive advantage of ocean mining over land-base production of minerals 
(Wijkman, 1982).
The major source of disagreement between the two groups lies in 
their perception of the "common heritage of mankind." To design and to 
evaluate a distributional policy, some standard of justice or fairness must 
be applied. The views of the developed and developing countries are en­
riched and motivated by different economic and philosophies of justice. 
Discussion of these philosophies is necessary for the understanding of 
their specific views on sea-bed mining regime.
Private Property Right Philosophies
Perhaps John Locke's views best present the position of the devel­
oped countries. In his writings, regarding the theory of property rights, 
he points out that saying something belongs to everyone really means it 
does not belong to anyone. Therefore, "What fish anyone catches in the
ocean, that great and still remaining common of mankind  is made his
property who takes that pains about it" (John Locke from Robert Goldwin,
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1981, p. 47). At the end of the Seventeenth Century, Locke's idea that man 
has the right to the "fruits of his work" established the case for an indi­
vidual right to unlimited appropriation. In effect, his justification of 
private property rights is implicitly written into the constitutions of 
most of the western capitalist states (Macpherson, 1978).
Locke's philosophy of property right is a part of his "natural law" 
theory which is similar to Plato's notion of "natural order of things" in 
which a man's place in society is dictated by his station at birth 
(Musgrave and Musgrave, 1980). In Locke's view, and later maintained by 
many western philosophers or economists from Adam Smith to Milton Friedman, 
the role of government is limited to the protection of private rights.
Most western philosophers continued to believe that private property 
rights are justified; however, there were some modifications in the source 
of justification or the limits to the size of property rights. For exam­
ple, Jeremy Bentham, approving the institution of unequal property, argued 
that there is no such thing as natural property and property right is en­
tirely the work of law. He believed that the role of law is to provide 
social happiness or utility by serving the four ends of security, 
subsistence, abundance and equality. The most important functions of law 
were maintaining security and providing subsistence; abundance and equality 
were not as important. Bentham held, that an equal wealth distribution 
would increase the total social happiness because of the diminishing 
marginal happiness of those possessing fortunes. However, he was opposed 
to a perfect equality of property rights for he believed that equality 
would eliminate motives for industry and leave no property to divide. 
Morris Cohen's philosophy of private property right seems to be an 
extension of Locke's idea of the right of the laborer to the produce of his
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work. On one hand, Cohen supported private property rights of the original 
discoverer based on this theory of occupation. But, to maintain 
occupation, he believed, one needs to secure his possession. On the other 
hand, private ownership encourages enterprises and it is a means of 
promoting maximization of productivity through the profit seeking 
incentives of the businessmen. Cohen, however, recognizes the wastefulness 
of the elimination of the unsuccessful competitor and the tendency of 
sacrificing social interest for the immediate monetary gains in a private 
owership system. According to these considerations, he maintained that 
only a limited private property right was defensible. Thorstein Veblen 
believed that, with the rise of modern corporations and absentee ownership, 
property rights are really a claim on revenues. On this basis, he 
discussed "natural right of investment". Charles Reich, agreeing with the 
concept of rights to revenues claimed that a rising number of individual
rights are dependent on government largess or government licenses. He
argued that, in the twentieth century, with the rise of giant corporations 
and the emergence of the welfare and regulatory states, private property 
rights became subject to limitations in the interest of the society. 
Private property, as a source of private power, was considered an enemy of 
the society and of individual liberty. Thus, the constitutional limits to 
the private property of some, i.e., antitrust laws, was dispensing of
private proerpty to the others (Macphereson, 1978). Finally, Oliver
extended Locke's labor theory of rights by using Schumpeter's distinction 
between factors of production and entrepreneurship. He maintained that 
Lcckc's labor theory of property rights is indeed involved with both 
factorial and entrepreneurial views of production (Blumenfled, 1974).
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State Property Right Philosophies
The developing countries' position concerning distributive justice 
is better explained through Rousseau's views on the relation between prop- 
erty and the state. The echoes of his ideas are recently reappearing in
some of the Third World countries, particularly in Africa (Macpherson,
1978). Rousseau argued that the property right in land "is not a natural 
right, for such property is not necessary for the preservation of one's 
life " (Lemos, 1977, p. 39). He supports, however, the notion of indi­
vidual right to a limited property that a person could work on. Perhaps 
his most thought provoking belief is that "You are lost if you forget that 
the fruits belong to all and the earth to no one" (Rosseau in Macpherson,
1978, p. 31). On this ground, he referred to the governments who support
unlimited property rights on their states as being fundamentally unjust. 
Rousseau's contributions are also known in social contract theory in the 
use of scarce resources. He disagreed with his predecessor Thomas Hobbes 
that "might makes right". Hobbes had already stated that property rights 
were a form of contractual agreements by which the individuals were given 
the right to exclude others from the use of a specific resource. Under­
standing this, Rousseau's major contribution was introducing the concept of 
contract costs which later was used in externalities literature (Umbeck, 
1981).
One can find some similarities between the socialistic views of 
Rosseau and the communistic ideas of Marx where Marx wrote that the state 
proclaims "without regard to these distinctions, [birth, social rank, edu­
cation, and occupation], that every member of society is an equal partner 
in popular sovereignty, and treats all the elements which compose the real 
life of the nation from the standpoint of the state" (Marx in Bottomore,
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1963, p. 19). But where Rousseau advocated an approximate equality in dis­
tribution of wealth and left only capital - accumulation for the purpose of 
large-scale industrial investments to the state by the means of taxation 
(Lemos, 1977); Marx recognizes the state as the sole owner of factors of 
production.
Mixed Property Right Systems
In the market economy countries where the property right system is 
essentially private, sometimes the public shares with the private sector 
the ownership and control of productive facilities in an industry. In this 
parallel syBtem of ownership, public and private firms co-exist in an 
industry. Various objectives may be pursued by a government when a public 
enterprise is established. Economic efficiency is usually the prime objec­
tive. Other objectives such as equity, sovereignty, and economic 
development, are also served through public enterprises.
To achieve efficiency, government aims at the improvement of the 
performance of the industry through the public enterprise. One method to 
judge and control the performance of the industry is using a yard-stick 
firm whose main function is to provide standards for the evaluation of the 
private firms in the same industry. A well known example of a yard-stick 
firm in the U.S. electrical utility industry is the Tennessee Valley 
Authority. The problem with the yard-stick firms is the difficulty in 
making comparisons with the private firms because the yard-stick firms 
usually enjoy privileges such as low-interest financing and income tax 
exemption. An alternative method to improve the performance of an industry 
is forcing the private firms to adapt a desired behavior by the public 
enterprise choice of pricing or output policies that induces the desired 
behavior. This type of control is imposed in the U.S. financial sector.
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Another example Is the U.S. government stockpile projects which, In 
addition to being a security measure, are a means of controlling prices in 
the market. Equity objective may be served by the elimination of excessive 
profits made because of the monopolistic pricing of the private firms. The 
objective of sovereignty is usually met by a complete take over of the 
industry by the government. In many developing countries, the governments 
have exercised total control over their oil and gas industries by 
nationalization of these industries. In these cases, the governments also 
collect all of the economic rents. To encourage economic development, 
especially in the developing countries, governments invest in certain in­
dustries where sufficient private investment does not exist. The Corpo­
ration de Fomento de Chile, and the National Financiers de Mexico are exam­
ples of this kind of mixed property ownership systems. It is believed that 
the Tennessee Valley Authority has multiple objectives including economic 
development of the region.
Judgment of the performance of the public enterprises in the market 
economy countries has been controversial sometimes. In other words, while 
their objectives are usually approved, their effectiveness in action is 
questioned. The evidence on their effectiveness is mixed. On one hand, 
the public enterprises have become powerful tools in the hands of the poli­
ticians; for example, the United Kingdom's nationalized coal and electric 
industries. On the other hand, public enterprises have served the society 
by providing a yard-stick for more accurate and informed judgments and by 
spurring competition in the Industries they have operated in. The most 
successful public enterprises cited in the literature are the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, the Australian National Airlines Commission, and Ontario 
Hydro-Electric Commission of Canada. One may conclude that, however, the
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inconsistancy in the performance of the public enterprises does not seem to 
be any more than the one of the private firms. Yet, Sweden which has a 
well-known social democratic government operates with a few nationalized 
industries or public enterprises. Instead, the Swedish government meets 
its socialistic policies through taxes, subsidies, and supervisory 
regulations.
The Choice of the Sea-Bed Mining Regime
The position of the developing countries in the LOS negotiations re­
flects the trend in recent mineral development contracts in the developing 
countries (Sebenius, 1980; Hauser, 1978; Hughes, 1975; Kildow, 1980; 
Gillis, 1982; and Walde, 1983). The distribution of benefits from mineral 
exploitation by the multinational enterprises began to be questioned after 
World War I when former colonial countries became Independent. But, it was 
really after World War II that the terms of mineral exploitation contracts 
changed drastically. First, there was a shift in the taxation system from 
royalties to income tax, where income tax, while riskier, is more likely to 
capture economic rent and is more efficient in terms of allocation of re­
sources because it puts fewer constraints on the decisions of the miner. 
Second, developing countries demanded periodic renegotiations of the terms 
of mineral contracts. Third, viewing mining activities as a part of their 
entire political and economic development program, developing countries 
with mineral resources tried to create backward and forward linkages 
between the mining industry and the rest of the economy through joint 
ventures, production sharing agreements, service contracts, and technical 
assistance agreements. Major developments in control and ownership of 
mineral resources during this period have been: decline in the share of
crude oil traded In the world market by the "seven sisters" (the seven
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largest multinational companies from the Industrialized countries) from 90% 
in 1957 to 24% in 1979; developing countries-based firms’ investment in 
other developing countries particularly in the timber industry; increase in 
the capacities of the developing countries to prevent transfer-pricing 
abuses between the affiliates of the multinational firms; and growth in the 
state-owned multinational firms from Europe.
The developing countries see the seabed mining as a link to a global 
economic policy in their favor. To them, ocean mining is a part of their 
demand for a New International Economic Order to solve the North-South 
problem in general. They view state ownership as a way of obtaining con­
trol over the resources and to redistribute not only wealth but power. 
Then, on this basis, their objective in the Law of the Sea negotiations was 
to avoid exploitation of deep-seabed minerals by the multinational enter­
prises. Instead, they sought to create an international entity, which 
would be granted a decisive political control; and it in turn, will be 
controlled by the developing countries.
Borgese and Pardo (1976) consider the change in the structure of in­
ternational relations, caused by the entry of the new nations into the 
world affairs, as one of the main causes of the current transformation of 
the international order in the oceans. They maintain that "the principle 
of freedom of the sea was explicitly based on the assumption that living 
resources of the seas were inexhaustible and that the oceans were suffi­
ciently vast to accommodate all navigational uses without need for regu­
lation. Implicitly, it was assumed that man could not seriously impair the 
quality of marine environment and that the oceans were so vast and their 
uses so limited that serious conflicts of use were impossible" (Borgese and 
Pardo, in Domna, 1976, p. 306). Since the perceived national interest of
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every nation in the world Is affected by the manner in which oceans will be 
used and exploited, the Law of the Sea Is vitally important in the creation 
of any new international order.
The followers of the Club of Rome, who advocate the New Interna­
tional Economic Order, argue that the Inequalities in the International 
system are of tremendous significance. The industrialized countries are 
consuming about twenty times more of the resources per capita than the poor 
countries. While in the rich world there is concern about the quality of 
life, in the poor world the concern is about life itself. Being uncomfort­
able with the visible differences of the rich and the poor in the ’’global 
village", they believe "mankind's future depends upon it coming to terms 
with these differences, with developing a new understanding and awareness, 
based upon interdependence and mutual interest of working and living 
together" (Dolman, 1976, p. 23).
Where the allocative efficiency of the North Is achieved In the mar­
ketplace, the distributive goals of the South can only be attained outside 
the market through the distributive institutions. The UNCLOS has played 
the role of the institution which is to distribute the wealth of the oceans 
according to the policy of one vote for each nation regardless of Its size, 
military power, resource endowment, population, or technological stock. 
The decisions in the conference are influenced by economic and political 
factors. The economic issue is the division of rent. The political issue 
is sharing of control and power over the ocean bed resources. Kildow 
(1980) maintains that the desire to control resources is motivated by eco­
nomic and political utilities. The economic utility is derived from the 
consumption of resources, and command over scarce resources generates the 
political utility. Regardless of the state of its economic development, a
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country may prefer to substitute economic utility of the free trade with 
the political utility of exercising control over the flow of its resources. 
Kildow cites examples of OPEC using oil and the U.S. using uranium and mil­
itary technology as political weapons to deal with ideological concessions 
which he believes are remotely related to the appropriation of rent.
The U.S. believes that the Law of the Sea Conference should not be 
like a meeting of equal shareholders, each with one vote. What the 
Americans are worried about is the controlling power given to the develop­
ing countries over the deep seabed resources through the voting provisions 
of the Conference. Furthermore, some American experts claim that the power 
and the wealth will not go to the poor countries, but to their self­
selected and corrupt elites (Berns, 1981). Supporting this idea, Johnson 
holds that "ratification of the common heritage of international politi­
cians is not necessarily synonymous with the realization of the common her­
itage of mankind" (Johnson, 1981, p. 11). In addition to the objection to 
the allocation of resources by bureaucrats instead of the markets, there 
have been arguments against the high negotiating costs of reaching 
decisions through the Conference.
To sum up, the international community is faced with two opposite 
positions concerning the nature of the deep seabed mining regime: the po­
sition of the developing countries and the position of the industrialized 
states. The ISA and its Enterprise have been severely opposed by the 
developed countries, particularly the U.S. From the standpoint of economic 
efficiency, Eckert argues, the Enterprise "would constitute a monopoly of 
ocean mining geared to protecting the interests of a group of terrestrial 
metal-producing states that were neither among the world's lowest-cost 
producers of metals nor its main consumers of metals" (Eckert, 1979, p.
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249). On the same ground, Johnson maintains that the ISA would hinder re­
source availability and cause prices to be substantially higher than they 
otherwise would be (in Amacher and Sweeney, 1976). Thus, it is not sur­
prising to see statements such as: the ISA "would be an OPEC of the
oceans" (Ely, 1981, p. 19), "the proposed Law of the Sea treaty is designed 
to establish an International cartel" (Johnson, 1981, p. 10), "any world 
government would almost certainly be a world wide tyranny" (Berns, 1981, p. 
15), or "international politicians are holding economic development hostage 
to political demands" (Bandow, 1981, p. 820). Cheung's description of the 
effectiveness of market system and contractual agreements on private prop­
erty rights illustrates the ideal for the developed countries:
For any resource, a number of individuals compete for owner­
ship. Each potential buyer or user possess some knowledge not 
only of alternative uses of the resource, but also of differ­
ent transaction costs associated with different [contractual] 
arrangements by which the resource may enter into production. 
Assume away information problems that may exist in competitive 
trading in the marketplace; the resource will find that owner 
whose use of the resource yields the highest value. Competi­
tion for and transferability of the ownership right in the 
marketplace thus perform two main functions for contracting. 
First, competition conglomerates knowledge from all potential 
owners— the knowledge of alternative contractual arrangements 
and uses of the resource; and transferability of property 
rights ensures that the most valuable knowledge will be 
utilized. Second, competition among potential contract 
participants and a resource owner's ability to transfer the 
right to use his resource reduce the cost of enforcing the 
stipulated terms in a contract. This is because competing 
parties will stand by to offer or accept similar terms. In 
sum, competition in the marketplace reduces the cost of 
finding and pursuing the most valuable option in which a 
resource may be contracted for production. While transaction 
cost determines, it is also determined (Cheung, 1970, p. 70).
However, when the developed countries urge the International commun­
ity to accept a deep seabed raining regime which Is economically efficient, 
they refer only to production efficiency, ignoring the distribution of 
benefits issue (Leipziger and Mudge, 1976). The developing nations, on the
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other hand, are less concerned about efficient production and their main 
objective is the distribution of benefits based on the "common heritage of 
mankind" argument. Advocating the developing countries' position, Young 
(in Russel, 1979) states that an unrestricted and open-to-entry regime for 
deep sea mining makes no provision for the regulation of the social costs 
of deep sea mining relating to such matters as the quality of the marine 
environment. Nor does it value achievement of political goals such as the 
use of deep sea mining as a device for transferring certain types of tech­
nology to the developing countries. In Chapter 5, after the presentation 
of some of the proposals offered to the U.N. for the management of 
manganese nodules, the question of whether a management regime can 
compromise the objectives of both groups will be dealt with.
CHAPTER IV
FOUNDATIONS OF THE EXISTING LAW OF THE SEA 
A review of the historical development of the status of the sea ac­
cording to the changes of power, economic, and technological conditions of 
the time will enable one to understand the present controversy on the Law 
of the Sea. Increase in the importance of fish as a source of food, and 
technological advancement in fishing influenced the Greeks and Romans’ 
ancient philosophy of common ownership and common use of the sea. By 
extending the feudal law, kings claimed the ownership of the sea while the 
right to use the sea remained mostly common. The ancient philosophers 
believed, at this time, that the sea was so vast that there could be no 
competition in fishing. Later, as this belief was shaken, states such as 
England began to charge foreign ships a fee for fishing in their waters. 
Sovereignty of the states, such as England and Venice, was based on their 
military power the extent of which was limited to range of cannon shot. 
With the growing importance of trade in the 17th century, freedom of 
navigation was being questioned. Two major philosophies presented the 
positions of the economic and military powers of the time in regard to the 
freedom of the sea. In this dispute, Grotius, representing the Dutch, 
followed the classic Roman doctrine of the freedom of the sea. On the 
other hand, Selden's argument for the sovereignty of the state according to 
the feudal law sided with Portugal and Spain. The controversy about the 
appropriation and domination of the sea, before the U.N. involvement, 
continued to the twentieth century when the Truman Proclamation, initiating
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the doctrine of continental shelf, became a turning point in the evolution­
ary trend of the law of the sea.
Ancient
In the ancient international maritime law, oceans came under the 
shipping code of Hammurabi and later the Rhodian sea law. During this 
period, there was no direct control over the ocean resources by the states 
or individuals; however, activities associated with the sea were closely 
regulated. Fenn (1926) indicates that Rhodes seems to have exercised 
extensive jurisdiction over their seamen, their sea-borne trade, the ships 
flying the national flag, and even the business and personal relations 
between their merchants and seamen. According to Fenn, Greeks adopted 
Rhodian sea laws to control their navigation and sea-borne commerce. Thus, 
the maritime legislation of the Greeks lacked any legal doctrine on the 
status of the sea. In other words, the exercise of maritime jurisdiction 
did not imply the right of the state to appropriate the sea or to restrict 
access to it, but ports and navigable rivers were considered the property 
of the state.
Greeks, as well as Romans, believed in the ’’natural" method of 
acquiring property. The references to this belief are as old as 
Aristotle's writings on the role of nature to supply her offspring with 
food. To acquire food, hunting and fishing were considered among the most
natural means. Indeed, there is historical evidence that fish was not only
a main food among the Mediterranean people from early times, it was also an 
important article of commerce. Besides, the Athenian and the Roman states 
used fisheries as a source of revenues (Strabo, 1857), so it was natural 
for Greeks and Romans to regard the fish or animals captured by fishing or 
hunting as belonging to the captor. The works of Cicero, Seneca, Paulus
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and Ovid express the view that freedom of the sea was a common opinion in 
this era (Fenn, 1926). Clarkson (1974) maintains that the absence of 
international law or other political agreements on ocean use in the ancient 
Mediterranean was a reflection of non-conflicting claims. Supporting the 
same notion Jones (1972) argues that, for centuries, the bounty of the 
oceans was so enormous that it was believed to be limitless.
Throughout history, law of the sea has been dominated by factors 
such as naval supremacy, the level of consumption and trade of ocean 
resources including fish and minerals, technological advancement in the 
navy, fishing, extraction of minerals, and general trade and commercial use 
of the ocean. Considering these factors, the position of Greeks and Romans 
on the common right of all men to a free use of the sea is more understand­
able. During the ancient time, since rich fisheries were generally avail­
able, communities were isolated and there were difficulties in the preser­
vation and transportation of fish, the international contact and 
competition were not significant. Thus, under these conditions, communal 
ownership and freedom of fishing was easy to maintain. Also, the period of 
commercial and naval domination of one nation, or the parity of power 
achieved by two, has coincided with the time of the liberty of navigation 
and impunity of shipping from local control. For example, when the Romans 
were the undisputable supreme of the Medlteranian waters or when the power 
was shared with the Greeks, freedom of navigation prevailed. When, on the 
other hand, big powers have been declining, or power has been shared by 
many states, the emphasis has shifted to claiming local authority and 
protection and reservation of ocean resources.
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Middle Ages
Since the second century, eminent lawyers or juriconsults gained 
respect as a source of law outside the existing edicts and codes. In the 
early sixth century, Justinian, the emperor of Rome at the time, ordered 
the compilation of fragments from the marks of juriconsults. This 
collection, later known as Justinian's Digest, was promulgated in 529. 
Though it is not the first codified law of this kind, Justinian's Digest is 
certainly the most influential and widely known. None of the codified laws 
of the early ages, however, contained any direct reference to the subject 
of a common right of fishing, or to the sea being open to the use of every 
man. Apparently, this class of law was settled through experience and 
practice. The presumption of historians is that virtually all nations 
believed that the sea was common to all by the law of nature. There is no 
trace of a break in the continuity of this idea until the twelfth century.
The ancient doctrine of freedom of the sea was affected by the 
changes of economic and technological conditions in medieval Europe. On 
the one hand, new methods of preservation led to the increase in the supply 
of fish; while, on the other hand, some new religious codes which allowed 
consumption of fish raised the demand for it. The result of these changes 
was an increase in per capita consumption of fish. With the increase in 
the importance of the fishing industry in the medieval ages, the states 
claimed the ownership of the sea by extending the feudal law. Under the 
feudal system, the king or the emperor was the ultimate landowner in the 
state. Being the pivot of the system, the king enjoyed some exclusive 
rights, privileges and prerogatives named "Regalia" (Fenn, 1926). Property 
rights in the sea were asserted and justified through the Regalia. There­
fore, applying the legal arrangements regulating the use of land to the
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sea, the feudal system transferred the property rights of the sea to the 
king. This was actually a change in the status of the sea from res commune 
(commonly owned and used) to res publicae (owned by the state but commonly 
used).
Later Baldus, a juriconsult of the fourteenth century, injected the 
theory of the adjacent sea intc the feudal law (Fenn, 1929). Based on 
Regalia, Baldus argued that the king should only have an exclusive 
jurisdiction over the sea adjacent to the territory of the king. So, he 
confined the authority of the king on the sea to mere jurisdiction and the 
limit of jurisdiction to the territorial waters. Of course, the king had 
the right to fish in coastal waters for an unspecified distance off shore; 
but, on the high seas the fishing right belonged to everyone. In addition, 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the king was to be used to safeguard the sea 
for commerce, navigation, and fishing purposes rather than forcing recogni­
tion of sovereignty from the other states. Here the theory of territorial 
waters began to take shape, while national claims to large territorial seas 
did not exist yet.
Before the end of the thirteenth century, with the growth of mari­
time commerce and fishing, the competition among states for the sovereignty 
of the waters of the Mediterranean and the coasts of western Europe led to 
conflicting claims. The monarchs of the republics of coastal states 
started to claim sovereignty over the waters adjacent to their land terri­
tory. Venice, which was famous for its commercial activities, its 
affluence, and its naval power, assumed sovereignty over the entire 
Adriatic Sea. Venetians claimed not only the right of exclusive jurisdic­
tion; they also claimed the ownership of the sea. Ironically, Venice never 
possessed both shores of the Adriatic. In 1269 Venice actually demanded
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fees from all vessels sailing in the Adriatic. Adjacent cities and common­
wealths were forced to agree to the demands of Venice, and Venetians 
maintained the control of the Adriatic until the fall of Venice in the 
eighteenth century (Jonsson, 1982),
Of course, economic conditions, which were a more dominant factor in 
the structure of the ocean policies of the nations, were not similar in all 
locations. For instance, during the medieval period, England's domestic 
consumption of fish exceeded its fishing production; therefore, the crown 
granted fishing rights to many foreign vessels fishing along English and 
Scottish coastal waters and they also allowed foreigners to sell their 
produce in England. During this time, England signed many treaties 
recognizing the coastal fishing rights of the other states. Unlike the 
English, the Scottish discouraged the fishing activities of foreign vessels 
in their coastal waters. The Scottish ocean policy was a reflection of its 
comparative advantage in maritime activities and the lower costs of 
policing fishery in its coastal waters (Clarkson, 1974).
Mare Liberum vs. Mare Clausum
Between the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries, 
commercial and military uses of the ocean increased. These changes 
exacerbated the existing fishery disputes among coastal states. 
Furthermore, in the search for additional food resources from the sea, 
coastal states began to pay more attention to foreign fishing in their 
territorial waters. To expand fishing operations and to be able to pursue 
valuable migratory fish, new technologies were used in the structure of 
newly made fleets. As the conflict between the nations was intensifying, 
juriconsults had to take a position on two questions. First, whether, 
according to law, a state or a private individual could acquire ownership
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of the sea? Second, what Is the extent of jurisdiction of a coastal state 
over its maritime fisheries? Generally speaking, debates about sea usage 
were common during this period of time, and Groitus' Mare Liberum and 
Selden's Mare Clausum were published as the products of two extreme 
positions on the question of freedom of the sea.
Since the early sixteenth century when the colonial powers of Europe 
claimed sovereignty over the entire seas from the colonial homeland to 
their colonies, the controversy over Mare Liberum and Mare Clausum received 
particular attention. In the sixteenth century, Portugal claimed sover­
eignty over the entire Indian Ocean as well as the Atlantic south of 
Morocco. Spain claimed the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean as its 
own, Genoa claimed sovereignty over the Ligurian Sea, and Venice continued 
its claim over the Adriatic. Among these claims, those of Portugal and 
Spain were more comprehensive and produced far reaching consequences. 
These two powers divided oceans between themselves on the basis of the 
authority granted to them in a papal edict. Fenn (1926) maintains that it 
was the theory of exclusive jurisdiction of the local sovereign in the 
adjacent sea that made the theory of ownership of the sea possible. While 
Spain and Portugal propagated the theory of Mare Clausum, the Dutch argued 
for the freedom of navigation and trade. The Dutch were not really after 
the open sea. What they wanted was the open door.
The Dutch also argued against England about the freedom of 
fisheries. At this time, the position that England had held since medieval 
ages changed slightly. The British now believed that the rich fishing area 
along their coasts was a benefit from God granted to the British people. 
Other nations could share in this advantage only by the payment of a just 
price. So, the British, like the Venetians, claimed the ownership of the
49
resources of the sea along their coasts and demanded a fee for fishing in 
these areas. Therefore, the Dutch argument for the freedom of the sea was 
to take freely the products of that sea the use of which, they asserted, 
was common to all.
To defend its position against Spain and Portugal, The Dutch East 
India Company solicited Hugo Grotius, a Dutch jurist, to prepare a defense 
for its trading policy with the East. In his defense in 1605, and later in 
a pamphlet entitled Mare Lib exrum in 1609, Grotius wrote on the complete 
freedom of high seas for the innocent use and mutual benefit of all. He
argued: "The sea, since it is as incapable of being seized as the air,
cannot have been attached to the possession of any particular nation" 
(Grotius, 1916). Initially Grotius* argument was not directed towards 
fisheries or towards England's claim, but it was available for that purpose 
when James I prohibited fishing by foreign vessels along coasts of England. 
The Dutch, sending their representatives to London, negotiated the subject 
based upon Grotius' doctrine.
Grotius considered his doctrine of freedom of the sea both moral and
legal. As a follower of the classic Roman doctrine on the status of the
sea, he differentiated between public and private property. The right of 
property is based on possession or occupation; and seas, since they cannot 
be possessed or occupied, are common property for all to use. Grotius 
called this a moral reason. The basis of his reasoning was the magnitude 
of the sea. He believed that the sea was so vast that no competition for 
the use of it was foreseeable. While he compared the resources of the sea 
with the air and maintained that they both were inexhaustible. His legal 
reason had a natural basis. He argued that occupation can only take place 
In things which are bounded, and the sea is not. Thus, he concludes that
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occupation cannot take place in the sea. On the adjacent sea, Grotius 
maintains that the limit was where it could be protected from the land. 
Later, the development of the theory of the adjacent sea was affected by 
this argument.
The roots of the opposing theory is in feudal law and the Regalia of 
the king where the king has exclusive jurisdiction over the high seas, 
while the freedom of the sea is held to be true. In 1580, Queen Elizabeth 
had asserted the freedom of the sea as a part of Law of the Nations, In 
the early seventeenth century the situation changed. To search for 
evidence supporting the oldness of a sovereignty of the British over its 
waters, the British crown employed emminent scholars and jurists (Jones, 
1972). Among them was John Selden, In 1635, John Selden, in his attempt 
to establish the sovereignty of England over the surrounding seas,
published his Mare Clausum. In his book, he tried to prove that the sea is
capable of appropriation, and has actually been appropriated in many
instances. He cited many cases including Venetians in the Adriatic and 
Spanish and Portuguese in the Mediterranean to show the practice and the 
custom of dominion of the seas. Logically, whereas Grotius rested his case 
on nature, divine law was the basis for Selden*s argument. Selden believed 
that God's intention that the earth should be divided must be executed with 
respect to the sea as well as the land by means of social contract 
(Shearer, 1982).
Controversies relating to appropriation and dominion of the
surrounding seas continued during the eighteenth century. Regardless of 
its philosophical establishment, the universal view held during this period 
was that every coastal state had a natural right to property in the sea to 
the extent it had effectively occupied it. The question which remained,
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however, was what amounted to effective occupation? The widespread opinion 
in the early seventeenth century was that the domination of the sea by 
ships provides the necessary tools to claim exclusive property in the sea. 
This was the use of an old notion that physical power and presence was 
regarded as the basis of exclusive rights. Since the beginning of the 
eighteenth century the idea of cannon shot range permanently dispositioned 
on the coast replaced the domination of the sea by ships for the 
determination of the territorial waters. At this time, the range of 
cannons was considered to be about three nautical miles. But, a deeper 
understanding was slowly being developed that maritime jurisdiction should 
be intellectually as well as militarily defensible. Being affected by the 
logical arguments of the Age of Reason and secularization of European 
culture, there was a gradual transition from a theological to a logical 
position. The logical basis for appropriation of the sea was power; that 
is, a sea was regarded under a country's power if the country could use it 
and keep the others away from it.
Due to the power of its navy, Britain played a significant role in 
the international ocean politics throughout the nineteenth century. Under 
her leadership, the three mile territorial limit was accepted by the 
colonial powers of Europe as well as the United States. Besides the might 
of its navy, the British Empire, at this time, faced no significant compe­
tition in manufacturing, international trade, and international finance; 
therefore, by a deliberate act of policy, it adopted the practice of free 
trade and applied the principle of open seas. Thereby, freedom of the 
seas, which was rather ambiguous before, partially because of the practice 
of mercantilism, was clarified through the evolution of the philosophy of 
free trade, the invention of the steam ship and the open door policy of
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Latin America. Of course, one of the features of the new developments was 
the right of innocent passage through territorial waters.
While the freedom of international trade became more acceptable 
during the nineteenth century, conflict over fishing in the coastal waters 
intensified. The reason was mainly the introduction of evidence indicating 
the possibility of depletion of the plentiful fishing grounds discovered 
before. Later other indicators such as an increase in catches, development 
of trawling, and expanded fishing fleets confirmed the interpretation of 
the evidence. From the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth 
century, many fisheries conferences were held to settle the disputes over 
fishery. The outcome was numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties 
signed by the countries involved. Relative stability attained in the law 
of the sea between 1880 and the second world war provided the opportunity 
for the codification of its rules. The objective was merely the collection 
of the existing international law governing the sea. Many attempts were 
made by the international organizations such as the League of Nations as 
well as by various bodies, private and public, from individual countries. 
These codifications were usually inconsistent with one another.
Recent History
The Second World War deeply affected the power structure of the 
world. On one hand, the British Empire and the colonial powers of Europe 
declined. On the other hand, the United States and the Soviet Union became 
the new superpowers of the world. Meanwhile, former colonies gradually 
developed their influence through the formation of a Third World bloc. 
During the war, the significance of oil became more obvious; and, the 
United States oil industry called the attention of the government to the 
possible rich oil resources of the continental shelf and the seabed. This
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led to the first important assertion of national rights in an area which 
was regarded as a part of international waters. In 1945, President
Truman claimed exclusive rights for the United States to exploit the
mineral and hydrocarbon resources lying on or under the U.S. continental
2
shelf and the right to establish fisheries conservation zones in the areas 
of high seas along the coasts of the United States. Truman carefully 
avoided making any claims of sovereignty; therefore, there was no extension 
of the U.S. territorial waters beyond its three mile limit, nor was there 
any challenge to the rights of navigation of the other countries in the 
waters superjacent to the U.S. shelf. As a result, no opposition was 
registered against Truman's proclamation. Later, the U.S. claim was
effectively implemented by Congress in the Outer Continental Shelf Act of 
1953.
The Truman Proclamation, initiating the doctrine of continental 
shelf, became a landmark in the evolutionary trend towards wider claims of 
coastal jurisdiction. The width of the U.S. continental shelf varied from 
about one half mile to over six hundred miles, so it added control of
significant resources to the U.S. Within a few years after the Truman
Proclamation, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, El Salvador, and 
Iceland made similar, but more far-reaching, declarations in respect to
2
Swing defines the continental shelf as the "area of the 
underwater continental land mass lying immediately adjacent to the shore 
line and generally extending out for a distance that can be as little as 
two and as much as six hundred miles wide,,.., and the outer edge of 
which Is usually found at a depth of between 130 and 200 meters."
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fisheries in their territorial seas (Johnson, 1982; and Eckert, 1979). 
Meantime, the modern enclosure movement of the sea began to gather.
In 1953, the International Law Commission, initiated by Iceland, 
reported the results of its study on the codification of the rules of 
international law on the territorial limit. The study demonstrated that 
the three mile rule was only a minimum for territorial limit. There was no 
general or universal rule for the maximum limit among nations. The steady 
and continuous enclosure of the sea, In the late 1940s and up to the mid 
1950s, produced concern among land locked states and states with 
insignificant coastal areas. The fear was that the process of enclosure 
would distribute the wealth of the oceans against these countries, and 
would increase the rivalry among the major powers in the ocean. The need 
to reconcile the position of these countries with the claims of the others 
and to codify the existing law and practice led to the assembly of the 
first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958.
CHAPTER V
THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 
Continuing efforts to establish some form of public order in the 
oceans led to the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS I) in 1958. This conference was attended by 86 delegations at 
Geneva, where four conventions were adopted: the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone; the Convention of the High Seas; the 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High 
Seas; and the Convention on the Continental Shelf. Manganese nodules and 
other mineral deposits were known to exist on the deep ocean floor; but, 
because of the state of technology, no commercial value was attached to 
them. Therefore, there was no controversy about the right of ownership of 
the nonliving resources of the deep ocean yet.
While failing to agree upon a common distance of the territorial 
sea, the conference set a 12-mlle maximum limit on the territorial sea. 
It, however, permitted coastal states to regulate fisheries beyond the 
12-mile limit. On the high seas, freedom of navigation, fishing, and 
overflight was codified. Finally, the conference provided for national 
exploration and exploitation of continental shelf resources. The lasting 
disagreement on the breadth of the territorial sea and the march of new 
claims extending well beyond 200 miles from the coast line as well as the 
unresolved issue of fishery limits resulted In the second United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) in 1960. The UNCLOS II was 
held in Geneva again, with 88 delegations attending, but it failed to reach 
any agreement on these issues.
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In 1966, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution to survey the 
present state of knowledge of the sea beyond the continental shelf and of 
the techniques for exploiting them. As a result of this survey the 
technological feasibility of deep ocean mining in the near future was 
officially recognized. Mineral resources located on the ocean floor 
outside the limits of national jurisdiction were recognized as having
potential commercial value for the first time. The question of who was 
entitled to the wealth of the ocean's minerals was recognized as a
potential source of international conflict. This question was raised by 
Arvid Pardo, Malta's representative to the United Nations in 1967. In his 
historic address, he proposed the peaceful use of the resources of the 
ocean floor in the interest of mankind, In 1968, the General Assembly 
established the Seabed Committee to consider Pardo's proposal.
On the basis of the work of the Seabed Committee, completed in 1970, 
the General Assembly adopted a declaration of principles governing the use 
of the seabed. There were three major points on this declaration. 1) The 
seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction were pronounced as the "common heritage of mankind". 
This area cannot be subject to appropriation by any state and no state can 
exercise sovereignty over it. Also, no state or person shall claim or 
exercise the rights to this area or its resources inconsistent with the 
international regime to be established. 2) The area should be used
exclusively for peaceful purposes. 3) The exploration of the area and the 
exploitation of its resources should be carried out for the benefit of 
mankind. The General Assembly decided to call a third conference on the 
law of the sea in 1973 to deal with the question of common heritage and the 
establishement of an equitable regime to govern exploitation of the
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resources of the seabed and the ocean floor. Other issues under 
consideration were the extent and the regime governing the territorial sea, 
the 200-mile zone, high seas, scientific research, and environmental 
issues.
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 
III) held its first major meeting at Caracas in the summer of 1974 with 137 
delegations in attendance. For the first time, the focus of the 
international conflict was not on the fishery limits, but on the access to
the mineral resources of the deep sea. The conference was divided into
three committees: the first was concerned with deep sea mining; the second
with territorial jurisdictions and ’’economic zones" in the oceans; and the 
third with a miscellany, such as pollution and scientific research.
Subsequent UNCLOS III meetings were held in various countries. While there 
was a general polarization of the industrial nations of the North and the 
developing nations of the South, political alignments were somewhat 
different in each committee depending upon the interests of the countries 
involved.
1. Deep-Sea Mining Committee
This committee was responsible for establishing an international
regime to manage the exploitation of the hard mineral resources of the deep 
ocean bed lying within the "common heritage of mankind". The basic issue 
that arose in the negotiations was the extent of international regulation 
over mining as opposed to the right of private enterprise to engage in it 
freely. The South maintained that the "common heritage of mankind" 
received the sanction of international law when the General Assembly of the 
United Nations adopted the 1970 declaration. Therefore, in its view, the 
task of the First Committee was to establish a strong Seabed Authority with
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comprehensive functions and powers. The North, particularly the United 
States, while a.ffinning the notion of "common heritage", argued that the 
"common heritage" refers to the distribution of revenues; therefore, the 
free market system must be allowed to operate on the ocean floor. The 
preference of this group for a free- market-oriented regime stems from the 
technological and financial abilities of its members, to exploit deep 
seabed resources. The developing countries of the South, of course, lacked 
these abilities and resources.
The literature suggests four major alternative regimes to allocate 
rights to the minerals of the sea floor.
A. The Flag-Nation Approach— Under this approach, advocated by the 
developed nations prior to 1970, the mineral resources beyond the limits of 
coastal states' jurisdiction would be treated as open to appropriation and 
exploitation under the law of the flag of the discovering nation (Ely, 
1966). This system assumes that there is plenty of room on the deep seabed 
of the world, and there will be no argument about the geographical extent 
of appropriation until a neighbor sets up operations close enough to create 
friction. The apparent inexhaustibility of the resources was also the 
backbone of the principle of freedom of the sea advanced by Grotius in the 
seventeenth century (Christy, 1968). Many experts after Grotius believed 
that the resources of the sea were infinite and treated them as free goods 
like air. They argue that since there is no incentive or need for the 
acquisition of exclusive rights, the property has no price. Of course, 
even during Grotius' time, this condition was not widely accepted for 
marine fisheries.
The chief problem with this approach is clearly its assumptions 
about the inexhaustibility of resources. Also the assurance of
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exclusive rights, either iti extent or tenure is arabigious. The flag-nation 
regime operates outside the domain of the common heritage concept and 
provides an arbitrary system of allocation of exhaustive rights. 
Particularly after the acceptance of the notion of common heritage in the 
United Nations, this approach found heavy opposition among both the 
developing and the developed countries.
B. International Registry Office —  Under this regime an 
international agency would be established to record the claims of the 
participating nations on behalf of their citizens to explore and exploit a 
certain portion of the seabed (Eckert, 1974, 1979; and Christy, 1968). 
This regime operates on the "first come, first served" basis and the 
registry, in its extreme form, would have no powers of enforcement or 
policing other than to inspect the installations and equipment of mining 
firms and revoke a claim if the firm fail to discharge its obligations 
properly. Because of its limited functions, it is virtually a costless 
system (Johnson in Amacher et al., 1976). However, Eckert argues that 
there is an adverse effect on efficient exploration, if registration 
becomes mandatory for dredging and if comprehensive data on the nature and 
location of the deposit had to be made public as a precondition for 
recording. Enforcing this kind of requirement would increase the gains 
from free-riding by reducing the incentive to search independently. In 
addition, if claims are non-transferable, the first firm to record is not 
necessarily the most efficient producer. As a result, there may be some 
losses to the society from the operation of producers who are not the most 
productive in the industry (Christy, 1968). If the claims are transfer­
able, an entrepreneur can sell his rights In the market place, then he has 
little to lose by recording a claim. Thus, transferability would make the
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international registry office similar to a gambling house. Christy also 
points out the performance requirements such as "use it or lose it" would 
give the incentive to those who had recorded claims to produce even though 
returns to their investment were inadequate or negative, so, fear of losing 
the claim by hot producing tends to stimulate too rapid rates of output. 
However, the "use it or lose it" requirement does not exist in some 
variations of the International Registry Office proposals. For example, 
Johnson and Logue (in Amacher and Sweeny, 1976) suggest a system of claim 
registry that does not impose a time limit on the producers to exploit the 
resources.
The International Registery Office proposal has been rejected by the 
UNCLOS due to market orientation which was anathema to a majority of the 
deligations.
C. International Licensing Agency - The jurisdiction of the 
International Licensing Agency proposals go beyond registration of claims. 
A number of alternative licensing agency plans were proposed. In 1968, C. 
Pell, a U.S. Senator, proposed issuance of licenses for exploration and 
exploitation to states or to non-governmental international organizations. 
His licensing agency was also to decide between two or more contending par­
ties for a particular license, to fix the size and dimension of the area 
under terms of the license, to fix the period of the validity of the 
license, and to fix the payment of a fee or royalty (Jones, 1972). Pell's 
proposal includes a provision for supervisory responsibility by the United 
Nations Security Council. Generally speaking, his proposal follows the 
treaty for the use of outer space.
Danzing has also proposed a treaty based on the outer space treaty. 
His "ocean agency", a specialized agency of the United Nations, would be
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entrusted with exclusive accountability for the allocation of exploitation 
rights to the ocean bed and be empowered to exercise independent explora­
tion and exploitation rights, but only with regard to those resources for 
which licensing agreements are not readily available. Danzing proposed 
that licenses be allocated to the highest bidder, but competency and 
reliability of the bidding entity would also be regarded. Furthermore, the 
licenses would be issued so as to avoid monopolization of ocean mining by 
any enterprise, Danzing*s plan grants discretion to the agency to 
disregard the highest bidder criterion if chosing a developing country 
helps it to improve its technological capability for the exploitation of 
the resources of the seabed.
Another proposal, more general in nature, has been made by F. 
Christy, who suggests a "United Nations Authority" to be established for 
the purpose of distributing of sea-bed mining sites. He, too, recommends 
the highest bidder approach to maintain efficiency. The bid, in his 
regime, can fake the form of royalty payment, fixed percentage of the gross 
revenues, a fixed percentage of net revenue, a cash bonus on an installment 
basis or a combination of them. He suggests the allocation of higher 
percentage of royalty payments to the coastal states for the exploitation 
nearer to their shores. Conversely, the percentage share of the authority 
is suggested to increase as the mining takes place at a greater distance 
from the shore.
While these proposals may be more desirable on efficiency grounds 
than the International Seabed Authority (Eckert, 1979), they too have been 
rejected in the UNCLOS because underdeveloped countries expect more than 
redistribtuion from economic gains or efficiency from ocean mining. Their
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expectations are apparently met in the context of the International Seabed 
Authority.
D. International Sea-Bed Authority - The fourth alternative regime 
was originally an extension of the International Licensing Agency, which
was thought by the North to be analogous to the regime that governs the
exploitation of the oil resources of the U.S. continental shelf. It was 
supposed to have the ability to extract rents, or royalties, through some
form of pricing mechanism. The rights would be awarded to the highest
bidder, with the bid being expressed as a percent of net income. - The 
authority did not have to operate under the United Nations, and it could be 
directed by a board with a majority representation from the developed 
countries. While some suggested that the authority should have the 
function of redistributing the revenues received from the market and the 
revenues must be simply returned to the exploiting nations, others 
maintained that the revenues could be devoted to some widely accepted goals 
such as the overcoming of malnutrition (Christy, 1968).
Pardo's proposal in 1967 was the basis for the development of the 
Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST) regime in 1982. This regime is more 
complicated than the original international sea-bed authority. After the 
adaptation of the notion of "common heritage of mankind" in 1970 by the 
United Nations, in 1971 thirteen Latin American countries proposed a regime 
with substantially broader powers than the International Licensing Agency. 
Their international seabed authority included an international enterprise 
which would undertake exploration as well as exploitation of the resources 
of the seabed up to the marketing state of operation. The authority 
itself, of course, could tax the private enterprises and countries engaged 
in the exploitation of seabed resources.
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While the existence of manganese nodules on the floor of the ocean 
had been known for more than, a century* the rising prices of metals, the 
improvements in the technology of ocean mining, and the rise in the New 
International Economic Order argument in the 1970s attracted the attention 
of the world to the opportunities and the problems created by the 
extraction of manganese nodules. By this time, the issue was not merely 
the development of a set of rules and regulations to govern the development 
of manganese nodules. The international community was facing an additional 
question, that is, how to deal with the economic implications of 
exploitation of manganese nodules, such as providing adequate protection 
for the land-based mineral producers.
After about fifteen years, in 1982, the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea ended by proposing a treaty approved by 130 nations; 
while 4 nations (United States, Turkey, Israel, and Venezuela) voted 
against the treaty and 17 nations abstained (Borgese, 1983). By May 1985, 
the Treaty has been ratified by eighteen countries including Egypt, Mexico, 
Cuba, Philippines, and Ghana. No industrialized country has ratified the 
Treaty yet. Through this treaty, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) 
is empowered to issue licenses, collect taxes and royalties and design 
production ceilings. Moreover, the "Enterprise," a subsidiary of the ISA, 
would directly engage in the production and exploration of the deep seabed 
minerals, competing with the mining companies. To prepare for the 
establishment of the two major organs of the Convention, the ISA and the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, a preparatory commission has 
been designed. The preparatory commission has met for the first time in 
March, 1983 and was scheduled to meet again In April, 1984 (The U.N. Press
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Release, 1983). The non-signatories may only participate as observers 
and are not. given any voting rights (Simmonds, 1983).
2. The National Jurisdiction Committee
This committee was responsible for a wide range of law of the sea 
Issues from the territorial sea and the proposed economic zone to the 
rights of land-locked states. Before the meeting of the UNCLOS III, the 
limit of the territorial waters was 3 miles, which was based on the limited 
ability of the coastal states to protect their exclusive jurisdiction. 
However, from the time of the Truman Proclamation of 1945 until 1976, 54 
nations claimed a 12-mile territorial sea and a territorial sea of 200 
miles was claimed by eight (Johnson and Logue, 1976). The basis for 
ideological differences on the territorial sea was the hard realities of 
ocean geography. Some states, both developing and developed, have long 
coastlines while others have short coastlines or are totally land-locked. 
There are at least 50 land-locked and geographically disadvantaged 
countries who were the initial source of the pressure to maintain the 
freedom of the high seas because the expansion of coastal state 
jurisdiction would benefit them little or nothing (Charney, 1977). To 
satisfy the conflicting views and interests of the states with long 
coastlines, on one hand; and the land-locked and geographically 
disadvantaged states, on the other, a relatively narrow territorial sea of 
12 miles along with a relatively wide economic zone of 200 miles were 
adopted (Johnson, 1982).
The concept of the 12-mile territorial limit guaranteed freedom of 
transit through coastal state jurisdiction waters as long as the passage is 
not harmful to the peace and security of the coastal state. Under this 
doctrine of "Innocent passage", embraced by Article 20 of the Final Act of
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the Conference, submarines must navigate on the surface and show their 
flags as long as they are within the 12**mile territorial limit. The United 
States, while strongly favoring freedom of transit through straits for 
commercial and military purposes, resisted the limits Imposed on the 
movements of its submarines for military purposes.
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles gave coastal 
states control over their living and non-living resources within this 
range. However, coastal states1 control over the non-living resources 
could go as far out as 300 miles. For most of the states the 200 mile 
limit would be beyond their continental shelf for which they had claimed 
jurisdiction and control. The economic resources of this area include 
fisheries, minerals, and petroleum. Based on the Law of the Sea Treaty, 
coastal states are required to pay royalties to the ISA ranging from 1 to 7 
percent of the value of all production in this zone; but, the developing 
coastal states that import mineral resources are exempt from this payment.
The notion of the EEZ has been criticized for being mutually 
exclusive with the idea of the common heritage of mankind (U.N. Document, 
1978). Eckert (1979) believes the EEZ has been the largest enclosure to 
national territory in history. Geographically, nearly 36 percent of the 
worlds ocean is closed off by the EEZ. This area is considered the most 
valuable part in terms of resources and in terms of use. It includes all 
off-shore hydrocarbon, all commercially exploitable minerals in 
unconsolidated sediments such as sand, gravel, tin, gold, and diamonds; a 
substantial portion of known manganese nodules; and more than 90 percent of 
all living resources of the sea. Besides the general contradiction with 
the concept of common heritage, the EEZ has been specifically objected to 
for its distribution of gains. It is estimated that only 20 countries in
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the world gain control of 76 percent of the world EEZs; out of which 13 are 
developed. These 13 countries acquire 48 percent of the total EEZs, while 
the remaining 12 developing countries get 28 percent of the world’s EEZs 
(U.N. Document, 1978). In spite of this debate the idea of the EEZs had 
received general acceptance in the U.N. as a part of the Law of the Sea 
Treaty. The United States, with 2.2 million square miles of ocean space 
rich with fisheries resources and mineral wealth enclosed within its 
national limits, regards the EEZ as the best part of the treaty (Johnson, 
1976; Alexander, 1975).
3. The Committee on Environment and Research
The subject of the third committee was preservation of the marine 
environment and freedom of marine scientific research. Since the Torry 
Canyon incident in 1967, when about 30 million gallons of oil had leaked 
from the Torry Canyon in the English Channel, protection of the marine 
environment has become a dramatic and vital concern of all nations in the 
world. In the past two decades there has been an increase in vessel-source 
pollution due to the increase in the capacity of oil cargo ships or 
tankers. In response to the deterioration of the marine environment, 
according to the results of the negotiations of the Third Committee 
embodied in the Law of the Sea Treaty, coastal states may enact laws to 
prevent and reduce pollution in their territorial sea and the EEZ, subject 
to certain qualifications. Countries ratifying the treaty are held 
responsible for the compliance of vessels flying their flags with the 
pollution standards. Also, the participating countries are encouraged to 
establish international or regional organizations to control pollution.
The second major topic in the Third Committee, scientific research, 
interested the developed and developing countries for different reasons.
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The developed countries, with the exception of the Soviet Union siding with 
the developing countries, favored perfect freedom of scientific research. 
But, the developing countries desired control over research activities 
within their territorial limit and their EEZs. Being unable to participate 
in these activities alone, they demanded involvement in the scientific 
research of the developed countries. They also demanded transfer of marine 
technology from the industrial world to their own. Finally, the UNCLOS III 
provided that the conduct of marine scientific research is permitted as 
long as it Is used exclusively for peaceful purposes and it meets the 
regulations of coastal states. Within these boundaries the treaty 
persuades all countries, developed and developing, to conduct marine 
scientific research— preferably in cooperation. Another provision of the 
treaty pertains to the management of technology transfer to the developing 
countries and the ISA.
CHAPTER VI
DEEP SEABED PROVISIONS IN THE LOS
The LOST covers so many aspects of ocean activity such that it seems 
to be an international constitution for the oceans, which will replace the 
traditional laissez faire system. This chapter is confined to one subject, 
that is, the exploitation of the mineral resources found in the 
international zone of the oceans. The establishment of the Treaty for the 
development of the deep seabed mineral resources is based on the assumption 
that the international zone and its resources are the common heritage of 
mankind (Article 136 of the Treaty).
Throughout the negotiations on the Treaty, three distinct groups of 
countries emerged: 1) the industrialized countries whose main objective
was to ensure the availability of the metals for their Industries In the 
long-run; 2) the countries now producing and exporting the metals, or the 
land-based producers of metals, who foresaw the threat of competition from 
the seabed nodule production; and 3) the majority of the developing 
countries whose main concern was distribution of the benefits resulting 
from the exploitation of the nodules, as a part of the common heritage, to 
the international community as a whole, and not just to a small number of 
industrial entrepreneurs. To achieve their objectives, the last two groups 
desired to maintain control over the use of the seabed minerals. The 
Treaty is a complex mechanism to reach a compromise among these seemingly 
conflicting objectives.
68
b9
Organization and Power
The principal governing structure created by the LOS Treaty Is the 
International Seabed Authority (ISA) which would exercise almost unlimited 
control over exploitation of the deep seabed minerals. Organizational 
structure of the ISA is similar to the United Nations, but it is more 
liberal in substance. Based on Article 158 of the Convention, the ISA 
consists of four organs: an Assembly, a Council, a Secretariat, and an
Enterprise. The Assembly is considered the supreme organ and it includes 
all member countries. The decisions in the Assembly are made by a 
two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, with each member 
country having only one vote. While the Assembly has the law making power, 
the Council is granted operating power. The Council has no permanent 
members, and there is no veto power in the council, or elsewhere— contrary 
to the current situation in the United Nations (Articles 159 to 162 of the
Convention). The Council members are elected from the Assembly body and
represent four different groups totaling 36:
1. Four members from the states that, during the last five years
have either consumed more than 2 percent of total world consumption of the 
metals or have had net imports of more than 2 percent of total world 
imports of the commodities produced from the type of metals to be derived 
from the deep ocean, and in any case one state from the Eastern European 
(Socialist) region;
2. Four members from the states with the largest investments in the 
seabed, including at least one state from the Eastern European (Socialist) 
regime;
3. Six members from developing countries representing special 
interests such as states with large populations, states which are land­
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locked or geographically disadvantaged, .... or states which are potential 
producer of such minerals;
4. Eighteen remaining members from various regions of the world to 
ensure an equitable geographical distribution of the seats in the Council, 
including at least one member from Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe
(Socialist), Latin America and Western European, and others (Article 161 of 
the Convention).
Article 155 of the Convention indicates that fifteen years from the 
January of the year in which the earliest commercial production commences, 
a review conference shall be held to reconsider the provisions of the
Treaty, But, before then, ten years from the date of the Convention enters 
into force, the states consented to be bounded by the Convention are 
allowed to propose specific amendments to the Convention.
The Parallel System
The establishment of the ISA to promote exploitation of the 
resources of the international zone was generally agreed upon; however, the 
procedure by which the ultimate control would be exercised became a major 
issue. At one extreme, the developing countries expected the ISA to carry 
out the actual seabed mining; at the other extreme, the industrialized 
countries favored a system of state-sponsored contractors who would pay a 
levy to the ISA. The parallel system, originally proposed by Henry 
Kissinger in 1976, combines the two ideas so that the state-sponsored 
organizations can exploit areas of the ocean while, at the same time, they 
have to indicate areas of proven equal economic value to be reserved for 
exploitation by the Enterprise (Article 153 of the Convention). The
Enterprise will reserve the right to choose between the two sites of equal
economic value.
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To ensure the ability of the Enterprise to exploit the areas allo­
cated to it, the provisions of the Treaty guarantee access of the 
Enterprise to financial resources and to the necessary seabed mining 
technology. The initial capital costs of developing the first mine site by 
the Enterprise is estimated to be between $700 million to $2200 million. 
Half of this amount was supposed to be in the form of private loans 
guaranteed by the states consented to be bound by the Convention, and the 
other half in the form of interest free loans from them. But, many 
delegates have expressed reluctance to accept this commitment. The 
financing problem will be more severe if the major powers don't ratify the 
Treaty (Langevad, 1983; and Oxman, 1983). The Authority, as well as the 
Enterprise, are also to be granted exemption from any kind of taxes or 
duties-this includes the exemption of the Enterprise from taxes and 
royalties to be paid for the exploitation of the resources of the deep 
seabed.
Technology Transfer
Article 144 and 266-269 of the Convention and Article 5 of Annex III
of the Treaty require the States Parties,* directly or through reliable
2
international organizations, to transfer marine technology to the
^Article 1 of the Conversion defines "State Parties” as the "States 
which have conscended to be bound by this Convention and for which this 
Convention is in force."
2
According to Article 5 of Annex III, "technology" means "the 
specialized equipment and technical know-how, including manuals, designs, 
operating instructions, training and technical advice and assistance, 
necessary to assemble, maintain and operate a viable system and the legal 
right to use these items for that purpose on a non-exclusive basis."
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Enterprise and the developing States on a fair commercial terms and 
conditions. The purpose of the transfer of technology is to help the 
developing States with their economic development and advancement of their 
domestic technology. Technology transfer is also to assist the Enterprise 
to acquire the scientific knowledge necessary for the exploitation of 
marine resources. Each operator, as a part of its plan of work to be 
submitted to the ISA, should inform the Authority of a general description 
of the technology it intends to use. Operators are also expected to inform 
the Authority of any substantial technological changes introduced after the 
submission of the plan of work. The technology should be available to the 
Authority at its request only if the Authority is unable to obtain the 
technology in question, or an equally efficient technology, at a fair 
market price. In the event the operator does not provide the Authority 
with the technology, its rights to use that technology in carrying out the 
mining activities will be denied. The provisions of technology transfer 
have created a great deal of resentment among the developed countries who 
own the technology, especially since there is no clear market for transfer 
of technological know-how.
In the Treaty, there are several suggested measures to be considered 
by the developed States in regard to the transfer of technology. Some of 
these measures are as follows:
a) creating favorable economic and legal conditions for the
transfer of marine technology;
b) development of human resources of the developing States by
training and education:
c) undertaking and promotion of joint ventures;
d) promoting the exchange of scientists;
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and, e) conducting scientific and technological conferences, seminars, 
and symposia, especially In the field of marine technology.
Production Policies
To protect the existing land-based mineral industry from adverse 
economic impacts of manganese nodules exploitation, a scheme for limiting 
the amount of metal production from the seabed was designed. The major 
land-based producers supported by this plan are from both industrialized 
and developing countries such as Zaire, Canada, Australia, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. One difficulty In developing a protection scheme was the fact 
that several metals are produced together. Finally, taking into account 
the relative size of the output of each metal from manganese nodules In 
relation to the size of its industry output as a whole, and the relative 
prices of metals, the decision was made to use nickel production level as 
the controlling factor. Based on Article 151 of the Convention, the
adopted system limits the production of nickel from the seabed for an 
interim period of twenty years from the start of seabed production to 60 
percent of the increase in the world demand for nickel. A trend line 
method was adopted for estimating the future world demand for nickel as 
well as the production ceiling for each year. A safeguard clause provides 
assurances for the continuity of seabed mining if world demand for nickel 
Is low.
A brief explanation of the economics of the three major metals—  
nickel, copper, and cobalt— would help to understand the reason for linking 
the production ceiling plan to nickel. The annual production of these 
metals, during the late 1970s, was 700 thousand tons of nickel, 7,600 tons 
of copper, and 27 thousand tons of cobalt. Each standard seabed mining 
project Is expected to process 38 thousand tons of nickel, 33
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thousand tons of copper, and 3.8 thousand tons of cobalt annually. Vlth 
1977.prices, nickel vas considered to be the main source of revenues for 
seabed miners. Therefore, it vas assumed that the miners would try to 
maximize their nickel production (Langevad, 1983), According to these 
statistics, Langevad, a technical consultant on the IDS Issues, estimates 
that one seabed project alone produces 531 of nickel market, 0.5% of the 
copper market, and 15% of cobalt market. Or, a 10% penetration In the 
copper market will be accompanied with 115% penetration in the nickel 
market, and 286% penetration In the cobalt market; whereas If there Is a 
10% penetration In the nickel market, a 1% penetration In the copper market 
and a 26% penetration in the cobalt market can be expected. These 
calculations demonstrate the degree of complexity In policy making of 
production limits.
The Treaty does not specifically include any direct pricing scheme 
for the metals, nevertheless, merket stability of those commodities 
produced by the metals derived from manganese nodules at prices 
remunerative to producers and fair to consumers is a part of the announced 
strategies of Article 151 of the Convention. In addition, to compensate 
the land-based producers of metals from developing. Article 151 recommends 
a system of payment or some other measures of economic adjustment 
assistance such as cooperation of specialized agencies and International 
organizations.
Financial Provisions
There will be two principle sources of revenue for the ISA: the
profits of the Enterprise which will extract, process, and market manganese 
nodules on behalf of the International community; and fees, royalties, and 
taxes levied on the state-sponsored operators. Given that the Enterprise
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will have to borrow a substantial amount of money to start its first mining 
operation, it is not expected to provide much financial assistance to the 
ISA. In dealing with the state-sponsored operations, the Treaty in Article 
13 of Annex III makes provision for three types of payments: a) an
application fee; b) an annual fixed fee; and c) either a production charge, 
or a combination of production charge and a share of net proceeds.
Firms or countries interested in exploration or mining of the 
resources of the deep seabed will be charged an administrative fee of 
$500,000 per application. Then, a fixed annual fee of $1 million a year is 
required until commercial production begins. In addition, after the start 
of commercial production, if the operator chooses production charge system 
(or royalties) the levy will be initially 5% of the market value of the 
processed metals and will increase to 12% after 10 years. Alternatively, 
the operator can pay a production charge of 2% in the early stage of mining 
operation and 4% after the operator has recovered his development costs. 
Under this system, the operator should pay 35% of its net proceeds (or 
profits) as long as its return on investment is less than 10%, and the 
percentage of net proceeds levied would rise gradually to 70% when return 
on investment is 20% or greater. The second alternative is actually a 
progressive profit tax system. While the Enterprise is exempted from the 
payment of any fees or taxes to either ISA or national governments, there 
is no provision in the Treaty to prevent double taxation of the 
state-sponsored operators.
Although the two main sources of ISA's revenues are expected to 
generate significant financial resources in the future, the ISA needs money 
for its present activities such as the Preparatory Commission meetings. 
Therefore, to close this gap, Article 160 of the Convention requires the
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states that have signed the Treaty to make contributions to the adminis­
trative budget of the Authority in accordance with the scale used for the 
regular budget of the United Nations until the Authority generates enough 
income from other sources to meet its administrative expenses. Since the 
U.S. pays 25% of the U.N. budget, it will also be the chief contributor of 
the Authority's budget.
Financially, the primary beneficiaries of the Authority's revenues 
are the land-based producers of metals and the developing countries. From 
the future net revenues of the ISA, the land-based producers will be com­
pensated for their losses of their revenues due to either decline in their 
output level or in prices of metal caused by the exploitation of manganese 
nodules. The developing countries will also receive some pecuniary assis­
tance for humanitarian reasons. In addition to these two groups, national 
liberation groups, such as the PLO, will be among the recipients of 
financial benefits for humanitarian and political reasons.
The Preparatory Commission
This commission consists of the states which have either signed the 
Convention or acceded to it. The role of the Committee is to draft rules 
and regulations as well as clarification, interpretation, and application 
of the Convention text with more precision. As a part of this task, the 
Preparatory Commission is to exercise the powers and functions assigned to 
it under the Preparatory Investment in Pioneer Activities (PIPA) provisions 
of Resolution II. The Commission has recently met for the third time and 
will remain in existence until the first meeting of the Assembly.
The reference to the PIPA calls for further explanation because it 
will have significant impact on the development of deep seabed mining 
during the 20 year interim period. Originally, under Resolution II, the
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intention was to provide protection for six consortia and one state which 
had invested funds in developing seabed mining technology, equipment and 
expertise before 1983. Resolution II identified the pioneer investors as a 
French consortium, a Japanese consortium, and four other consortia 
consisting of firms from Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States. These 
pioneer investors are to be legally protected by granting them a right to 
delineate an exclusive area for their exploitation activities as soon as 
the Preparatory Commission begins to function until the Convention comes 
into force. They will also be given priority in obtaining a production 
authorization within the total production ceiling no later than six months 
from the time the Convention comes into force. Of course, the Enterprise 
is recognized as a pioneer operator and will receive priority for 
production authorization of two projects.
In the final version of Resolution II, the scope of the pioneer 
investors protection plan was extended to include the Soviet Union and 
India. The developing countries will also be added, if they carry out 
investments at the, same level as required for the original group of 
investors; but, the time for developing countries was extended to January 
of 1985 (Brown, 1983).
CHAPTER VII
U.S. POLICY ALTERNATIVES TO THE LAW OF THE SEA TREATY
Since the early 1970s, most of the industrialized countries capable 
of deep-seabed raining have expressed their discontent with the U.N. Confer­
ence. Of course, the disagreement with the continuing process leading to 
the LOST has not been unanimous among the industrialized countries, nor has 
the position of each industrialized country remained the same In time. For 
example, the fact that Denmark, France, Ireland, and Greece have signed the 
Treaty, presumably In order to be assured of their participation in the 
Preparatory Committee, is an indication of some disarray among the 
industrialized countries (Simmonds, 1983). Earlier, France had passed a 
unilateral legislation on the exploration and exploitation of the mineral 
resources of the deep sea-bed (Brown, 1983). The U.S. position has also 
changed in time depending on the policies of the administration in office 
at the time. In the early and mid 1970s, when Henry Kissinger was the 
Secretary of State, the U.S. seemed to support the parallel system of ocean 
mining. It is even believed that Henry Kissinger origianlly proposed the 
idea of the parallel system. The Carter administration also had a rather 
compromising view of the Treaty. But, the Reagan administration has been 
strongly opposed to the parallel system embedded in the LOST.
At this time, the U.S. is the major challenger of the Treaty, 
especially the ISA. Understandably, most of the provisions of the Treaty 
are at odds with the United States' interests. Although there have been 
some improvements in the Treaty to satisfy the U.S., the following 
objections remain unsettled.
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1. The Treaty has given the ISA almost unlimited control over the 
sea-bed resources of the ocean and it is by far the greatest obstacle to 
deep sea-bed mining.
2. While the U.S. will contribute 25% of the Authority's budget 
during the early years of its operation, the system of governance of the 
Treaty has not guaranteed commensurate influence according to its financial 
contributions and the technological and financial ability of its firms to 
extract deep seabed mineral resources. Based on the Treaty provisions no 
veto power is given to any country and there is no guaranteed seat for the 
U.S. in the 36 member governing Council.
3. Private companies, as a precondition to receiving production 
authorization, are required to sell their technology to the Enterprise and 
developing countries at a "fair" price, if they are unable to acquire the 
necessary technology for ocean mining elsewhere. The notion of technology 
transfer has been one of the most controversial issues. The U.S. objec­
tions in this regard can be summarized as follows: a) under the Treaty 
provisions, it is impossible for the U.S. firms to negotiate a fair deal 
with the ISA for their technology; b) the term "technology" is left 
undefined; c) firms will be obliged to expose not only their own 
technological know how but that of others associated with them in the 
production process either vertically or horizontally; d) under mandatory 
technology transfer, there would be no patent protection; therefore, the 
incentives for technological innovation will be reduced; e) the transferred 
technology to the Authority can be passed on to the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern bloc nations.
4. Mandatory production ceilings, which include limiting the number 
of sites, and provisions for commodity agreements to protect land-based
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producers are against free market standards and will endanger resource 
independence objectives of the U.S. Besides, consumers of metals will have 
to pay higher prices in the future. Furthermore, since the production 
limit is based on nickel, changes of demand for other minerals, especially 
cobalt and manganese, cannot be accommodated.
5. American firms will be put in a disadvantaged position in 
comparison with the Enterprise and the firms from the developing countries 
because of the preferential treatment given to them. These privileges 
include tax exemptions, selection and sharing of mine sites, transfer 
technology, interest free loans, and etc.
6. The automatic review and the openness of the Treaty to 
amendments in the future would create Insecurity for private investors.
7. In addition to the specific objections to the provisions of the 
Treaty, the U.S. is afraid that the Treaty will become a precedent in its 
relations with the developing countries. The fact is that the New Interna­
tional Economic Order sought in the Treaty is not favored by the U.S.
During the course of developing the LOST, the industrialized coun­
tries attempted to create a free-access regime of seabed mining through 
their Licensing and Registry Office proposals to the U.N. Conference. 
Having failed to achieve this objective in the Conference, some of the 
industrialized countries resorted to unilateral seabed mining legislation. 
Since the formal announcement of President Reagan in July of 1982 that the 
U.S. would not adhere to the Convention mainly because of objections to the 
form and the content of the proposed seabed mining regime (Simmonds, 1983), 
t-he U.S. has been seeking to create some alternative arrangements for the 
seabed development to proceed. In fact, unilateral actions were considered 
by some of the industrialized countries in the 1970s (Laursen, 1982). The
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purpose of the national legislation at this time was to allow the mining 
industry to begin commercial mining before the LOST was completed. In the 
U.S., the first bill was introduced in 1971; but, it was in the early 1980s 
that the Congress finally adopted legislation under which companies can 
register claims and demand permits for commercial mining by 1988 (New York 
Times, April 1981, p. D 15). Similar legislation has been approved by the 
U.K., West Germany, France, and the U.S.S.R. Italy Is expected to be added 
to this group shortly (Simmonds, 1983; New York Times, April 1981, p. D 15; 
and Brown, 1983).
In addition to the domestic legislation, the U.S. has continued to 
explore the possibility of drawing up a mini treaty with the other indus­
trialized nations such as West Germany, France, the U.K., and France. The 
purpose of a mini treaty is coordination of the national legislations and 
provision of a framework for a Reciprocating States Regime where the 
licences issued by one state are recognized by the other reciprocating 
states. Principal benefits of a Reciprocating States Regime is that the 
mining companies will be assured of a tenure In the mining site against 
potential competitors from the other reciprocating states. Also, the 
mining company from the states included in the mini treaty will be 
protected against potential competitors from the states outside the treaty. 
But, still the security of the reciprocating states' miners is threatened 
by direct physical interference of the countries claiming to protect the 
common heritage of mankind from illegal miners, and by legal challenges in 
the International courts.
Harmony among the reciprocating states is necessary for the success 
of a mini treaty. Essentially all national legislations approved so far 
are designed to provide free-access through licensing to operators from
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their own states. According to Brown (1983), in the national legislations 
of the U.S., West Germany, the U.K., and France there are no limitations on 
the number of sites held by each licensee. The anti-monopoly provisions of 
the LOST, however, limits the number of sites held by each operator to one 
while the Enterprise is initially permitted to have two mine sites during 
the interim period. Financially, some kind of tax or royalty is levied on 
the mining companies by their own state. Brown estimates that the proceeds 
of these taxes or royalties would generate approximately half as much 
revenues as could be collected under the LOST regime. Most national 
legislations are vague about the use of the trust funds established with 
the revenues generated by the states. Brown maintains that the American 
Act includes no specific commitment about the use of the trust fund if the 
U.S. has not entered the Convention by 1990. The German Act is the only
one which is clear and specific in this regard. In the German Act, the
national regulation of seabed mining is considered transitional and the 
trust fund is to be Invested for foreign aid purposes until West Germany 
enters the Convention. After its entry the Government of West Germany is 
authorized to transfer the funds to the ISA (Allen and Craven 1979, and 
Brown, 1983).
The debate on the mining regime governing the use of ocean resources 
is not over yet. The American advocates of the LOST argue that if the U.S. 
does not sign the agreement, it will suffer in the long run. Louis Kenkin, 
an expert on international law maintains that "the Treaty is probably the
best one obtainable and is certainly better than the alternative of
isolating the U.S. by not signing the agreement" (Time, July 1982). Most 
of those involved in the negotiations and some raining company executives do 
not believe that a "mini treaty" is enough to risk major investments that
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could be challenged by other nations and by an international treaty, if one 
works out (New York Times, April 1981). Elliott Richardson, Jimmy Carter's 
chief negotiator for the UNCLOS, holds that miners need an exclusive legal 
right to a suitable ore body before they undertake the large, long term 
investment necessary for the recovery and processing of the ore (Goldwin, 
1981).
CHAPTER VIII
MARKET STRUCTURE OF LAND-BASED MINING 
In this chapter, the market structures of the land-based mining of 
cobalt, nickel, copper, and manganese are investigated. The physical
properties and applications of each metal is studied first. Then the size 
of reserves and reserve base for each country and the world are discussed. 
Distribution of the reserves and reserves base of the metals are the major 
determinants of not only the present market structure but also the one in 
the future. The following step would be consumption and demand of each 
country and the world for each method. Recycling and use of substitutes 
are discussed as alternative methods of satisfying the need for the metals. 
National stockpile projects have been developed to deal with the threat of 
shortage of minerals. Finally, production share of each country in the 
world output and its impact on price of the minerals is studied.
In writing this chapter, an attempt was made to include the study of 
forms of ownership in the mineral deposits market, the mineral ores market, 
and the refined metals market. The ownership system in each of these 
markets can influence the market structure in that market, thereby, prices. 
In the planned economy countries, the deposits, the ores, and the refined 
metals are all owned by the State. Although, some of the ore produced in 
these countries are exported to the market economy countries for refining, 
its size has been limited in recent years. Among the market economy 
countries, there are two groups with two distinct situations. First, there 
are the developed countries which have partial state ownership of deposits.
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But, in these countries the federal and state land containing deposits are 
leased through auctions to the private sector for extraction purposes. The 
form of ownership in the next two stages, i.e., mining and refining, are 
virtually private. In most of the developing countries, however, strategic 
mineral deposits are, generally speaking, owned by the government. In 
these countries the state is also engaged in the extraction of ore. But, 
often the ore is sold to the developed countries before being refined. In 
recent years, to absorb more of the value added to the product, developing 
countries have tried to refine their ore within their own countries. Thus, 
in the market economy camp, the degree of private ownership increases as we 
move from mining to processing and refining stages of production. Since 
the information available on the form of ownership in the first and third 
markets are incomplete, the focus will be on the mining ore market.
Cobalt
Cobalt is strategically important because of its essential qualities 
such as heat resistance, high strength, wear resistance, and superior 
magnetic properties. Due to these properties, cobalt is a major element in 
superalloys used in jet engine parts. Its other specialized uses include 
electrical devices, cutting tools, permanent magnets, catalysts, and many 
more in the chemical industry.
Cobalt, in its natural state, is usually associated with copper and 
nickel ores. The amount of cobalt in the minerals varies from 1 to 5 
percent. Given the relative scarcity of cobalt in the mixture of other 
ores and their close association, the separation process is considered both 
complex and costly. Therefore, cobalt is regarded as a by-product or 
co-product in the processing plants which are primarily designed for the
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recovery of copper and nickel. Rough estimations of Levy and Odunton 
(1984) indicate that at least 90% of copper and nickel of the
cobalt-bearing ore is presently being extracted while the relevant figure 
for cobalt is less than 50%. They maintain that, in the short-run, the 
major determinants of the amount of cobalt produced are the type of
copper-nickel processing plant in use and the capacity of the plant devoted 
to cobalt recovery. Levy and Odunton also believe that cobalt should not 
be recognized strictly as a byproduct of copper and nickel because after 
the recovery of copper and nickel, further processing is needed which 
requires some additional highly intensive capital. Thus, in the long-run, 
only sufficiently high prices of cobalt can justify the extra capital cost.
Table 8-1 includes the world cobalt reserves and reserve base. The 
U.S. Geological Survey has defined reserve base as "the in-place demon­
strated resources from which reserves are estimated and includes those
resources that are currently economic and some that are currently sub-
economic" (Mineral Comodity Profiles, 1983, p.4). But, the economically 
extractable part of the reserve base at the time of estimation is known as 
reserves. According to these definitions, Zaire has both the largest re­
serve base and reserves of cobalt. Other countries rich with cobalt are 
Zambia, New Caledonia, and Cuba. Although the U.S. reserve base of cobalt 
is considerable, there are no economically recoverable reserves at this
time. Cobalt is one of the common elements in the earth's crust, and world 
cobalt reserves are believed to be sufficient to meet the demand in the 
foreseeable future (Levy and Odunton, 1984). However, a high degree of
concentration in the ownership of the resources and the control of refining
capacity, in addition to the increasing scarcity of virgin cobalt, can lead
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TABLE 8-1 - World Cobalt Reserves and Reserve Base 
(Million Pounds)
Area Reserve Reserve Base
North America:
United States 0 1,900
Canada 100 570
Cuba 400 2,000
TOTAL 500 4,470
South America:
Brazil 0 60
Guatemala 0 100
Peru 0 200
TOTAL 0 360
Europe:
Finland 50 75
Greece 30 275
U.S.S.R. 300 500
Yugoslavia 20 100
TOTAL 400 950
Africa:
Botswana 20 60
Morocco 0 10
South Africa 40 150
Uganda 0 40
Zaire 3000 4,600
Zambia 800- 1,200
Zimbabwe 5 10
TOTAL 3,865 6,070
Asia:
India 40 90
Indonesia 400 1,200
Philippines 300 880
TOTAL 740 2,170
Oceania:
Australia 50 200
New Caledonia 500 1,900
TOTAL 550 2,100
World Total (Land-based) 6,000 16,000
SOURCE; Mineral Commodity Profile* 1983.
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to a continuous increase in the price of cobalt in the long-run (Fischman, 
1980).
World cobalt consumption has grown rapidly, though irregularly, 
since the 1960's. The major consumers of cobalt in this period have been 
the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., and Germany. Most of 
the cobalt consumption in these countries has been in manufacturing of jet 
aircraft engines, precisions electronics, and high speed machine tools. 
There has been a decline in the consumption of cobalt between 1979 and 
1982, mainly due to the world recession. However, Engineering and Mining 
Journal reports that, along with the world economic recovery, consumption 
of cobalt has Increased in 1983 (John LeRoy, 1984). Experts believe that 
the share of U.S.S.R. consumption is steadily increasing; but, since most 
of its cobalt are provided through domestic or Cuban sources, its 
consumption has limited impact on international trade of cobalt. The 
remainder of the world consumption, about 75% of total, takes place among 
market economies. Among the Western industrialized countries, the United 
States and Japan have contributed significantly to the consumption growth.
Historically, consumption of cobalt has not been always equal to its 
demand in the market. On one hand, increasing prices and the insecurity of 
the supply of cobalt to the industrialized countries have encouraged build 
up of stockpiles, thereby increasing the demand for cobalt above its 
consumption level. On the other hand, the same factors have led to the 
development of secondary sources and to the substitution of other metals 
for cobalt.
The U.S. National Defense stockpile was established in 1946 to 
secure availability of strategic materials in times of war. The level of 
stockpile goal has varied several times since then. However, there have
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been two major changes. In 1973, the stockpile objective as set at 11.95 
million pounds which was 26.25 million pounds lower than the previous
objective. Between 1967 to 1976, about 61 million pounds of cobalt in
excess of the stockpile was sold in the market. In 1976, the objective
level of stockpile was raised to about 85.4 million pounds and the 
government has been periodically buying cobalt in the market for this
purpose (William Kirk, 1983). Other industrialized countries, such as the 
U.K. and Japan, have recently attempted to build strategic minerals 
stockpiles (John LeRoy, 1984).
Recycling provides a second source to satisfy the demand for cobalt. 
In 1981, recycling, used as a method oof conservation, accounted for 
meeting 8% of the U.S. demand for cobalt (W. Kirk, 1984). Kirk reports 
that considerable quantities of cobalt included in mixed scrap Is also 
recoverd by other countries. The major source of secondary cobalt is the 
waste material discarded in making cobalt bearing superalloys. Some 
chemical wastes have also been recently recycled. But most of the other 
cobalt-bearing products such as chemicals, salts, driers, and magnets are 
dissipative.
There is indeed a competition between the primary or virgin industry 
and the secondary or recycling industry depending on the degree of 
substitutability of the outputs from the two industries. In most cases, 
since the scrap, especially the old scrap, is processed directly to new 
alloys rather than being converted to its individual metallic form, the 
primary and secondary sources can be considered as imperfect substitutes. 
The secondary industry is essentially made up of many small firms. Also, 
the size of the secondary industry, in comparison with the primary indus­
try, is so small that the firms in the secondary industry are basically
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price-takers. Rising cost of production in the primary market in recent 
years, due to the increase in the price of energy and the subsequent higher 
prices of the metals from the primary sources have boosted the activities 
in the secondary market.
Attempts to find substitutes for cobalt have increased in the last 
two decades. Nickel is usually used as a substitute for cobalt; while 
cobalt can also be substituted for nickel. For instance, during the 1969 
nickel mining strike in Canada, cobalt was effectively applied in electro­
plating (William Kirk, 1983). But a few points regarding cobalt substi­
tutes ought to be kept in mind. First, in any substitution of cobalt, even 
by nickel, some of the size, weight, or other physical properties will be 
lost. Secondly, substitution by nickel is replacing one expensive and 
scarce resource with another. Thirdly, cost of cobalt as an input, in most 
cases, is a small fraction of the total cost of the final product. There­
fore, even at the relatively higher prices of today, the cobalt cost does 
not have a major impact on the cost of the final product. Finally, the 
trend currently is towards an increase in the use of alloys with less 
cobalt, instead of a complete substitution of other metals with cobalt 
(Fischman, 1980; and Kirk, 1983).
According to the Mineral Commodity Profile of 1983, Table 8-2, the 
world mine production of cobalt between 1971 and 1981 has been fluctuating 
due to many factors including the economic conditions of the world, Zaire’s 
pricing policies, and changes of the U.S. stockpile. Among various 
determinants of the world output level of cobalt, the dominant role of 
Zaire is perhaps the major element that requires further discussion. Table 
8-3 shows mine production and mine production capacity of various 
countries. In most cases, cobalt is produced as a by-product of nickel or
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SOURCE:
TABLE 8-2 
WORLD MINE PRODUCTION OF COBALT 
(Thousands of Pounds)
Year World Production
1971 54,954
1972 54,752
1973 61,056
1974 63,264
1975 56,460
1976 47,218
1977 51,698
1978 59,542
1979 65,586
1980 67,476
1981 66,053
1982 55,300
1983 46,800
Mineral Commidity Profile, 1983; Mineral Year Book 1982; and, 
Mineral Commodity Summaries, 1984.
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TABLE 8-3
COBALT PRODUCTION AND CAPACITY BY COUNTRY 
(Thousands of Pounds)
Mine Production 
Mine Production Capacity
1981 1982 1983 1981 1985*
Zaire 30,860 24,920 20,000 35,500 42,000
Zambia 9,920 7,160 7,000 10,000 12,000
Canada 5,000 3,300 3,200 5,500 5,000
U.S.S.R. 4,960 5,000 5,200 5,000 5,000
Cuba 3,940 3,300 3,640 4,000 4,000
Australia 3,520 4,800 4,000 3,700 4,000
Philippines 2,400 1,100 1,000 2,800 3,000
Finland 2,280 2,200 2,200 3,000 3,500
Morocco 1,658 1,540 — 2,500 2,500
Botswana 550 560 600 600 1,000
New Caledonia 310 1,100 600 500 2,000
U.S.A. — — — — —
South Africa 475 N.A. N.A. 500 500
Others 127 N. A. N.A.
WORLD TOTALS 66,000 55,300 46,800 73,300 84,000
SOURCE: Mineral Commodity Profile, 1983; and Mineral Commodity
Summaries, 1984.
*Mine production capacity figures for 1985 are from Levy and 
Odunton's article which appeared in 1984 Natural Resources Forum.
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copper mining. Zaire is the world's largest producer of cobalt. However, 
its market share has been declining from 57% in 1978 to 45% in 1983, 
Zaire's role as the major importer of cobalt to the U.S. is also
dissipating. While in 1978, Zaire supplied 60% of the total U.S. imports 
of cobalt, in 1982 its share had dropped to only 16%.
There are two reasons for the decline in Zaire's market share.
First, due to world recession, demand for cobalt has decreased. Second, in 
response to the decreasing demand, Zaire cut back in its production in 
order to stablize cobalt prices. Zaire's single state-owned producer of 
cobalt, Generale des Carrieres et des Mines (GECAMINES), has been recog­
nized as a price-leader with its semi-monopolistic position in the world's 
cobalt market. Other than the sharp price increase of 1978 where Zambia 
and Finland took the initiative and Zaire followed, Zaire has always 
appeared as the price leader.
Producer quoted price of cobalt increased from $1.50 per pound in 
1964 to $25 per pound in 1979, where only the price increase of 78-79
raised the share of the revenues generated by cobalt production in Zaire
and Zambia from about 10 percent of total mineral export earnings to more 
than 30 percent. The price rise also improved the position of cobalt from 
being a by-product of nickel and copper to being a co-product. In spite of 
the change in the status of cobalt, experts still maintain that supply is 
relatively inelastic. However, the causality between the price jump of the 
late 1970's and the expansion of production facilities or build up of new 
facilities is accepted by them (Sibley, 1979). While demand is considered 
as the primary determinant of price (Fischman, 1980), costs of raining and 
refining remains as an influential factor (Sibley, 1979).
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Kirk (1983) sees the price increases between 1964 to 1979 as a 
reflection of several factors including: 1) inflation, 2) the elimination
of cobalt from a list of commodities prohibited from being shipped to 
Sino-Soviet nations in 1964, 3) increase in the U.S. cobalt consumption 
during the Vietnam War, 4) the 1967 nationalization of mines in Zaire, 5) 
substitution of cobalt for nickel during the Canadian nickel strike in 
1969, 6) the U.S. dollar depreciation against Belgium franc in 1972-78, 7) 
ending the sales of cobalt in excess of the national stockpile goal in 
1976, 8) Invasion of Zaire in 1978, and 9) excess demand for copper and 
nickel created by a decline in their production along with an unusual high 
demand for them.
The $25 per pound price of cobalt quoted by Zaire remained constant 
until February 1981 when the price began to drop in response to falling 
world demand. By this time, the dealers who were not representing the 
producers had established a free market where cobalt was sold at $20-22 per 
pound. Although less than 15 percent of the world trade was taking place 
in this market, to regain its declining market share, Zaire reduced its 
price to $20 per pound. But, the free market price decreased to $17-18. 
Zaire, which was accumulating undesired inventories and was suffering from 
heavy foreign debts offered the U.S. government 5.2 million pounds of
cobalt at the price of $15 per pound; $5 below the official price quoted by 
Zaire. The reaction of the free market to this transaction was lowering of 
the price to $9.50-10.00 by November of 1981. Further drops in Zaire 
posted price in 1982 to $12.50 per pound was followed by a decrease in
market price to $5 per pound. Before the end of 1982 market price
approached $4.25/lb. However, the price statistics of early 1983 indicates
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an upward movement of cobalt prices trailing the world economic recovery 
and increase in demand for cobalt.
Zambia is the second largest producer of cobalt in the world. The 
two state-owned mining companies in Zambia, Nchanga Consolidated Copper 
Mines Ltd. and Roan Consolidated Mines Ltd, have recently merged into 
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. (ZCCM). Table 8-4 includes the name 
of the firms and their state of ownership. In Canada, cobalt mining is 
undertaken by three state owned companies: Inco, Falconbridge, and
Sherritt Gordon Mines Ltd. Due to low cobalt demand, Falconbridge and
Sherritt Gordon Mines have been recently shut down. Cobalt production
in the U.S.S.R. and Cuba is controlled by the state. In Australia,
Metals Exploration, Ltd. and Queensland Nickel Pty., Ltd. are jointly 
extracting cobalt. In most of the other major cobalt producing coun­
tries, there is only one firm in operation which is either totally or
partially state-owned. The U.S., at this point, is not producing any 
cobalt; but since 1974 a relatively large refinery at the Port Nickel, 
La., has been established by AMAX which receives its matte from
Botswana, New Caledonia, and South Africa. Cobalt matte extracted from 
developing countries mines is ususally sent to western European
countries or Japan for refining processes.
A recent study by Lemons (1984) on the competitive position of
nickel-cobalt and copper-cobalt deposits in the market economy countries 
shows that the market structure of cobalt mining industry depends on the 
cost of production on one hand, and price of the output on the other. 
Among the determinants of cost in Lemons' study are: prices of factors
of production such as labor, energy, and supplies; as well as technology 
of production, joint recovery with copper and nickel, and the ore grade.
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TABLE 8-4
COBALT PRODUCING FIRMS AND THEIR OWNERSHIP
Country Firms Form of Ownership
Zaire
Zambia
Canada
U.S.S.R.
Cuba
Australia
Philippines
Finland
Morocco
Botswana
New Caledonia
Generale des Carrieres et des Mines 
(GECAMINES)
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines, Ltd.
(ZCCM)
Inco
Falconbridge
Sherritt Gordon Mines, Ltd.
Metals Exploration Ltd. and 
Queensland Nickel Pty. Ltd.-Jointly 
Marinduqe Mining and Industrial Corp.
Autokumpu oy
Bon Azzer Mine
Bamangwato Concessions, Ltd.
Societe Metallurgique le Nickel
State-owned
State-owned
State-owned
State-owned
State-owned
State-owned
State-owned
Partially
State-owned
Privately-
owned
State-owned
Partially
State-owned
State-Owned
SOURCES: Kirk, William, Mineral Yearbook, 1982; Sibley, Scott, Mineral
Commodity Profile, 1979; and, International Directory of 
Mining published by Engineering and Mining Journal, 1981.
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Lemons' estimates of the impact of an overall cost increase, due to 
inflation from 1981 to 1983, on selected countries explains a decline of 
69 percent in the potentially economical resources of Canada and a 4 
percent decline for Zaire, These variations are because of the differ­
ences of factor intensity in the production methods used by these 
countries. But, the focus of Lemons' study is really on the impact of 
the changes of price of cobalt, between 1981 and 1982, on the economic 
viability of cobalt deposits. For this purpose, the deposits of the 
countries were ranked according to the economic feasibility of their 
extraction under the market prices prevailing during the study period. 
Considering the ore grade status of the deposits and with a 15% IRR, as 
the market price was lowered Zaire's production level declined in 
absolute terms but its market share increased. Finally, at the low 
market prices of November 1982, Zaire became almost the sole producer of 
cobalt among the market economy countries. Although it is not explicit­
ly stated by Lemons, one can see in his report the important role that 
the ore grade of cobalt deposits in various countries can play in the 
market structure of the industry.
Nickel
Nickel's major application is in the iron and steel industry. 
Chemical, petroleum, and areospace industries are the most specific 
beneficiaries of nickel. In fact, nickel is most valuable in alloys 
with other elements. Because of its specific physical properties such 
as corrosion resistance and strength under a very high or low 
temperature, nickel is regarded as a critical metal. Although Chromium, 
manganese, cobalt, molybdenum, columbium, and vanadium are potential
TABLE 8-5
WORLD NICKEL RESERVE AND RESERVE BASE 
_________(Thousand Short Tons)_________
Area Reserve
North America:
United States 
Canada
TOTAL
Latin America:
Brazil
Columbia
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Guatemala
Venezuela
TOTAL
Europe:
Greece
Finland
U.S.S.R.
Others
TOTAL
Africa:
Botswana 
South Africa 
Zimbabwe
TOTAL
Asia:
Indonesia
Philippines
TOTAL
Oceania:
Australia 
New Caledonia
TOTAL
WORLD TOTAL (Land-Based)
Reserve Base
2,700
8,200 8,600
8,200 11,300
700 800
600 700
3,200 3,400
1,000 1,200
— 600
— 650
5,500 7,350
2,100 2,400
40 50
8,000 8,100
1,800 2,000
11,940 12,550
400 500
900 1,000
200 300
1,500 1,800
2,300
5,500
2,500
5,700
7,800 8,200
5,200 5,600
14,000 15,000
19,200 20,600
54,000 62,000
Source: Mineral Commodity Profile, 1983.
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substitutes for nickel, due to limits to the degree of substitutability 
and relative scarcity of these metals, the critical nature of nickel 
remains.
According to the Bureau of Mines statistics (Sibley, 1983), Table 
8-5, with the 1981 prices, New Caledonia has the largest reserves and 
reserve base of nickel. The second largest reserves and reserve base 
holder is Canada, while the U.S.S.R. is ranked third. Large quantities of 
reserve are also located in the Philippines, Cuba, and Indonesia. Although 
the U.S. has 2,700 thousand short tones of reserve base, ranked seventh, at 
the current level of prices and technology only a small quantity of nickel 
is extracted as a by-product of copper— less than 2% of the world output.
Among the market economy countries, the major consumers of primary 
nickel are the United States, Japan, and Western Eurpean countries (Table 
8-6). In the Eastern block, U.S.S.R. is the main consumer of nickel. 
Along with the world economic recovery, though with some lag, the 
non-communist world consumption of nickel in 1983 has increased following a 
three-year downward trend (Webster, 1984). In the U.S., in particular, 
primary nickel consumption in 1983 increased by 17 percent (Mineral 
Commodity Summaries, 1984). Primary nickel, however, is not the only 
source of nickel consumption. Scrap is considered a relatively significant 
secondary source of nickel supply. Scrap is either generated as waste in 
the primary nickel processing and fabricating plants, or it is recovered 
from the obsolete consumer goods. In the U.S. alone, one-fourth of the 
1981 demand for nickel was met by the recycling sources (Sibley, 1983).
While the existence of secondary sources alleviated the demand 
pressure on the primary source of nickel, continuing build-up of government 
inventories in the U.S. and some of the other industrialized countries of
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TABLE 8-6
ESTIMATED WORLD CONSUMPTION OF PRIMARY NICKEL IN 1981 
(Thousand Short Tons)
United States 145
U.S.S.R. 132
Japan 125
West Germany 75
France 42
Italy 30
United Kingdom 23
China 18
Canada 13
Sweden 13
Brazil 12
Spain 9
Others 148
TOTAL 785
SOURCE: Sibley, Scott: Mineral Commodity Profile, 1983, published by
the Bureau of Mines.
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the west, applies some extra pressure on the demand. The U.S. National 
Defense Stockpile goal is 200,000 tons of nickel. But, currently only 
about 32,000 tons are in the inventory. Of course, consumers and 
producers also maintain inventories; but the size of their stock varies 
depending upon their demand and supply forecasts, and cost of maintain­
ing inventories including the rate of interest. Pearce (1982) believes 
that increase in demand for nickel is usually observed at the beginning
of an upturn in industrial activities. The actual producers inventor­
ies, however, moves opposite to the fluctuations in demand while the 
actual consumer's inventories is procyclical.
Nickel demand is believed to have a rather high income elasticity 
because of the fact that it is consumed mainly in capital and consumer 
durable goods. This explains the nickel demand sensitivity to the 
business cycles. Demand for nickel in the U.S., during the period 
1981-2000, is predicted to grow at the rate of 2,1% annually. But, a 
higher rate of growth, 2.9% is forecasted for the rest of the world. 
This is due to the anticipation of a higher rate of economic growth for 
the rest of the world, especially some of the developing countries, in 
comparison with the U.S. Developing countries are also expected to 
become more involved with the production of industrial products. Based 
on this forecast, the cumulative demand for primary nickel during 
1981-2000 will be 21 million tons. Thus, with the world reserves of 54 
million tons, the reserves of nickel seems to be adequate to meet the 
demand in the next few decades (Sibley, 1983).
The Mineral Commodity Profile of 1983 shows that in the 1970s the
world mine production of nickel has been increasing, though not consis­
tently (Table 8-7). The lower demand for nickel in the early 1980s,
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TABLE 8-7 
WORLD MINE PRODUCTION OF NICKEL 
(Thousands of Short Tons)
Year World Production
1971 702
1972 673
1973 782
1974 849
1975 890
1976 873
1977 912
1978 722
1979 748
1980 821
1981 772
1982 669*
1983 630*
SOURCE: Mineral Commidity Profile, 1983; Mineral Year Book 1982; and,
Mineral Commodity Summaries, 1984.
* Projected.
TABLE 8-8
NICKEL PRODUCTION AND CAPACITY BY COUNTRY 
(Thousands of Short Tons)
Mine Production 
Mine Production Capacity
1981 1982 1983 1981 1985*
Canada 176 97.8 100 275 275
U.S.S.R. 174 187 185 180 180
New Caledonia 82.1 65 35 120 120
Australia 81.6 90.6 90 100 100
Cuba 44.6 39.3 40 45 65
Philippines 40.8 22 20 45 45
South Africa 29.1 24.3 25 35 40
Indonesia 28.7 32 25 40 40
Dominican Repub. 21.5 5.3 N.A. 37 37
Botswana 18.2 19.5 20 20 20
Greece 17.2 15.2 N.A. 25 25
Zimbabwe 12.7 13.3 N.A. 20 20
United States 12.1 3.2 0.4 18 18
China 12.0 11.0 N.A. 13 13
Others 20.8 43.5 N.A. 10 10
WORLD TOTALS 772.0 669.0 630.0 1028 1060
SOURCE; Mineral Commodity Profile, 1983; and Mineral Commodity 
Summaries, 1984 and Mineral Yearbook 1983.
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along with the decline In prices, caused the shutdown of mining activities 
in some of the nickel producing countries with the market oriented econ­
omies. Table 8-8 demonstrates the distribution of nickel production in the 
world. In 1981, Canada, the largest producer in the world, produced 176 
thousand tons of nickel. Canada, however, lost its leadership status in 
production to U.S.S.R. in 1982 and 1983. Nickel production in Canada was 
cut by more than 40%. The major cause of the decline in Canada's nickel
production in the last two years was a 9-month strike at the INCO, Ltd.'s
Ontario operation starting May 31st, 1982, The strike was a reaction to 
some of the cost saving policies of the INCO Ltd. such as reductions in its 
staff and limiting its production capacity in order to face the new condi­
tions in the market place. In addition to the INCO Ltd,, Falconbridge 
Ltd., the second largest producer in Canada and the world, Table 8-9, also 
shut down its Canadian operation in the last 6 months of 1982. The sub­
stantial decline in nickel production during the 1981-82 period is believed 
to have hurt Canada's economy which heavily relies on its mineral industry.
Both INCO Ltd, and Falconbridge Ltd. have operations in other
countries besides Canada. INCO, Ltd. is mining nickel in Indonesia and 
Guatemala, and Falconbridge Ltd. has mining operations in the Dominican 
Republic. The INCO Ltd. has been traditionally considered the price leader 
in the nickel market. Before the 1982 strike, the company maintained at 
least a 20% market share among the market economy countries. With the INCO 
Ltd.'s leadership, nickel prices increased from $.74 per pound in 1960 to 
$2.20 per pound in 1976 and it continued increasing to the peak of $3.43 
per pound in 1981 allowing the producers to mine lower grade ore resources. 
But, in the early 1980's, the Increased competition by the by-product
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TABLE 8-9
NICKEL PRODUCING FIRMS AND THEIR OWNERSHIP
Country Firms Form of Ownership
Canada INCO, Ltd. 
Falconbridge, Ltd.
Privately-owned
Privately-owned
U.S.S.R. — State-owned
New Caledonia Societe Metallurgique le Nickel (owned 
by the French IMETAL) State-owned
Australia Western Mining Corp, Ltd. 
Metals Exploration, Ltd. 
Freeport Queensland, Ltd.
Privately-owned
Privately-owned
Privately-owned
Cuba — State-owned
Philippines Marinduque Mining and 
Industrial Corp.
Privately-Owned
South Africa Rustenburg Platunimum Mines, Ltd. 
Impala Platunium Mines, Ltd. 
Western Platunium, Ltd.
Privately-owned
Privately-owned
Privately-owned
Indonesia P.T. International Nickel 
Indonesia (98% owned subsidiary 
of the INCO, Ltd. of Canada)
Privately-owned
Dominican
Republic
Dominicans (owned by Falconbridge 
of Canada and ARMCO of the U.S.)
Privately-owned
Botswana Bamangwata Concessions, Ltd. 
(owned by AMAX, Anglo American, 
Ltd., and the Botswana Goverment)
Partially
State-owned
Greece Larco S.A. State-owned
Zimbabwe Rio Tinto Mining Zimbabwe, Ltd. Privately-owned
United States Hanna Mining Co. 
AMAX Nickel, Ltd.
Privately-owned
Privately-owned
China -- State-owned
SOURCES: Mineral Commodity Profile, 1977 and 1983; and Mineral
Yearbook.
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dollar gap between the producer listed price and the free market quota­
tions of London Metal Exchange (LME) at the beginning of 1982 was 
sellers and the subsidized producers, and the depressed demand 
conditions in the nickel market weakened the control of INCO Ltd. on 
prices. The one widened by the imports of nickel from the U.S.S.R. at 
very low prices to generate hard currency for the country. By November 
of that year the LME price fell to $1.50 per pound, one-half of the 
producer quoted price. During 1983 the LME price was stable between 
$2.00-2.20 per pound, while the producer quoted price remained unchanged 
at $3.20 per pound. Even at the price of $3.20 per pound the 
profitability of nickel mining, especially the laterite-sourced nickel 
facilities, was questioned in 1982 (Pearce, 1982). But, since 1982, the 
improvements in efficiency and costs achieved by most of the major 
firms, including INCO, Ltd. and Falconbridge, Ltd., have convinced the 
experts that nickel mining is profitable even at the price of $3.00 per 
pound (Webster, 1984). The price stability of 1983, due to improvements 
in demand and production adjustments of the producers, is expected to 
continue.
Among the other major producers of nickel in the world, the 
Soviet Union has maintained its high production levels in 1981-83 
periods. In fact, 80% of the total nickel produced in the centrally 
planned economies was produced by the Soviet Union, and most of the rest 
by Cuba, ranked fifth in the world. In New Caledonia, challenging 
Australia for the third position in the world, nickel is produced by 
Societe Le Nickel's, S.A. (SLN). In 1982 the French government took 
over SLN's parent company, IMETAL. In Australia, Western Mining Corp., 
Ltd. is the major producer of nickel followed by Metals Exploration Ltd.
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and Freeport Queensland Ltd.; all privately owned firms. Having 70% of 
Its resources in Sulfide form, Australia has established and is expected 
to maintain a firm position among the nickel producing nations in the 
world. Other major producers of nickel in the world are the 
Philippines, South Africa, and Indonesia, all operated by private firms. 
In the 1980's, the market share of Australia, Indonesia, Colombia, South 
Africa, Soviet Union, and Cuba are expected to increase. The only U.S. 
nickel producer is Hanna Mining Co. operating in Oregon. Hanna Mining 
Co. decreased its near capacity production of 12,100 tons in 1981 to 400 
tons in 1983. Hanna has interests in some mining activities in 
Columbia, Canada, and Australia. Another American firm, AMAX Nickel 
Divison of AMAX, Inc., Is engaged in only refining of the Imported matte 
holding a 40,000-ton nickel capacity.
Copper
Copper has been used by man for thousands of years. Today, 
copper's four major physicochemical properties account for its 
widespread use. Superior electrical conductivity among other metals, 
second to silver, and its ready availability have given copper the 
credit for making the age of electricity possible. Still the electrical 
application of copper in motors, generators, power distribution, indus­
trial controls, communications equipment, and house wiring is signifi­
cant, The second reason for the importance of copper is its thermal 
conductivity which Is responsible for its wide application in heat 
exchangers of motor vehicles, refrigerators, and many other industrial 
equipment. Chemical stability is another quality of copper. The 
extensive use of copper in tubing and valves is due to this property.
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TABLE 8-10 - World Copper Reserves and Reserve Base 
(Million Pounds)
Area Reserve Reserve :
North America: .
Canada 15 32
Mexico 17 23
United States 57 90
Other 1 15
TOTAL 90 160
South America:
Chile 79 97
Peru 12 32
Other 3 12
TOTAL 95 140
Europe: TOTAL 50 70
Africa:
Zaire 26 30
Zambia 30 34
Other 4 7
TOTAL 60 70
Asia:
Philippines 12 18
Other 24 19
TOTAL 35 35
Oceania:
Australia 8 16
Papua, New Guinea 6 14
Other 1 4
TOTAL 15 35
World Total 350 510
SOURCE: Mineral Commodity Profile, 1983.
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Finally, copper can be easily rolled, drawn, or machined. This work­
ability character of copper has made its employment in household 
tools,instruments, jewelry, and coinage possible. Of course, in most 
applications, copper is used in alloy with other metals rather than alone.
The 1983 Mineral Commodity Profile (Butterman, 1983), Table 10,
indicates that there are 350 million short tons of copper reserves in the 
world, 85% of which is placed in the market economy countries. The reserve 
base of the world is estimated at 510 million short tons of which 90% is 
located in the market economy countries. The largest share of the
reserves, 19%, belongs to Chile. The United States is ranked second with 
18%. The other countries holding substantial reserves are the U.S.S.R., 
Zambia, Canada, Peru, and Zaire; each having 6-7% share of the total world 
reserve.
Consumption of refined copper by the free world peaked in 1979 at 
7.5 million tons while the U.S. peak was in 1978. World consumption of 
copper continued decreasing between 1979 and 1983. By 1983 the free world
consumption had dropped to 6.7 million tons. The low consumption was
particularly among the European countries; but the United States and Canada 
witnessed higher consumption in comparison with 1982. The last few years 
have been rather disappointing for some of the developing countries, such 
as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, who shared 23% of the world copper 
consumption growth of the 1970's. The slowdown in economic growth of these 
countries has been the cause of their low consumption in the early 1980s. 
The optimistic forecasts of a few years ago for the developing countries 
copper consumption growth in the next two decades has been revised. The 
new forecasts anticipate an annual consumption growth rate of 6% on the 
average till 2000. According to these forecasts the developing countries
110
will consume 15% of the world consumption in comparison with 9% in 1981. 
Although in absolute terras Japan and Western countries consumption is 
expected to rise, but their share of consumption is predicted to decline 
from 67% in 1981 to 55% in 2000. This is due to a relatively low 
consumption growth rate, 1%, forecast for them. The planned economy 
countries, on the other hand, with a forecasted annual consumption growth 
rate of 3.5% are expected to increase their share of world consumption from 
24% in 1981 to 30% in 2000 (Mineral Yearbook 1983; Mineral Commodity 
Profile, 1983; and Lesemann 1982, 1983, and 1984).
Scrap, as a secondary source of copper, is an important part of the 
copper supply, especially in the U.S. Copper is considered as one of the 
most extensively recycled metals. The recycling can be from either new 
scrap sources or the old ones. The new scrap, also called manufacturing 
scrap, is created during the fabrication of copper products. The old scrap 
is included in copper-containing proudcts which are worn-out, discarded, or 
obsolete. The new scrap is a substantial part of copper input in the 
manufacturing industry; but, since it is not usually an inflow of the metal 
to the industry, the Bureau of Mines does not include the new scrap in its 
sources of supply. The proportion of supply furnished by old scrap in the 
U.S. has varied in recent years between 22 percent in 1979 to 19 percent in 
1983. But, the share of old scrap is expected to rise by 2000 to 31 
percent (Mineral Commodity Profile, 1979 and 1983). To bridge the gap 
between demand and supply, copper can be repalced in most uses by other 
materials. Copper's close substitutes are aluminum in electrical equipment 
and heat exchangers, plastic in plumbing, optical fiber in telecommunica­
tions cable, steel in shell casings, and silver, nickel, aluminum, and zinc 
in coinage. But copper substitutes either are more costly or lack some of
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the qualitative characteristics of copper (Mineral Commodity Profile, 1983; 
and Mineral Commodity Summaries, 1984).
Because of its wide application, inferior performance of its substi­
tutes, and the limits to the use of recycling, copper has been placed among 
the strategic minerals. National Defense Stockpile has been established in 
the U.S. and some of the other high copper consuming industrial countries 
of the world. A stockpile of several hundred thousand tons has been main­
tained by the U.S. Government in most of the years since 1942. But, 
recently, the level of inventory has been rather low. In 1960's and early 
1970’s the stockpile was sold, and given that U.S. does not heavily rely on 
the imports of copper, only 1-17% in recent years, the country has not 
rushed to rebuild its inventories. Presently only 20,000 tons of copper is 
in the U.S. National Defense Stockpile, while the stockpile goal is set at 
1 million tons (Mineral Commodity Profile, 1983; and Mineral Commodity 
Summaries, 1984).
World mine production of copper showed a rather steady growth 
between 1972 and 1981 (Table 8-11). But, in 1982 and 1983 production 
dropped representing a lagged reaction to the world recession. In 1982, 
from the 9,640 thousand of short tons of world mine production capacity 
only 82%, 8,071 thousand short tons, was being utilized (Table 8-12). The 
declining trend in price of copper since 1981 has made extraction of copper 
from some of the marginal mines economically infeasible. In the U.S., 
copper mines were operating at 65% capacity in 1982. In 1983 the gap 
between production capacity and the actual output was enlarged. By this 
time there was a massive production cutback in the U.S. and Canada. The 
U.S. is believed to have operated at 50% capacity and Canada at 60%. Some 
of the other market economy countries of Africa and Philippines also
112
TABLE 8-11 
World Mine Production of Copper 
(Thousands of Short Tons)
Year World Production
1972 6,642
1973 7,117
1974 7,301
1975 7,009
1976 7,525
1977 7,739
1978 7,618
1979 7,674
1980 7,656
1981 8,190
1982 8,040
1983 7,960*
*Expected,
SOURCE: Mineral Commodity Profile, 1983; Mineral Commodity Summaries,
1984; and Mineral Yearbook 1983.
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TABLE 8-12
Copper Production and Capacity by Country or Region 
(Thousand of Short Tons)
Mine Production Mine Production Capacity
Country_________ 1981 1982* 1983** Region__________ 1981 1985
U.S. 1,538 1,140 1,050 North America:
Chile 1,081 1,240 1,190 U.S. 1,730 1,650
U.S.S.R. 940 970 1,000 Others 1,250 1,400
Canada 691 612 625 TOTAL 2,980 2,050
Zambia 588 567 543 South America: 1,700 1,850
Zaire 555 519 535 Europe 1,850 2,250
Peru 341 369 335 Africa 1,710 1,650
Poland 294 376 380 Asia 950 1,200
Australia 231 245 256 Oceania 450 430
South Africa 208 188 210
Others 1,723 1,845 1,903 World Total 9,640 10,430
TOTAL 8,190 8,071 8,027
*Preliminary
**Expected.
SOURCE: Mineral Commodity Profile 1983, and Mineral Yearbook, 1983.
witnessed modest declines. But, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Iran and a few 
other developing countries have increased their output (the increase in 
the output of some of these countries is shown under the "other" in 
Table 8-12). Most of the countries with planned economies have shown a 
steady increase in their output level mainly because -they have not been 
subject to the negative Impact of price decreases of the early 1980's.
Increase in the mine production of copper among some of the 
developing countries was due to two factors. First, given that exports 
of raw materials is the principle source of foreign exchange for these 
countries, their governments sought to support copper production through 
several channels such as: guaranteed price-support systems in Brazil,
Chile, and Philippines; protective tariffs in Japan and Repubic of 
Korea; import restrictions in Brazil; or loan guarantees and assumptions 
of company's debts that provided direct financial support for the 
producers. Second, the U.S. producers have lost their cost competitive­
ness because of the high costs of pollution control devices installed on 
one hand, and the currency devaluations of the developing countries on 
the other. In the 1973-1979 period alone, 41 % of the U.S. domestic 
capital expenditures in the copper indutry, or $.7 billion, was made for 
pollution control. The figure for the early 1980's has not been as 
high, however, the drain on capital has continued. In the case of 
stronger dollar; since 1978, the Chilean Peso, the Zambian Kwacha, 
the Zairian Zaire, the Peruvian Sol, and the Philippine Peso have been 
devalued between 48 to 97 percent (Mineral Yearbook, 1983; and Mineral 
Commodity Profile, 1983). The above factors have also contributed to 
the increase in the U.S. imports of copper from 289 thousand short tons
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TABLE 8-13
COPPER PRODUCTING FIRMS AND THEIR OWNERSHIP
Country Firms Form of Ownership
U.S. Kennecott Corp, Phelps Dodge 
Corp., Magma Copper Co., Chino 
Mine Co., and Many Others
Privately-owned
Chile Corporation Nacional del Cobre 
de Chile
State-owned
U.S.S.R. — State-owned
Canada INCO, Ltd., Falconbridge, Ltd., 
Noranda Mines Ltd., and a few 
more
Privately-owned
Zambia . Zambia Consolidated Copper. 
Mines Ltd. (ZCCM)
State-owned
Zaire LaGenerale des Carrieres et des 
Mines du Zaire (Gecamines), and 
Societe de Developpement Industriel 
et Minlere due Zaire
Partially
Privately-Owned
Peru Southern Peru Copper Corp.,
Empresa Minera del
Centro del Peru, and Empresa
Estatal Minera Asociada Tintaya S.A.
Partially
Privately-owned
Poland — State-owned
South Africa Palabora Mining Co., Ltd. and 
O'okiep Copper Co., Ltd.
Privately-owned
SOURCES: Mineral Yearbook, 1982 and 1983.
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in 1979 to 790 thousand of short tons in 1983 (Mineral Commodity 
Summaries, 1984).
The market structure of world copper industry is largely competi­
tive. The world output of copper comes from about 200 principal mines, 35 
of which are in the United States; and numerous other mines extracting 
copper as by-product, 150 of which only in the United States. In 1981, the 
share of the centrallly planned economy countries of the world mine pro­
duction was 20%, while the market oriented countries produced the rest. 
But, mining operations in many market oriented developing countries are 
controlled partially or totally by the government. The state ownership in 
these countries was created mostly after the beginning of nationalization 
of natural resources in the early 1950's when more than three-fourths of 
the market economy countries' copper output was controlled by eight 
privately owned North-American and Western European countries (Mineral 
Commodity Profile, 1983). Presently, state-controlled institutions control 
about 40% of the output from the market economy countries (Table 8-13).
In 1967, four of the developing countries, Chile, Peru, Zambia, and 
Zaire, who had the control of their copper mines established the Inter­
governmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC). CIPEC has 
increased its members, since its establishment, to eight by including 
Indonesia, Australia, Papua New Ginea, and Yugoslavia. In 1981, CIPEC 
maintained 38% of the world mine production with Its market share increas­
ing to 41% in 1982. Since its origins, CIPEC has never been able to 
exercise its power in the market. In 1974, CIPEC made its first price 
control move, but its plan to cut exports was never fully implemented and 
had no noticeable effect on prices. Another attempt to control prices by 
CIPEC in 1982 remained ineffective because of the lack of action by the
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members after the agreement was made. The market share of CIPEC is likely 
to rise, disregarding the possibility of exploitation of manganese nodule 
reserves, because Peru and Chile hold 25% of total world reserves and are 
predicted to increase their production share from 20% to 30% in the near 
future. Besides, attracting new members such as Iran can increase CIPEC's 
market power. Thus, without the use of ocean resoruces, CIPEC will have 
more potential to exercise its power as a cartel (Mineral Yearbook, 1982 
and 1983; Miner Commodity Profile 1983; and Lesemann, 1983).
Price of copper, being essentially determined by the market forces, 
had a moderate upward trend in 1960-1980 period; moving from the low of 
$.32 per pound in 1960 to $1.02 in 1980. However, copper price has taken a 
downward trend since 1981. The over one dollar per pound price of 1980 
dropped to $.85 in 1981, and $.74 In 1982. Due to the optimistic expecta­
tions of the positive Impact of U.S. economic recovery on copper price, in 
the early 1983 price of copper slightly rose but by the end of the year 
prices were as low as $.64 per pound. The low prices of the early 1980's 
are, in real terms, even lower than 1930's prices; making survival dif­
ficult for the private firms of the market system countries. The U.S. 
countries in 1982-83 period have reported $1.5 billion loss on their 
primary copper operations. However, with the strong U.S. recovery the low 
prices of copper are not expected to last long (Lesemann, 1982, 1983, and 
1984; Mineral Commodity Profile 1983, and Mineral Yearbook, 1983).
Manganese
Manganese is a relatively abundant element in the earth's crust. 
Its major use is in steel and iron production. To improve workability, 
toughness, and hardenability of steel, manganese is added to it as an 
essential element. Manganese is also consumed in the chemical Industry and
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in production of dry-cell batteries. The strategic value of manganese 
comes from the fact that no satisfactory substitute in its major applica­
tions has been found. In chemical uses, however, workable substitutes do 
exist.
Although the earth's crust is rich with manganese, its geographical 
distribution Is concentrated among a few countries. South Africa, 
according to the Bureau of Mines' report (Table 8-14), with more than 400 
million tons of reserves and 2,900 million tons of reserve base has 40% and 
75% of the total world reserve and reserve base of manganese, respectively. 
U.S.S.R., ranked second, holds almost the same level of reserves as South 
Africa; but its reserve base is only 560 million tons, about 13% of the 
world reserve base. Gabon, with about 10% of the world reserves and about 
5% of the world reserve base, is ranked third. Other countries having 
significant amount of reserves and reserve base are Australia, India, 
Brazil, China, Ghana, and Mexico. Manganese reserves are not only located 
in a very limited number of countries, in most cases, with the exception of 
India, they are also concentrated in one or a few fields.
World demand for manganese ore is strongly related to the steel 
production in the world. In fact, 95% of the world manganese consumption 
is in steel industry. The industrialized countries of the West and 
U.S.S.R. are the main consumers of manganese in the world. The United 
States consumes more than 10% of the world output of manganese ore; but 
about 99% of its consumption is met through Imports. In 1981, the U.S. 
consumed about 1 million tons of manganese ore where the world output was 
about 9.5 million . U.S. consumption in 1983 dropped to 730 thousand tons 
due to the recession. Recently, the U.S. has decreased its imports of 
manganese ore and increased the exports of ferromanganese (ferromanganese
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TABLE 8-14
World Manganese Reserve and Reserve Base 
(Thousands of Short Tons)
Country Reserve Reserve Base
South Africa 407,000 2,900,000
U.S.S.R. 365,000 560,000
Gabon 110,000 190,000
Australia 51,600 216,000
India 21,500 44,000
Brazil 20,900 69,000
China 15,000 32,000
Ghana 4,000 6,600
Mexico 3,500 7,800
Morocco 600 1,700
WORLD TOTAL* 1,000,000 4,000,000
*Rounded
SOURCE: Mineral Commodity Profiles, 1983.
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is the smelted form of manganese ore before being added to steel). This 
change has been due to the decline in the U.S. ferromanganese production 
capacity which in turn was caused by rising costs of energy, transporta­
tion, and pollution control as well as the persistence of the ore-producing 
countries to absorb more of the value added‘in their exports (Kilgore and 
Thomas, 1982; and Tinsely, 1982, 1983, and 1984).
In terms of import dependency, Japan's situation is similar to the 
U.S. But, Japan's percentage of domestic supply of manganese ore is high­
er; meanwhile, in spite of the U.S., Japan has been able to continue im­
porting mostly manganese ore and convert them to ferromanganese in her 
land. The U.S.S.R, on the other hand, has no import dependency and share 
9% of the total world consumption of manganese ore. World demand is ex­
pected to rise at a 2.3% annual rate till 2000; but a lower rate of growth, 
1.6%, is forecast for the U.S. Actually the forecasts of consumption 
growth rate of manganese are nearly the same as for steel demand. Tinsley 
(1984) maintains that demand for manganese ore usually lags industrial pro­
duction by 9-12 months as steelmakers change their stock of ore and alloy. 
Even though the economy of the world has improved in 1984, no significant 
increase in manganese consumption is anticiapted in the near future. In 
fact, the U.S. steel industry operated at 60% capacity in 1984. Then, with 
the estimated reserves at the 1981 price level, the quantity of reserves in 
the world is far more than needed to satisfy the cumulative demand in the 
next two decades (Mineral Commodity Profiles, 1983).
To cope with the uncertainties of the import dependency, the U.S., 
like many other industrialized countries, has established a National 
Defense Stockpile. The U.S. stockpile initiated in 1945, however, the 
level of Inventories has varied ever since. In 1965 the stockpile peaked
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at about 5.6 million tons, but later that year the government began to sell 
manganese in excess of goals. Recently, the U.S. has announced its plans 
to upgrade the form of manganese maintained in the National Defense 
Stockpile; that is, keeping more high-carbon ferromanganese and high-carbon 
ferrochromium than manganese ore. The purposes of the change are the 
improvement of stockpile readiness and maintaining the domestic capacity to 
produce ferroalloy. In 1982, three-fourth of the government inventory was 
in the form of ore. The total stockpile in this year was 2.1 million tons 
which, with the addition of about 1 million tons of private inventories, is 
sufficient for 3 years of the U.S. consumption (Coffman and Palenica, 1984; 
Mineral Yearbook 1982; and Mineral Commodity Profiles 1983).
While recycling was relatively important for cobalt, nickel, and 
copper, it is insignificant in the case of manganese. Considerable 
manganese, however, is recycled as a component of iron or steel scrap. 
But, in these cases, the main objective is to recover iron. Limited 
manganese is also recycled in aluminum industry as a part of alloys bearing 
manganese.
World mine production was peaked in 1980, but since then it has been 
declining (Table 8-15). About 30 countries were engaged in production of 
manganese ore in 1981. Soviet Union is the largest producer of manganese 
ore in the world. In 1981, nearly one-third of the world output, 3,043 
tons, was produced by the Soviet Union (Table 8-16). But, in the early 
1980's, Soviet Union has almost stopped exporting manganese ore to the 
market economy countries. South Africa ranked second in the world, first 
among the market economy countries, produced about 25% of the world output. 
The two countries together holding about 80% of the world reserves, produce 
about 60% of the world output. The two countries are expected to increase
TABLE 8-15 
World Mine Production of Manganese 
(Thousands of Short Tons)
Year World Production
1971 9,998
1972 10,012
1973 10,738
1974 10,220
1975 10,810
1976 11,038
1977 9,574
1978 9,582
1979 10,832
1980 10,952
1981 9,477
SOURCE: Mineral Commodity Profile, 1983.
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TABLE 8-16
Manganese Production and Capacity by Country and Region 
(Thousand of Short Tons)
Production Capacity
1981 1981 1985
North America:
United States 24 40 40
Mexico 242 300 300
266TOTAL 340 340
South America:
Brazil 1,024 1,360 1,500
Chile 10 15 15
TOTAL 1,034 1,365 1,515
Europe:
Bulgria 15 20 20
Hungary 30 40 40
U.S.S.R. 3,043 3,800 4,200
Other 16 20 20
TOTAL 3,104 3,880 4,300
Africa:
Gabon 836 1,300 1,500
Ghana 99 150 150
Morocco 64 85 70
South Africa 2,166 3,000 3,500
Other 7 50 50
TOTAL 3,172 4,585 5,270
Asia:
China 528 550 550
India 578 800 800
Japan 23 30 30
Other 19 35 40
TOTAL 1,148 1,415 1,400
Oceania:
Australia 753 1,300 1,400
WORLD TOTAL 9,477 12,900 14,200*
*Rounded.
SOURCE: Mineral Commodity Profiles, 1983.
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their share of world output in the future. Where the Soviet Union has 
been able to maintain its production level in the early 1980's, South 
Africa, being affected by the depressed economy of the world, has witnessed 
a substantial cut in its output.
Jones (1983) characterizes the international manganese ore market as 
oligopolistic on both producers and consumers sides. But, he sees no 
likelihood of cartelization in the market. Fluctuation of ore prices since 
1960 reflects the market conditions. In 1960, manganese ore was priced 
$.94 per long ton. But, price trend in 1960's was downward reaching $.50 
per long ton in 1969. The 1970's, however, witnessed an upward movement in 
price of manganese ore because of high demand, and increase in cost of 
energy and transportation. Price peaked in 1981 at $1.72 per long ton, 
nevertheless, the $.94 per long ton price of 1960 remains as the highest 
price in real terms based on 1981 constant dollars. Price trend since 1981 
has been downward (Jones, 1983). In 1982 price was lowered to $1.58 per 
long ton, and Tinsley (1984) argues that because of the world wide 
oversupply of manganese ore, as long as the producers strive to increase 
their market share, more price decreases may continue in the near future.
The firms producing manganese in each country and their ownership 
systems are listed in Table 8-17. In the Soviet Union the state carries 
out two large-scale manganese mining operations in Ukraine and Georgia. In 
south Africa, two large privately-owned corporation, South African 
Manganese Amcor Ltd. (SAMANCOR) and Associated Manganese Mines of South 
Africa, Ltd. (AMMOSAL), are engaged in producing most of the nation's 
manganese ore. In Brazil, Industria Comercio e Minerios S.A. (INCOMI) used 
to be almost the sole producer of manganese. Recently, however, a state 
controlled agency, Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), has increased its
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TABLE 8-17
Manganese Producing Finns and Their Ownership
Country Firms Form of Ownership
U.S.S.R.
South Africa
Brazil
Gabon
Australia
India
China
Mexico
Ghana
Morocco
South African Manganese 
Amcor, Ltd. (SAMANCOR), and 
Associated Manganese Mines of 
South Africa Ltd. (AMMOSAL)
Industria Comercio e Mineries 
S.A. (ICOMI), and Companhia Vale 
do Rio Doce (CVRD)
Cie Miniere de l'ogoune S.A. 
(COMILOG)
Groote Eylandt Mining Co. Pty. 
Ltd. (GEMCO)
Manganese Ore India Ltd. (MOIL) 
and many others
Minera Autlan S.A. de C.V.
Gana National Manganese Corp.
S.A. Cherifienne d1Etudes 
Minieres (SACEM)
State-Owned
Privately-owned
Partially State- 
Owned
Partially State- 
Owned
Privately-Owned
Partially State- 
Owned
State-Owned
Partially State- 
Owned
State-Owned
State-Owned
SOURCE: Mineral Commodity Profiles, 1983; Mineral Yearbook, 1982; and
Manganese Availability - Market Economy Countries by J. Coffman 
and C. Palencia, 1984.
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Involvement in the extraction of manganese ore in Brazil. Gabon’s manga­
nese are mines are owned and operated by Cie Miniere de l'ogooue' S.A. 
(COMILOG) which is jointly owned by U.S. Steel, Gabon's government, and 
other private firms. Virtually all manganese ore production in Australia 
is by Groote Eylandt Mining Co. Pty. Ltd.' (GEMO). Manganese Ore India Ltd. 
(MOIL) produces about one-third of Indian ore output. Other than MOIL, 
there about 300 manganese ore producing companies operating on small scale 
in India. In India, although the government has a partial ownership of 
mining operations, it exercises a close supervision on them. Limited 
informations on China's mining activities Indicate that the state-owned 
manganese ore production takes place on a small scale scattered over the 
eastern part of the country. In Mexico, almost all manganese ore produc­
tion is controlled by a partially government-owned company named Minera 
Antlan S.A. de Cov. State-owned companies also control manganese ore 
production in Ghana and Morocco.
Synopsis - Of the four land-based mining industries, the world 
cobalt market is dominated by Zaire, producing 50-60% of the world output. 
The price leadership of Zaire, however, has been dissipating in recent 
years. In 1981, the top four major producers of cobalt were Zaire, Zambia, 
Canada, and U.S.S.R., which together mined 77% of the total world output. 
In the nickel market, INCO. Ltd. of Canada Is considered a price leader 
with about 30% share of the market; while the market share of Canada as a 
whole increases to 50% if one includes the two other nickel producers in 
the country. In 1981, the top four major producers of nickel mined about 
60% of the total world output. These countries were Canada, U.S.S.R., New
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Caledonia, and Australia, Copper, a by-product in many mines, is sold in a 
relatively competitive market, CIPEC, a copper producer organization which 
holds about 40% of the market, has attempted to control the market since 
1967; but, it has never been successful as a cartel. The United States, 
Chile, U.S.S.R., and Canada were the top four producers of copper in 1981, 
when together they mined 52% of the total world output. Soviet Union as 
the major producer of manganese mined about 32% of the world output in 
1981. But, there are a few other countries which produce a relatively 
significant amount of manganese. In 1981, U.S.S.R., South Africa, Brazil, 
and Gabon constituted the top four major producers of manganese in the 
world, when their market share was 74% of the total. Some experts maintain 
that manganese market is oligopolistic on both demand and supply sides, 
while the others see this market as a competitive one.
The Herfindhal-Herschman Index (HHI) of concentration for the world 
cobalt, nickel, copper, and manganese ore industries are also calculated. 
The HHI provides an alternative to the market share of the top four 
producer measure of concentration where countries, instead of firms, were 
used in computations. Since most of the planned-economy countries are 
engaged in trade of the metals with the market-economy countries, though 
not consistently, each planned-economy producer is viewed as a decision 
making unit. On the other hand, in the market-economy countries, many 
large metal producers are involved with the production of metals with other 
firms in joint ventures. Because of the difficulty in the evaluation of 
the impact of this kind of intra-industry connections, joint ownership 
relations are ignored in the calculations of HHI. Accordingly, the HHI for 
the world cobalt producers Is computed to be .255 which is considered 
highly concentrated by the U.S. Department of Justice standards (the
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maximum value of HHI is one in the presence of a pure monopolist in the 
industry and it declines as the number of firms in the industry increases). 
The HHI for the world nickel, copper, and manganese producers are .107, 
.105, and .15, respectively, which are all considered moderately 
concentrated.
Recycling is playing a relatively important role in satisfying the 
demand for some of the metals. Secondary sources of nickel and copper meet 
more than 20 percent of the U.S. comsumption; but, they are not as 
significant in the cobalt and the manganese markets. Given the prices of 
the metals, the relative costs of the virgin versus the secondary sources 
determines the share of the market absorbed by each sector. The secondary 
producers operate in a competitive market and behave like a price-taker in 
relation to the primary market sector. Some degree of market power seems 
to exist for the major producers in each of the four markets. The downward 
trend of metal prices in the early 1980's, due to the depressed demand of 
the market-economy countries, has temporarily increased the degree of 
competitiveness in these markets. Along with the revival of the world 
economy, and the subsequent rise in the demand and the prices of the 
minerals, more attention will probably be paid to recycling in the future.
CHAPTER IX
THE MARKET STRUCTURE IMPACT OF NODULE MINING 
Review of the literature on the existing market structure of the 
four major metals potentially extractable from the nodules demonstrated 
that their markets are largely uncompetitive, even though some markets such 
as manganese enjoy a higher degree of competitiveness in the absence of the 
Soviet Union. Worcester (In Kydland, 1979) analyzes the dynamics of 
dominant firm pricing and concludes that the dominant firm case Is a 
short-run phenomenon; that is, the market share of the dominant firm 
steadily declines in time. While this is an acceptable proposition in 
economics, some economists ask why this process takes as long as three- 
fourths of a century (Kydland, 1979). The initial level of concentration 
is affected by various factors In different industries. Looking at the 
structure of the industries in the four metals, the ownership of reserves 
combined with some degree of economies of scale appear to be the basic 
element controlling the level of concentration.
Extraction of manganese nodules from the deep sea, depending upon 
the system of property rights governing these resources, is perceived by 
the countries importing the metals as an opportunity to increase the degree 
of competitiveness in these markets, and by the countries exporting the 
metals as a threat to their market power. The metal mining industries can 
be viewed as markets in disequilibrium. Based on Wender's definition, 
"disequilibrium exists during the time period between the appearance of 
profitable investment flows and the time when such flows finally take
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effect" (Wender, 1971, p. 249). The investment opportunity arises because 
of either a decrease in costs resulting from technological advancements or 
a decline in price of inputs, or an increase in output prices resulting 
from demand changes. Recent technological advances along with the growth 
in demand for metals in the 1970's created the incentive for investments in 
the deep-ocean mining ventures. However, the legal uncertainty created by 
the LOST as well as the decline in demand for metals in the early 1980's 
have temporarily disappointed the investors.
In the future, as the demand for the minerals increases and ter­
restrial deposits are either exhausted or degraded, sea-bed mining will 
become more attractive. The relative share of sea-bed mining will 
increase in time and the firms operating in this subsector of the mining 
industry will play a more important role in the pricing and output 
decisions. Of course, the market share of sea-bed mining from total pro­
duction of the metals will be different for each individual metal because 
of the differences of metal composition in the terrestrial sources and man­
ganese nodules (Table 9-1). Based on Adam's calculations, manganese and 
copper markets, with 1.7% and 2.4% of market share for sea-bed production, 
respectively, will be the least affected by the sea-bed mining. Manganese 
nodules will provide 15.7% of total world production of nickel, and 58.6% 
of the total world production of cobalt. Based on the available informa­
tion from the potential mining companies and the market conditions at the 
time, Adam's forecast assumed 19 nodule mining operations by 2000 and an 
annual rate of industrial production growth of 3-6% for various parts of 
the world. An early projection by Levy (in White, 1982) anticipates even a
TABLE 9-1
SEA-BED PRODUCTION AS A SHARE OF TOTAL PRODUCTION
Metals
Adams (by 2000) 
19 operations
Levy (by 2000) 
20 operations
Levy (by 1995)
4 operations 6 operations
Levy (by 2004)
6 operations 8 operations
Copper 2 .4 2-3 6 9 .6 .9
Nickel 15.7 26-66 10.0 15.0 10.5 14.1
Manganese 1.7 33-67 16.0 24.0 20.1 26.8
Cobalt 58.6 47-99 44.0 66.0 50.2 67.0
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larger market share for sea-bed mining where 20 operations are assumed by 
the year 2000, and consumption growth rate is estimated at 2-7%. These 
forecasts, which were made in 1980 and 1979, were based on an optimistic 
view of demand growth projected in the 1970s; therefore, they should be 
discounted. Levy's more current forecast based on a moderate growth rate 
of demand, 2-5%, and limiting the number of operations to 4-8 between 1995 
and 2004 reaches a conclusion that is still an indication of the important 
role played by the sea-bed mining, especially in the cobalt market (Levy, 
et. a,, 1984). However, these projections assume that ocean mining will 
only absorb the growth part of the present market. A few years after the 
start of commercial production, if no limits are imposed by the ISA, 
standardization of production processes and increase in the scale of 
production are likely to bring the average cost of production at sea even 
lower. Then, further drops in the price of the metals and raises in the 
market share of the sea-bed mining could be the result.
Since 1974, six consortia have invested millions of dollars in 
research and hardware and are anxious to start mining operations. Each 
consortium consists of land-based mining companies and off-shore drilling 
contractors, developers of ocean mining technology, suppliers of capital, 
and companies using the metals as inputs (Table 9-2). All companies, 
regardless of the activities of the parent company, are from the 
industrialized countries of the West and Japan. No land-based mineral 
producer from the developing countries, such as Zaire, which will lose in 
the absence of an income redistribution scheme, is included in these 
consortia. The dominant firm in each group is the one which provides the
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appropriate technology to develop ocean minerals. The typical pattern that 
exists in the mining industry seems to be prevailing in the sea-bed mining 
industry. Vertical and horizontal integrations can be traced by looking at 
the list of the major activities of the members of each consortium. 
Another usual feature of the mining industry is the existence of market 
power with a strong tendency towards oligopoly. While, so far, only six 
consortia have engaged in the activities leading to the mining of the 
nodules; it will be argued that the fewness of these companies is likely to 
remain unchanged.
Barriers to Entry
In spite of the hypothetical increase in the supply of minerals, it 
is possible that no major improvement in the degree of concentration in the 
nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese ore markets will be observed. The 
future of sea-bed mining will be in the hands of a limited number of 
consortia because of the existence of barriers to entry even in the absence 
of the control policies of the ISA. These barriers are mainly due to 1) 
economies of scale in production, and 2) economies of scale in financing,
3) involvement of a sizeable sunk cost, 4) economies of scope in extraction 
of four metals together, 5) requirement of a major R&D expenditure and 
possession of an edge by the first firms introducing new technology, 6) 
diversification of the producers of substitutable products, 7) LOST 
provisions such as technology transfer and production control, and 8) 
political clout enjoyed by large firms in their respective goverments.
1) Technical advances can affect market structure by increasing the 
minimum efficient plant size in an industry. Burns (1936) and Galbraith 
(1967) both have argued that technological change usually increases plant
TABLE 9-2 
Summary of Deepsea Mining Consortia
1. Kennecott Group (formed in January 1974) 
Composition of Consortium
Participants Parent Company
Country of 
Origin
Share of 
Participation 
(Percentage)
Major
Activities of Parent Company
Kennecott Copper Corp Same USA 50 Production and marketing of 
mineral resources, mainly 
copper
RT2 Deepsea Enterprises Rio Tinto- 
Zinc Corp
UK 10 International mining company 
in aluminium, copper, gold, 
lead and zinc
Consolidated Gold Fields Same UK 10 International mining finance 
company with major interests 
in gold
BP Minerals British Petroleum UK 
Co,
10 Vertically integrated oil 
major
Noranda Mines Same Canada 10 Mining and metullurgy of 
copper, lead and zinc
Mitsubishi Corp. Same Japan 10 General trading company
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TABLE 9-2
(continued)
2. Ocean Management Incorporated (often known as OMI or the Inco Group, formed in February, 1975)
Composition of Consortium
Participants Parent Company
Country of 
Origin
Share of 
Participation Major 
(Percentage) Activities of Parent Company
Inco, Same Canada 25 The largest producer of nickel in the 
world. Also engaged in batteries and 
formed metal products.
AMR Metallgesellschaft 
(Arbeit sgemeinschaf t 
Meerestechnischgewinnbare 
Rohstoffe) Preussag
West
Germany 25
Mining, refining, fabricating, and 
trading of metals.
Non-ferrous metals, coal and petroleum 
Red Sea muds development
Salzgitter Holding Company In steel making and 
shipbuilding
SEDCO Same USA 25 Contract Drilling and support opera­
tion for mainly offshore oil
Deep Ocean Mining 23 Companies Japan 25 Including trading, mining, and 
manufacturing companies and banks
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TABLE 9-2
(Continued)
3. Ocean Mining Associates (often known as OMA or Deepsea Ventures, formed in May, 1974)
Composition of Consortium
Share of 
Country Participation
Participants____________ Parent Company_______of Origin (percentage)_____Major activities of parent company
Essex Mineral Co. United States Steel 
Corp.
USA 33.3 Steel Manufacturing and Fabrication
Union Seas Union Miniere SA Belgium 33.3 International mining company, active 
in Belgium, Canada, United States, 
Australia
Sun Ocean Ventures Sun Company USA 33.3 Non-operating company in oil and gas
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(continued)
A. Ocean Minerals Company (often known as OMCO or the Lockheed Group* formed in November, 1977)
Composition of Consortium
Participants Parent Company
Country 
of Origin
Share of 
Participation 
(percentage) Ma.ior activities of parent company
Amoco Ocean Minerals 
Company
Standard Oil of 
Indiana
USA 25 Ranks sixth among United States 
petroleum companies. Amoco Minerals 
concentrates on non-ferrous metals
Ocean Minerals, Inc. 
Lockheed Missiles 
and Space Co.
Lockheed Aircraft 
Corporation
USA 25 Production of aircraft, missiles and 
spacecraft
Billiton B.V. Royal Dutch/Shell 
Group
Netherlands 30 Oil Majors. Billiton is engaged world­
wide in all stages of the mineral 
Industry.
RBKW Ocean Minerals 
BV
Royal Bos Kalis 
Westminster, NV
Netherlands 10 Dredging, land reclamation, civil 
engineering
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(continued)
5. Association francaise pour 1'etude et la recherche des nodules (known as Afernod, formed in 1974)
Composition of Consortium
Participants Major activities of parent company
Centre national pour 1Texploitation des 
Commissariat a l’energie atomique (CEA)
oceans (CNEXO) French government agencies
Societe metallurgique le nickel (SLN) Nickel Production
Chantiers de France-Dunkerque Shipbuilding
6. Deep Ocean Minerals Association (known as DOMA, formed in March, 1974)
Composition of Association
Participants Major activities of parent company
It includes more 
than 30 companies
trading companies
mining and metallurgy companies
shipbuilding and heavy industries
steel companies
electric appliances
fisheries
SOURCE: Manser, Roger, "Deep-Sea Mining: Bleak Future Faces Nodule Mining," Metal Bulletin Monthly, #131, Nov.
1981.
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size, thereby the level of industrial concentration. Blair’s review of the 
literature in 1972 indicates that technical advances such as steam power 
and railroads that occurred between the late eighteenth century and the 
early 1930s were more inducive to higher degrees of concentration. But, 
since then, he argues, the new technologies such as electricity and trucks 
have reduced plant size. Obviously, this is an empirical question that 
could be different for each industry depending on the nature of the new 
technology. For example, in the commercial aircraft industry, from the 
late 1920s through the mid-1960s, the number of manufacturers of commercial 
planes decreased substantially and there was a large shift in the market 
share of the ones who remained in the industry. Phillips (1971) argues 
that the basic element causing the structural changes in the commercial 
aircraft industry has been the changing scientific and technological 
environment which required large resources.
In the petroleum industry the existence and the position of the new 
resources have required a more advanced technology which has affected the 
market structure of the industry. Because of the similarities between the 
petroleum industry and the mining industries under study here, the U.S. 
Petroleum industry’s structural changes can provide a more relevant 
example. While offshore production of oil and gas began in the 1940s, it 
was basically during the last two decades that a major shift in the world 
oil and gas exploration and development activities from the land to the sea 
occurred. Increases in demand for oil and gas, thereby a rise in their 
prices, encouraged the producers to improve the technology of offshore 
production. Wilson (1975) holds that since 1955 there has been an increase 
in the degree of concentration in the U.S. petroleum Industry which is 
associated with the growing share of offshore production of oil and gas.
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In Wilson's study the market share of the top 4 U.S. offshore crude oil 
producers between 1955 and 1970 has improved from 18.5% to 30.5% which 
shows an increase of about 62%. In the same period the top eight have also 
raised their market share by about 61%, from 31% to 50%. Federal Offshore 
Statistics published in December of 1983 shows an increase of offshore 
production of oil and condensate from about 2.8% to 18% of total production 
for the 1955-1970 period. During this time, the percentage of oil and 
condensate production from federal leases, as opposed to the state leases, 
has also risen from 11.1% to 61.8%; meaning that the extraction has been 
moving to more distant areas from the coastal lines requiring a larger 
scale of operation and more capital.
The trend towards the federal territorial waters has continued. In 
1982 close to 80% of the total offshore oil production took place under 
federal leases. However, the share of offshore production of oil and 
condensate, after its peak of about 20% in 1971, has declined to about 13% 
in 1982. Since 1955, offshore production share of gas has continuously 
increased from slightly more than 1% in 1955 to about 14% in 1970 and about 
30% in 1982.
A report by the U.S. Department of Energy (Ody, 1981) indicates that 
between 1959 and 1979 there has been a rapid increase in the costs of 
drilling beyond the general rate of inflation during this period. The 
report identifies two factors explaining this phenomenon: the rise in the
average well depth and the fast rate of growth in the number of offshore 
wells. Cost of drilling increases with the well depth because deeper wells 
require more sophisticated and advanced equipment which is also more 
expensive. In the last two decades, especially in the 1974 and 1975 
period, when higher domestic production of oil and gas has been encouraged
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by the escalating prices of these products, extractive activities in the 
offshore areas have increased. Extraction of oil and gas from offshore 
elevated the drilling cost which is a fixed cost imposed on the firms. As 
a result of movement of the extractive activities from the land to the 
offshore areas and from the shallow waters to the deeper waters are 
eliminating the mom and pop businesses, or the "wildcatters," from the 
petroleum industry. Thus, utilization of the new sources of supply in the 
petroleum industry is at least partially responsible for the increase in 
the concentration in this industry. Of course, more research is necessary 
if the nature of the relationship between changes of concentration and 
higher capital costs is to be fully explored in the petroleum industry. 
This preliminary study, however, suggests that such a relationship does 
exist; and, similar changes can be anticipated in the extractive industries 
of the four metals if the nodule mining begins.
According to Mansfield (1983) some of the empirical studies of the 
market structure Impact of technical advances demonstrate that degree of 
concentration is more likely to rise in industries and during time periods 
that technological advances have been rapid rather than slow. 
Specifically, Mansfield cites the Nelson and Winter study in 1978, and 
Levin’s in 1980, both indicating that a relatively fast pace of 
technological change in a specific industry seems to have caused a higher 
level of concentration. Mansfield himself tests the relevant data for 
chemical, petroleum, and steel Industries and concludes that the minimum 
efficient scale of plant has increased in these industries. However, he 
warns to avoid generalization of these studies by pointing out that the 
nature and the sources of new technology must be known in each industry 
before this induction is made.
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Technological advances and the long-run increase in the price of
metals has made deep-sea mining of manganese nodules feasible. But, the
minimum efficient scale of plant for the mining of the nodules, because of
the position of the resources in the deep waters and the vastness of mine
sites, is substantially larger than the one for land-based mining. The
maximum production capacity per site of the traditional sources of nickel,
copper, cobalt, and manganese is about 30,000 tons of metal yearly. This
capacity may be smaller depending on the size and the depth of the
deposits, the ore grade, and other characteristics of the mine. Experts
maintain that the capacity of the future deep-sea mining of manganese
nodules varies between 1 to 3 million tons annually for a 3 to 4-metal
extracting plant (Mero, 1961; Kaufman, 1970; Nyhart, 1978; Bulkley, 1979;
Black, 1980; Lenoble, 1981; Flipse, 1982; White, 1972; and Hillman, 1983).
Each plant is expected to cover a site of approximately 23,000 to 36,000 
2
km , and remain in operation for 20 to 25 years (White, 1982). Based on 
White's estimates, a single nodule mine can produce 36,500 tons of nickel, 
29,700 tons of copper, 3,600 tons of cobalt, and 688,500 tons of manganese 
annually, which are respectively 4.9, 0.4, 13.4, and 7.4 percent of the 
1980 land-based production. Thus, if each of the six initial consortia is 
operating only one plant, together they will produce 30% of the nickel, 
2.5% of the copper, 80% of the cobalt, and 45% of the manganese produced in 
1980. Doubling of the number of plants by these consortia will give them a 
total domination in the cobalt market, and a significant power in the 
nickel and manganese markets. Obviously, the reaction of the present 
producers or the growth in the output of the industries have not been 
considered in these calculations. In fact, the impact of the rise in the 
optimum scale of plant on the level of concentration will be less severe if
143
the Industry is growing at a rapid rate or if the absolute size of the 
industry is large (Mueller and Hamm, 1974; and Weston, et al, 1973). 
Neither of these two factors, however, would change a rather pessimistic 
prediction in the dissertation in regard to the question of concentration. 
This claim is based on the fact that the scale of plant of sea-bed mining 
is considerably large in comparison with the size of the industries. Also, 
most forecasts predict a moderate rate of growth for the metal industries; 
therefore, growth rates will not help to accommodate many firms in the 
industries.
2) Technological advances can take two distinct forms, process 
innovation and production innovation. Mansfield (1983) maintains that 
large investments are usually needed for scale-increasing process 
innovations. He also argues that process innovations are more likely to be 
presented by one of the four large firms in the industry for the first 
time. In deep-sea mining one of the latest estimates of capital cost 
indicates that a capital cost of $1-1.5 billion with an operating cost of 
$150-450 million per year is necessary for a single operation (White, 
1982). Hillman’s 1983 estimates for capital cost is even higher by $200 
million. According to Hillman's calculations, the capital cost of 
processing accounts for about 46% of the total capital costs; and, the 
operating costs of processing makes about 49% of the total operating costs. 
The cost estimates to initiate production will be higher by $.5 billion if 
the start-up fee charged by the ISA is included. Then, the highest and 
most recent estimate for the initial costs approaches $2.2 billion. The 
fact is that cost estimates of sea-bed mining, in real terms, have been 
continuously rising in the past two decades (Table 3); and, yet, the rise
TABLE 9-3
ESTIMATES OF CAPITAL AND OPERATING COSTS OF A SINGLE SEA-BED MINING OPERATION
Capital Costs Operating Costs
Year of Capacity
Author Publication Measure (million ton) 3 Metals__________ 4 Metals________ 3 Metals_______4 Metals
Mero 1961 Current $ 1 mil. 100 mil. 12 mil.
Kaufman 1970 Current $ 1 mil. 105 mil. 25 mil.
Nyhart 1978 Current $ 1 mil. 493.05 mil. 100.5 mil.
Bulkley 1979 63 $ 1 mil. 329 mil. 108 mil.
Black 1980 79 $ 1 mil. 
3 mil.
700-800 mil. 
1.5-1.7 bil.
160-225 mil. 
350-450 mil.
Lenoble 1981 Current $ 3 rail. 1,250 mil. 1,325 mil. 270 mil. 400 mil.
Flipse 1982 Current $ 1-1.5 bil.
White 1982 Current $ 3 mil. 1-1.5 bil. 150-450 mil.
Hillman 1983 81 $ 1-3 mil. 1.5-1.7 bil. 1.63-1.83 bil. $71-83 per ton $103
(Per Ton)
To compile this table various sources by the authors were used (see the list of references).
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in costestixnation could continue (Merrow, 1979 and 1981; Rand Corporation 
Reports, 1979 and 1981),
Economic theory proves that high capital requirements can influence 
the number of firms in the industry (Kydland, 1979). Kydland holds that 
new entry will be discouraged where the firm has to suffer from a negative 
cash Inflow for several periods. The number of firms in the automobile, 
chemical, and steel industries testify to this fact. In sea-bed mining, 
firms will have to incur a very heavy initial cost for research and 
development, and plant and ship construction which will take about ten 
years before the full commercial production begins (Hillman, 1983).
Financing of the large capital required for sea-bed mining will be a 
barrier to entry for small firms. Generally speaking, because of the 
lumpiness of the investment opportunities a large firm and/or a firm In a 
concentrated industry is likely to attract capital at lower cost. For this 
reason Baumol (1967), and Hall and Wiss (1967) have blamed capital market 
as the major cause of entry barrier. Using capital market theory, Sullvan 
(1978, and 1982) tests this hypothesis by relating the capital costs to 
risk and argues that the lower riskiness of the investments by these firms 
allows them to acquire capital at cheaper rates. So, he concludes that the 
capital market is efficient, considering the lower risk associated with the 
large firm or the one with a high market share. Curley, Hexter, and Chio 
(1982) also have tested the same hypothesis; and although their statistical 
outcomes are different from Sulivan’s, they both agree that the available 
evidence is not clear to determine the cause of, or the justification for, 
the apparent relationship between cost of capital and the market power of 
the firms. It is not unreasonable, however, to assume that the high 
capital requirements and the riskiness of the venture, due to the economic,
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technological, and legal uncertainties, have been the driving force for the 
establishment of the consortia of as many as thirty firms in order to enter 
into the sea-bed mining operations.
3) The third theoretical argument applicable to the nodule mining 
is that in the presence of sunk costs, entry will be limited (Baumol, et 
al, 1982; and Spence, 193). The heavy initial investments in nodule mining 
are largely irreversible; therefore, they can be considered as sunk costs. 
The start-up costs are made for R&D, and construction of the mining vessels 
and processing plants which are not much applicable elsewhere. The 
existence of sunk costs indeed can increase the riskiness of the adventure 
and contribute to the financing problem.
4) In addition to the economies of scale, the consortia involved 
with the future deep-sea mining can enjoy economies of scope. Economies of 
scope refers to the cost advantages to the firm producing a few products as 
opposed to the firms producing a single output (Bailey and Friedlaender, 
1982). In land-based mining usually either one of the metals is mined 
alone or a second metal is extracted as a by-product. Extraction of 
nodules includes 3 to A metals. Even some consortia are considering 
recovery of molybdenum (Hillman, 1983). Nodules include about 60 minerals 
that can potentially be recovered.
5) As a part of their set-up costs, each consortium has to incur a 
substantial R&D cost. The latest estimate by Hillman in 1983 indicates 
that R&D costs are $72.7 million for each consortium. The R&D costs are 
independent of the scale of plant; I.e., costs remain the same no matter 
whether the plant size is 1 million ton/year or 3 million ton/year. Where 
effective entry requires the possession of the technical knowledge, a high 
and constant R&D expenditure creates an entry barrier to the industry.
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This has been witnessed in the pharmaceutical and electronic capital goods 
industries. However, this barrier to entry is likely to vanish as the 
sea-bed industry matures. Mueller and Tilton maintain that R&D costs 
become entry barriers during the earlier stages of the product cycle. At 
these stages, the large firms which are already in that industry have 
large industrial research laboratories that give them a competitive edge. 
Semiconductors and photocopying industries are the evidence of this claim 
where largeness, either in relative or in absolute terms, is required for 
invention (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982).
6) Another relevant observation in industrial organization which 
seems to be prevailing in the sea-bed industry is the Importance of 
diversification in industries. In the petroleum industry, for example, all 
entities are extensively tied together through joint ventures or similar 
kinds of intercorporate interlocks. Mayer (1974) refers to this group of 
firms as "energy companies". He believes that interfuel diversification of 
the energy companies will decrease the degree of competitiveness by 
controlling the output of the substitute products. Substantial investments 
of the petroleum industry in the coal industry increases the market power 
of the diversified firms. Looking at the list of deep-sea mining 
consortia, various types of integrations can be observed.
7) LOST is viewed by the industrialized countries as an entry 
barrier to the industry. Provisions such as technology transfer and 
production control will discourage the firms from entering the industry. 
The semi-cartel behavior of the sea-bed mining, under LOST, will benefit 
the firms which can enter the industry because they will be able to collect 
rent from the high prices supported by the ISA. One may argue, on the 
other hand, that other provisions of the LOST which enable the enterprise
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and the firms from the developing countries that would not otherwise be 
able to enter the industry, to exploit ocean resources along with the 
consortia. However, because of the technological and financial dependency 
of these entitles, they cannot enter the industry unless the consortia of 
the developed countries show interest in sea-bed mining under the LOST.
8) Finally, large firms are usually more capable of influencing 
their respective governments. The political clout enjoyed by large firms 
would be particularly necessary in the event of a conflict with the United 
Nations or other countries interested in exploitation of the sea-bed. 
Thus, lack of political clout, everything else the same, can discourage 
smaller firms to engage in a business that may involve legal battles at the 
international level.
Sea-Bed Mining Impact
Most of the entry barriers discussed will exist regardless of the 
management regime applied to manganese nodules. To estimate the market 
share of sea-bed mining, demand for nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese 
with two alternative growth rates is forecasted (Table 9-4). The low 
growth rate of 3 percent is chosen because it is the minimum growth rate 
considered in the LOST for the calculation of the production ceiling. This 
growth rate also represents a more pessimistic expectation of the world 
economy in the future. So, chosing the 3 percent growth rate as the lower 
limit of expectations will make the comparison between the two regimes 
feasible. The upper limit for the growth rate of demand is assumed to be 
at 5 percent. This rate represents a rather optimistic view of the world 
economy in the future which is not much higher than the actual growth rate 
of the metals in the past two decades. The base year for the forecast is 
1981 when the statistics for the production of all of the four metals are
TABLE 9-4
Forecasted World Demand for Nickel, Copper, Cobalt and Manganese with Alternative Growth Rates
(Thousands of short tons)
Metals
With 3% Growth Rate With 57 Growth Rate
19 90 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Nickel 1000 1160 1340 1550 1800 2080 1190 1520 1940 2470 3150 4020
Copper 10490 12150 14100 16330 18920 21940 12470 15900 20300 25900 33100 42200
Cobalt 43 49.6 57.2 66.2 76.7 88.7 51 65 82.7 105.3 134.3 171.2
Manganese 12360 14330 16600 19250 22310 25870 14420 18400 23480 29960 38230 48800
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available. The forecast is extended to the year 2015. Since the LOST 
provisions on the extraction of the nodules concentrates on a twenty-five 
year interim period, which starts five years prior to the start of 
commercial production and continues for twenty years thereafter, the same 
time interval is chosen for this study. Given that most experts predict 
that sea-bed mining begins in 1995, demand forecast is extended to the year 
2015. Also, production figures, instead of demand figures, are used for 
the estimation assuming that the world Inventories of the metals remain 
unchanged during the study period.
Using the demand forecast for the interim period, the market share of 
sea-bed mining under the two alternative management regimes is shown in Tables 
9-5 and 9-6. If a free-access management regime is applied to govern the use 
of the sea-bed nodules, six operations are assumed to begin commercial pro­
duction in 1995. This assumption is based on the fact that six consortia are 
presently active in exploring the available mine sites and in pilot studies 
testing technological feasibility of ocean mining. These consortia are the 
most likely candidates to start the commercial production in 1995. During the 
next twenty years from the start of the commercial production, sea-bed mining 
is assumed to absorb the whole growth part of the demand. This is a reasonable 
assumption because if the mining companies are allowed to make their investment 
decisions freely they would prefer to make their new investments in the nodule 
mining rather than in the terrestrial sources. This claim is based on Davis 
and Archer's reference to the cost comparisons between the two sources which 
indicates that new land-based mining of nickel costs more than twice that of 
sea-bed mining (in Larsen, 1982). In the free-access regime case, investment 
decisions are assumed to be made based on nickel production which is compatible 
with the case of LOST regime where production limits are imposed based on
TABLE 9-5
Market Share of Sea-Bed Mining Under a Free-Acceas Regime
With 3X Growth Rate With 51 Growth Sate
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Homber of 
Operations
Percentage of 
Market Share 
For:
Nickel
Copper
Cobalt
Manganese
18.4 
1.5
43.5 
29
18.4 
1.5
43.5 
29
10.8 17.5
25
2.2
58.7
38,6
35.5
2.7
82
54
25.2
44
3.4
102
67
14.5 
1
33
22.5
11.4
21
1.6
49.6
33.4
26
38.5
2.9
88.8
59.7
44.6
52
4
119.5
78
68.4
62
4.8
143.8
96.5
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nickel. This is also a reasonable assumption because nickel is regarded as a 
more valuable metal in comparison with the three other metals for the 
land-based producers and some of the other metals are regarded as a by-product 
of nickel. The sea-bed production of the three other metals is derived 
according to the production capacity ratios of 35.5, 29.7, 3.6, and 688.5 
thousand of short tons for nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese respectively.
In the free-access regime, manganese nodule mining begins with 6 oper­
ations in 1995. Assuming a 3 percent growth rate, the number of operations is 
kept constant for the next five years because of insufficiency of growth in 
demand to justify more investment projects. However, the number of opera­
tions by 2005 increases to 10.8; and, by 2025 more than twenty-five opera­
tions can be expected. The strongest impact of sea-bed mining will be on 
the cobalt market where 43.5 percent of the demand will be satisfied by the 
sea-bed sources in 1995; and, by 2015 sea-bed mining becomes the sole source 
of supply of cobalt. Manganese market will have the second strongest impact 
with the market share of sea-bed mining in 2015. The weakest impact will be 
on the copper market because of the difference between the ratio of the con­
stituent metals in the nodules and the ratio of the world demand for the 
metals (for calculations see Appendix A).
If the assumed growth rate of demand increases to 5 percent, the 
number of operations can rise from the initial of 6 in 1995 to 11.4 in 2000.
The number of operations in the deep-sea continues to increase till 2015 
when it reaches 68.4. The assumption of a higher growth rate of demand does 
not change the'relative impact of the sea-bed mining on the market structure 
of the land-based mining. The cobalt market remains the most affected 
market, and the least influenced one will be the copper market. However, 
high growth rate for demand improves the market share of sea-bed mining for
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each individual metal because of the assumption that sea-bed mining absorbs 
the growth part of the demand. By 2015, all of the cobalt, nearly all of 
the manganese, 62 percent of nickel, and only 4,8 percent of copper will be 
supplied by the sea-bed sources.
According to the LOST, an overall production ceiling is to be imposed 
on sea-bed mining. The number of operation permits given each year depends 
on the moving average growth rate of the consumption of nickel in the most 
recent fifteen years for which such data exist. A trend line is to be drawn 
to forecast the value of the consumption of the years for which statistics 
are not available at the time, such as the year that the production author­
ization is given. For the purpose of estimating the future consumption, a 
minimum growth rate of 3 percent is assumed if the moving average growth 
rate is less than 3 percent for any particular year. A logarithmic regres­
sion model for the period of 1968-1982 was tested. The estimated growth 
rate was 9%, but it was unreliable mainly due to the lack of sufflcent 
numbers of observations (Appendix B). No quarterly data for the world con­
sumption or production of nickel is avaiable at this time. Should the ISA 
insist on using its econometric model, quarterly data needs to be gathered 
soon.
Given the problems with the logarithmic regression model, demand 
forecasts of Table 9-4 with the two alternative growth rates of 3 percent 
and 5 percent are used to compute production limits. Then, LOST provisions 
are followed to calculate production limits as: sixty percent of the growth
in consumption of nickel between the year production limit is applied for 
and the year prior to the beginning of the commerical production of the 
nodules. Accordingly, the following relationship was applied:
Pt * -6<Ct - °T-1>
TABLE 9-6
Market Share of Sea-Bed Mining Under LOST Regime
1995
Number of
Operations .58
Percentage of 
Market Share 
For:
Nickel 1.7
Copper 0.1
Cobalt 4.2
Manganese 2.8
With 32 Growth Rate
2000_________ 2005 2010
3.6 7.2 11.3
9.6 16.5 22.4
0.8 1.3 1.8
22.6 39 53
15 25.8 35
   With ;
2015 1995 2000
16 1.2 8.3
27.5 2.8 15.1
3.7 0.2 1.2
65 6.7 36
67.4 4.5 24.4
Growth Rate_________________
2005______ 2010______ 2015
17.2 28.7 43.5
24.8 32.4 38.4
2 3 3
59 77 92
40 52 61
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where P® is the production ceiling for total sea-bed mining of nickel at 
time t, Ct is the estimated world consumption of nickel at time t, and 
is the world nickel consumption for the first year of commercial production. 
It is assumed that commercial production begins in 1995.
Table 9-6 shows the market structure impact of sea-bed mining under 
LOST (for calculations see Appendix C). With a 3 percent growth rate which
is the minimum assumed in the LOST, the number of operations increases from
.58 to 16 between 1995 and 2015. The year 2015 will be the end of the 
interim period if the commercial production begins in 1995 and the first 
permit is given in 1990. The market share of sea-bed mining under the 
LOST is insignificant during the early stages of commercial production.
By the year 2015 the market share of sea-bed mining increases to 27.5,
3.7, 65, and 67.4 percents for nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese, 
respectively, if a 3 percent rate of growth is assumed. At this time 16 
mining operations will be authorized. Assuming a 5 percent growth rate, 
the number of sea-bed mining operation permits will increase to 43.5 by 
2015, and the market share of nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese will 
increase to 38.4, 3, 92, and 61 percents, respectively.
Given the assumptions under which two regimes are investigated, the 
following implications can be made:
1) the share of sea-bed mining is sensitive to the rate of growth 
of demand for nickel in both regimes;
2) the degree of sensitivity is higher for the free-access regime 
case than the LOST;
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3) the number of operations and output level for sea-bed mining 
is more limited with the LOST, controlling the negative impact 
on the land-based producers;
4) in both regimes, the relative significance of the impact of 
sea-bed mining on the market share of the land-based producers 
of each metal will be the same.
Under either of the two management regimes the cobalt market will 
be strongly affected where Zaire is the major producer of the metal with 
50-60 percent of the world output. Losses of Zaire due to the decline of 
its market share and price of cobalt will be less severe if LOST governs 
the use of the nodules. The market share of the land-based miners of 
manganese also will diminish, but not as much as the cobalt at the earlier 
stages of sea-bed mining. The oligopolistic power of the land-based pro­
ducers in the manganese market will dissipate in time. Canada is going to 
lose its domination in the nickel market. But, land-based copper pro­
ducers will not be threatened by sea-bed mining. Therefore, the potential 
danger of cartelization by CIPEC will remain in this market. The market 
structure impact of the nodule mining will be less for all metals under 
the LOST because of its production ceilings. Especially under the 
free-access regime there will be a general shift of producers of the 
metals from the developing countries to the consuming developed countries 
alleviating their import dependency. If the LOST is applied, however, 
this transition will not be as strong because the Enterprise will have the 
authorization for two mining operations during the interim period. Also, 
developing countries, individually or combined, can engage in the produc­
tion of the metals from the sea-bed nodules with the assistance of the 
consortia from the developed countries.
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Since the production limits imposed by the LOST are implemented 
through the control of the number of production authorizations, and it is 
designed such that it will increase steadily in time, the argument of 
production inefficiency cannot be strongly made against LOST regime. But, 
allocative efficiency will remain a major source of criticism for the LOST 
which limits the production of the metals and prevents a decline in prices 
that would otherwise occur. In this regard, it can be argued that a 
system of profit tax or sales tax will be more efficient because it will 
not influence the output decision of the firms. If the LOST is not 
successful in absorbing the excess profit made by the producers of the 
metals due to production controls, the large multinational corporations 
will primarily benefit from the production controls along with the 
existing land-based producers. Consumers of the metals will be the losers 
in this regime. Finally, if sea-bed mining begins at all under this 
regime, a positive arguement can be made for LOST in regard to its impact 
on the degree of market concentration. According to the LOST, each 
consortium is limited to only one mining operation authorization. But, 
with the free-access regime, the six consortia which already have the 
technology of production are likely to maintain their edge and if there is 
any expansion in the sea-bed mining operations it is likely to be under­
taken by the same companies. This argument seems to be stronger if one 
refers to Laursen's citation of an industry source that the unit cost of 
processing will be lower if two or more of mining projects are using the 
same processing plants (Laursen, 1982). Where the major cost of 
production of the metals from manganese nodules is in processing, further 
economies of scale in processing will become another entry barrier 
limiting the degree of market concentration. Producers of the secondary
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sources of the metals, especially cobalt and nickel, will
have to limit their production because of the sea-bed mining and the 
consequent decline in prices of the metals. This impact will also be 
weaker under the LOST regime.
CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSION
In the last two decades, technological and financial changes In the 
extraction of manganese nodules from the deep-seabed have stimulated 
interests in the future exploitation of sea bed resources. Most experts 
believe that the deep-sea bed nodules will be commercially exploitable by 
1995. Some observers even maintain that capital investment in land-based 
mining is higher than seabed mining at this time. The world is facing two 
major alternative management regimes to govern the exploitation of the 
resources of the seabed. The LOST offers a parallel system of exploita­
tion by the consortia subject to specific regulations, and by the 
Enterprise. The national legislations of the host countries of the 
extracting companies such as the U.S., West Germany, and the United 
Kingdom present an alternative free-access regime. Today, the dispute is 
not so much whether mining should be regulated. The disagreement is 
really on the type of rules, on the institutions making the rules, on the 
supervision of the rules, and on the allocation of the benefits derived 
from the nodule mining.
Analysis of the impact of manganese nodule exploitation on the 
producers and consumers of the constituent metals is essential in judging 
the management regime. The impact of seabed production on nickel, cobalt, 
copper, and manganese will vary under each management regime. This is due 
to the disparity between the ratio of constituent metals in the nodules 
and the ratio of world demand for each of them, as well as to the
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differences in the relative price per unit weight of metals. Given that 
there are many different grades of nodules available, the extent of the 
disparity itself also depends on the type of nodules mined.
The following were assumed in the study of the market structure 
impact of sea-bed mining:
1) sea-bed mining will begin in 1995,
2) the study is limited to 1995-2015 period which is the interim period 
in the LOST,
3) nickel is the main product that influences the output decisions of the 
firms under both regimes; other metals are treated as by-products,
4) future consumption of world nickel may grow with two alternative 
growth rates of 3% and 5%,
5) under free-access regime, the six consortia which were actively 
Interested in sea-bed mining in the last decade will begin commercial 
production in 1995 and will continue to absorb only the growth part of 
world demand, and
6) under the LOST, sea-bed mining share will be limited by the production 
control provisions in the LOST.
Under a free-access regime, the strongest impact of deep-seabed 
mining will be on the cobalt market. Zaire, the major producer of cobalt 
in the world and the major supplier of cobalt to the western countries, 
will be the primary loser in this market. The two other major producers 
of cobalt after Zaire, the Soviet Union and Cuba, are not active in the 
international trade of cobalt. Assuming that only the six consortia which 
are actively preparing themselves for nodule mining will actually extract 
the resources by the year 2000, with a 3% growth rate of demand for 
cobalt, about 43% of the world cobalt demand can be satisfied by seabed
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mining. This is due to the high percentage of cobalt in nodules relative 
to its consumption. A substantial reduction in the price of cobalt can be 
anticipated as a result of the nodule mining. The price reduction will 
primarily harm Zaire which is heavily dependent upon its exports of 
cobalt. Zaire’s revenues from exports of cobalt will diminish even more 
considering the drop in the market share of Zaire to 282. Obviously, 
Zaire will lose its long-time domination in the international trade with 
the western countries. The major importers of cobalt, the United States, 
Japan, United Kingdom, and West Germany will gain from the nodule mining.
Nickel, which is an important metal for steel alloys, will also be 
affected rather strongly by the ocean mining. With a 3% growth rate for 
nickel demand, about 192 of the world demand will be supplied by the 
seabed sources in 2000. The quasi-monopolistlc power of Canada in this 
market will diminish greatly. No significant change in the price of 
nickel can be expected because of the lower degree of Interference by the 
seabed producers in this market as well as the possible substitution of 
cobalt for nickel. The industrialized countries importing nickel, such as 
the United States, Japan, and Western European countries will gain from 
the production of nickel from seabed sources.
The Soviet Union and South Africa currently produce more than 602 
of the world supply of manganese, a metal also essential in steel 
production. Evidence suggests that the manganese market is oligopolistic. 
Seabed mining is likely to satisfy about 29% of the total manganese 
demanded in the year 2000, with the demand growing at 3% annually. World 
supplies of manganese from land-based sources are believed to be abundant. 
However, since the possibility of finding substitutes for manganese is 
extremely limited and manganese is an essential input technical products
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with a relatively inelastic demand, it is considered a sensitive problem. 
Although the percentage share of the seabed production in 2000 is not 
large, seabed nodules add substantially to the potential reserves of 
manganese in the world. Technical difficulties and the high cost of 
refining seabed manganese in comparison with the land-based sources have 
created uncertainties for the companies to consider extraction of 
manganese from the ocean. However, considering the expected increase in 
the cost of land-based mining of manganese in the future and a subsequent 
price increase, the recovery of manganese may become more promising for 
the consortia. Again, the United States, Japan, and other industrialized 
market economy countries as the major importers of manganese will gain
from the higher output and lower price of manganese in the future. The
copper inflow from the seabed sources will meet only 1.5% of the world 
demand in 2000, assuming a 3% growth rate for demand. Therefore, the 
future nodule mining is expected to have very little impact on the world 
market for copper. The U.S. is both one of the leading producers and 
consumers of copper in the world. While the threat of cartelization by 
CXPEC exists, the copper market is competitive at this time and is likely 
to remain so in the future.
Under the LOST, production limits are imposed based on the growth 
in demand for nickel. Because of this basis, the greater the growth rate 
of demand for nickel in the future the larger the market share of seabed 
mining will be. With a 3% growth rate for demand, 3-4 operations by the 
consortia and two operations by the Enterprise can exist by the year 2000. 
The number of operations increases to 8-9 by the consortia if the rate of 
growth is 5% annually. The production ceilings of the ISA is not
significantly limiting the number of seabed mining operations to less than
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it would be under a free-access regime. It is likely, however, that the 
firms operate at less than full capacity or optimum output level when the 
ISA limits their output as the demand for the metals fluctuates In the 
future. But, operating at less than full capacity is not unusual for the 
mining companies during slack periods. Therefore, the LOST does not seem 
to be so much crlticizable for its allocative inefficiencies because of 
the production ceilings as it has been suggested by many experts.
Using either of the two management regimes the degree of concen­
tration in the markets will decrease but not significantly in most cases. 
If a free-access regime is adopted there will be some barriers to entry, 
limiting the number of firms in the Industry. If LOST is adopted, the 
number of firms will be controlled by the ISA. Degree of competition will 
not change drastically especially In the markets which are already 
competitive like manganese. The following needs to be considered in the 
evaluation of the management regime:
1) For both regimes, more so in some free-access cases, there will 
be a fall in the prices of nickel, copper, and especially cobalt; or at 
least seabed mining prevents a price rise that would occur otherwise. 
This price effect will transfer income from the owners of the competing 
land-based producers of these metals and their host governments to the 
consumers of the metals. At present, land-based production is concen­
trated among a few developed and developing countries, while the developed 
countries are the major consumers of the metals. Therefore, under a free- 
access regime, in the absence of a redistribution scheme, the developed 
countries will use the common property resources, or the "common heritage 
of mankind", to have an Income redistribution in their favor. Presently, 
the domestic legislation of some of the developed countries, such as the
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United States, have no clauses regarding income redistribution. Besides, 
the level of taxes levied on the mining companies by the domestic legis­
lations is not as high as the ones imposed by the ISA. However, other 
studies have demonstrated that the developing countries will not benefit 
much on the balance from seabed mining even if all rents or taxes are 
collected by the ISA and distributed among them.
2) The objective of creating a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) will only be served through the Law of the Sea Treaty regime. The 
NIEO is an attempt to close the gap between the developed and developing 
countries by undertaking measures such as transfer of technology, or 
direct participation of the developing countries in the exploitation of 
the nodules. Of course, technology transfer as a means to achieve this 
objective has been criticized for: a) the technology of the nodules 
mining is capital-intensive, while the developing countries economies are 
characterized by cheap and abundant labor; b) there Is lack of backward 
and forward linkage In the use of the seabed mining technology in the 
developing countries; c) It is argued that the technology of seabed 
mining Is unrelated to the economy of the developing countries; and 
finally, d) the companies from the developed countries who are currently 
possessing the technology may never agree to a rather mandatory technology 
transfer of the ISA even if It Is supposed to be paid for at a "fair 
price".
3) If the consortia of the developed countries do not respond 
favorably to the LOST, sea-bed mining may never start. This fact alone 
can be regarded as a serious entry barrier. However, if at least one 
consortia accepts to operate under the LOST, the semi-cartel behavior of 
the ISA, which is apparent in its production control and price stability
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policies, will result in extraction of economic rent by all entities 
active in sea-bed mining.
4) A free-access regime serves the purpose of import independency 
of the developed countries much better than the LOST does.
5) The United States and some of the other industrialized 
countries resent the LOST because of the fear of creating a precedent in 
the international relations such that the developed countries will not 
have a veto power. According to the structure of the institutions of the 
ISA, developed countries, especially the U.S., will not play a decisive 
role in the decision making units of the ISA. This is why the U.S. 
officials, for example, perceive the LOST as an opportunity for the Third 
World countries to be in a position to tax and to regulate the "haves" to 
benefit the "have-nots".
6) The LOST contains necessary provisions to preserve and protect 
the marine environment; but, protection of marine environment is not taken 
too seriously in the national legislations yet. Actually, experts have 
criticized both the mining companies and the developing countries for 
their lack of attention to establishing a framework to deal with the 
adverse environmental impacts of ocean mining.
7) The cost of implementing the LOST as a management regime is 
much higher than the cost of a free-access regime. But, the cost dif­
ferences should be discounted considering the need for an institutional 
framework to harmonize the national legislations of different countries 
and to settle the disputes among nations in regard to the rights of their 
corporate entities to the ocean resources.
To sum up, the role of an international agency or national govern­
ments in the management of the seabed resources is bound to Increase in
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the future. What is at dispute today is the form of government 
intervention that should take place. In the allocation of the offshore oil 
and gas rights within the territorial waters of the states, various 
management regimes have been implemented by different countries. For 
example, to protect the public interest, a more direct government 
participation regime has been introduced in countries such as the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. To maintain a flexible and efficient 
management regime, on the other hand, a competitive allocation of property 
rights under government supervision is used in countries such as the U.S. 
While the use of either a state property right regime or a private 
property right regime is practically feasible, there are always trade-offs 
in the use of each method. In the deep-seabed mining, due to the existence 
of the entry barriers, efficiency losses do not appear to be a major 
disadvantage of the LOST regime. The ISA does not impose limits that are 
greatly different from the limits Imposed by the non-legal entry barriers 
to the seabed mining of manganese nodules under a free-access regime. 
However, it Is likely that as long as the consortia of the developed 
countries do not consent to the LOST provisions or be willing to operate 
under the legal uncertainty of the free-access regime, the mining of the 
nodules from the deep ocean will be postponed indefinitely.
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APPENDIX A
In Table 9-5, the figures for the number of operations are 
calculated according to the production capacities of 35.5 thousand 
short-tons of nickel, 29.7 thousand short-tons of copper, 3.6 thousand 
short-tons of cobalt, and 688.5 thousand short-tons of manganese. For 
example, six sea-bed mining operations in 1995 will produce the following: 
6(35.5) « 213 Nickel
6(29.7) = 178.2 Copper
6(3.6) = 21.6 Cobalt
6(688.5) - 4131 Manganese
Then, these figures are used to calculate the market share of sea-bed 
mining by dividing the total sea-bed mining output for each year by the 
forcasted world demand for each of the four metals (Table 9-4) for the same 
year. The sea-bed mining market share in 1995 is estimated as follows:
213 + 1160 = .1836
178.2 * 12150 = .0147 
21.6 * 49.6 » .435 
4131 * 14330 = .288 
Thus, according to these figures, sea-bed mining, under a free-access 
regime will have approximately 18.4, 1.5, 43.5, and 29 percent of nickel, 
copper, cobalt, and manganese market shares in 1995, respectively.
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APPENDIX B
A logarithmic linear regression model, according to the LOST, was 
applied for the period between 1978 and 1982 as follows:
Ct = atb
logCt = logo + b logt 
where Ct is the world nickel consumption for each year, o is the intercept, 
and b is the rate of growth. Then, the results were:
Regression
Coefficient
Standard Scaled T
Error Coefficient Value
Intercept 2.8
log time 0.092
Multiple R2 = 0.24 
F ratio ~ 4.226
0.039
0.044 2.67
71.9
2.06
Thousands 
of Short 
Tons
1000
900
800
700
600
500
68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82
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APPENDIX C
In the estimation of the production ceilings of Table 9-6, 
production figures instead of consumption figures are used under the 
assumption that producer and consumer inventories are not changing or their 
net change is zero. Consumer Inventories include the National Defense 
Stockpiles. Since there is no distinction between the consumption of 
primary or secondary sources of nickel in the LOST production limit 
provisions, production and consumption of secondary sources are ignored. 
Then, using nickel demand forecasts of Table 9-4, production ceilings are 
calculated. For example, production ceilings for the first year of 
commercial production, assuming a 5 percent rate of growth, is computed as 
follows:
P1995 = *6 (C1995 “ C1994?
P1995 = *6(1520 - 1450) = 42 Nickel - thousands of short-tons
The number of operations is estimated based on the nickel capacity 
of sea-bed mining operation. Thus, if the production ceiling is 42 
thousand short-tons, the number of operations will be:
42 + 35.5 = 1.18 or 1.2 
Market share of sea-bed mining in the nickel industry is found by dividing 
the nickel world demand in 1995 by the sea-bed mining nickel production in 
that year:
1515 * 42 = 2.77 percent 
Market share of sea-bed mining in the copper, cobalt, and manganese 
industris are calculated by multiplying the number of sea-bed mining
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operations by the production capacities of 29.7, 3.6, and 688.5 thousand of 
short-tons, respectively:
1.2 X 29,7 - 35.64 Copper - thousands of short-tons
1.2 X 3.6 = 4.32 Cobalt - thousands of short-tons
1.2 X 688.5 = 826.2 Manganese - thousands of short-tons
These results are divided by the demand forecasts for 1995:
35.64 15900 = 2.2 percent
4.32 65 = 6.65 percent
826.2 t 18400 = 4.5 percent
Therefore, in 1995, sea-bed mining of manganese nodules, assuming a 5 
percent growth rate of demand, will have approximately 2.8, 0.2, 6.7, and 
4.5 percent of the market share of nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese 
industries, respectively.
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